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The pricing of audit services is a complex function of many variables. Prior research has 
proposed various approaches and models to identify some of these factors. This paper 
provides a description of one such model. Studies based on this model, or modifications 
of it, have been performed in Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. This 
thesis reports the findings of a similar study of 104 companies over the period 1991-
1992 conducted in South Africa .. 
The analysis indicates that there is an approximately linear relationship between audit fee 
and a company's total assets or sales. In addition, management advisory services, number 
of reports in addition to those required by the Companies' Act, the level of inventory and. 
debtors in relation to total assets and audit delay, are significant determinants of audit 
fees. Unlike overseas studies, audit firm size, auditor specialisation, the number of 
consolidated subsidiaries and audit risk as measured by gearing, liquidity and profitability 
do not affect the level of audit fees. 
Whilst the influence of auditee size and complexity have been found to be the most 
consistent predictors of audit fees, there is an apparent lack of consistency in other 
variables. These findings are largely consistent with international research and indicate a 
growing influence of the internationalisation of auditing practice. 
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AUDITING AND 
THE ROLE OF AUDITING RESEARCH 
" To adapt effectively, a profession must periodically evaluate how it might best fulfill its 
social role in the light of current and anticipated development in the environment. This 
evaluation process should involve. a deliberate, critical analysis of potential problems and 
opportunities faced by the profession. Without such study, many problems will go 
unidentified until the opportunity for their timely solution has passed, and all that remains 
is to deal with their undesired consequences. Likewise, opportunities to improve quality of 
service may be unnecessarily delayed or missed altgether~" 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co [1976, p.1]: "Research Opportnities in Auditing" 
xi 
1.1 Introduction 
Irrespective of size arid structure of ownership South African companies (private or 
public) are required by law to appoint external auditors who report to the 
shareholders in the annual financial statements by means of an auditor's report. 
The auditor has to be remunerated accordingly for services rendered. In effect the 
audit fee is unavoidable and "obligatory" [Gloeck and De Jager, 1993, p.vii]. It is 
therefore the quantum of the audit fee that may differ between different companies. 
General concern has also. been expressed about the pricing, type and quality of 
such services and the general market structure in which the services are performed 
[Pound and Francis, 1981, p.353]. At the same time, SAICA's Fee Dispute Panel 
has been receiving an increasing number of queries from clients about fees charged 
by chartered accountants [Accountancy SA November/December 1994, p.43]. The 
fee disputes appear to arise from both a lack of communication regarding the 
progress and complexity of the work in hand [Dijkman, 1994]. In spite of these 
observations, there is no South African study that satisfactorily explains why there 
are differences in audit fees of listed companies. 
Financial analysts make frequent references to the fact that some listed companies 
are reporting an increase in audit fees whilst others report static or declining 
amounts [e.g. Finance Week Top Companies Survey, 1993, p.170; 1994, p.212]. 
There is no plausible explanation given for the observed variances but only 
reference to possible reasons supported by anecdotal evidence. Therefore, these 
reasons cannot, in earnest, be extended to the rest of the companies listed on the 
JSE. The absence of empirical data to justify these differences makes this a useful 
area of research. These comments appear to be more than passing comments. They 
indicate a growing curiosity on the determination of audit fees. One may even 
construe them as an indication of the growing scrutiny of the auditing profession. 
Audit fees being a price for services rendered, are determined within a particular 
regulatory and market framework. Since the late 1980s the market for audit services 
has been dominated by six large auditing firms. In the US the Metcalf Study 
charged that the audit services market was "increasingly uncompetitive"[Buckley 
and O'Sullivan, 1980, p.37]. The commission charged that the largest accounting 
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firms dominated the audit services market in the US and possibly the whole world as 
well [Dopuch and Simunic, 1980]. In contrast, the Cohen Commission found that 
competition was "excessive "[AICPA, 1978, p.106], and Bernstein [1978, p.89] 
observed a "steady and fierce competitive struggle." It is not particularly clear if 
this domination and state of competitiveness in the market has had an impact on the 
pricing of audit services. If the market is dominated by a few suppliers, it is of 
particular interest to find out if the fees charged by the providers of such services 
are related to whether the firm providing the service is a large supplier or not. 
Although there are sound theoretical reasons for differential pricing strategies, 
available empirical evidence is inconclusive [Francis and Simon, 1987]. The major 
competing explanations seem to centre around the extent of competition in the 
audit services market, the existence of product differentiation and potential 
economies of scale to large audit firms [Francis, 1984]. The reasons for such 
differences between similar clients should be established and corroborated by 
empirical evidence. 
This dissertation will attempt to identify the factors that explain the differences in 
audit fees of listed companies and shed some light on whether audit firm size is a 
major influence on audit fees. There is evidence mainly from developed countries, 
Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Singapore, UK and the US. 
Developing countries studied thus far include India and Malaysia. Because of the 
internationalisation of economies and accounting, it of interest to compare evidence 
from these countries with that of South Africa. 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
The absence of plausible explanations of differences in audit fees between different 
listed companies, invites research into developing a model that will explain and/or 
predict audit fees for listed companies taking into account company- and audit 
firm-specific variables. Extensive research has been done in overseas countries 
whilst there is no record of such research in South Africa. 
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1.3 Objectives 
The objective of the study is to provide South African evidence of factors 
determining audit fees. Specifically, this will investigate the relationship between 
audit fees and: 
1. Company-specific variables such as size, risk, ownership control, . 
profitability, number of reports, audit opinion, location and complexity 
factors. Measures of si~e include assets, net income and revenues. The 
complexity variables include the number of consolidated subsidiaries, 
inventory and accounts receivables; 
2. ·Type of audit firm, with an emphasis on the size of the audit firm; 
classified by affiliation to its international network of accounting firms; 
3. Management advisory services; 
4. Change in auditors. 
These objectives will be achieved by developing a positive model for the 
determination of audit fees and testing the sign~ficance of the variables in the 
model. A model for testing .for the influence of audit-firm size developed by 
Simunic [1980], will be used to evaluate and interpret the effect of audit-firm size 
and to estimate the premium (in percentage terms) charged by the larger audit 
firms, if there is one. 
1.4 Scope 
The study will focus entirely on listed companies as there is sufficient data to carry 
out such an analysis. Therefore, it excludes a significant proportion of unlisted 
organisations such as municipal authorities, parastatal bodies such as the Electricity 
Supply Commission (ESKOM), South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), 
Transnet, insurance firms such as The Old Mutual and Sanlam, the oil companies, 
excluding Engen and Sasol which are listed on the JSE, agricultural co-operatives, 
government boards and educational institutions such as universities and technikons. 
As a result, the findings can only be applicable to listed companies. 
Audit fees for the financial years ending 1991 and 1992 will be examined. It 
should be noted that the data for audit fees will be based on declarations by the 
companies and is therefore subject to the accuracy of such reporting. 
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1.5 Contributions ofthis study 
This study aims to contribute to the international body of research into the 
determinants of audit fees with the presentation of South African data. It 
contributes insight into the nature of and the market for audit services by 
enhancing the understanding of the auditing environment in non-Anglo-American 
nations. Being exploratory in nature, it also lays the ground work for research into 
audit fees and practice in South Africa. 
Secondly, and probably more important, is that a model which explains audit fees 
can be of practical use because a demonstration of a relationship between audit fees 
and measures of transactions, assets, and liabilities may indicate areas where major 
audit effort is being expended. This may signal those accounting subsystems where 
improvements in internal control could be more profitably effected, and where 
accounting systems redesign would be of the greatest benefit [Taylor and Baker, 
1981]. In effect, management can use the regression equation to judge the 
reasonableness and fairness of their company's audit fee [Taylor' and Baker, 1981; 
Wallace, 1984a; Gist, 1992]. Further, some of the variables need to be monitored 
and controlled by the manager for far more important reasons than minimising 
audit costs [Gist, 1992]. 
Thirdly, some light can be shed on the relationship between audit fees and 
management advisory services. This could demonstrate whether there is relationship 
between the two services and the possible implications of it. 
Lastly, an evaluation of the use of "lowballing" (setting audit fees below total 
current costs on initial audit engagements) in gaining new clients will be carried out 
to gauge the extent of the use of this practice. 
1.6 Chapter organisation and layout 
The remaining parts of this thesis will be organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 gives a background on the development of auditing, its nature, role and 
benefits. 
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Chapter 3 discusses the current state of the structure of the audit services market. A 
brief history of the development of the dominance of the six largest accounting 
firms is given. There is also a discussion of the diversification of the firms into 
management consulting and the subsequent controversy surrounding such moves. 
The emphasis here is on the reasons for the diversification and the impact on the 
audit activities. 
Chapter 4 is a detailed summary of t~e major findings of representative research 
work done elsewhere. The current status of research is given together with the 
unresolved issues which warrant further research. 
Chapter 5 lays out the theoretical framework underpinning the research. The 
variables expected to have an impact on audit fees are discussed together with the 
model for testing and evaluating the premium charged by big firms, if in fact it 
exists. 
Chapter 6 gives an overview of the methodology employed in the research, detailing 
sample selection procedures and statistical analysis to be employed in the 
manipulation of data. 
Chapter 7 is a presentation of the results of the. research, together with their analysis 
and interpretation. These results are compared to studies done elsewhere to show 
where and how this study fits in with international data. 
Chapter 8, the final chapter, presents a summary of the key findings of the research 
together with potential applications for the findings. An important aspect of this 
chapter are the suggestions for future research on the topic. 
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" The independent auditor is in the most general sense an accountant. He is trained as an 
accountant, his professional designation is certified public accountant, and his primary 
service - the audit function - has grown from a need to provide an accounting to others." 
AICPA [1978, p.3] 
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2.1 Introduction 
Before embarking on the major task of analysing audit fees, it is imperative to 
present a definition of auditing and an unde~standing of the origins of the role 
and the need for auditors today. This is presented to gain an understanding of 
the nature of the subject matter. The role of the auditor has evolved from its 
original form and today has adopted a slightly dif~erent meaning. The 
regulatory framework of auditing will is also discussed to provide greater 
familiarity with the practice of auditing. 
2.2 Auditing - a definition 
An audit is a logically planned process of evaluating evidence and information 
regarding business transactions, events and decisions for the purpose of forming 
and reporting an opinion on the financial statements [Taylor, Kritzinger and 
Puttick, 1992]. 
This definition emphasises the importance of planning, gathering and evaluating · 
evidence, and the formation of an opinion. In substance, the audit is concerned 
with the verification of the validity, accuracy and completeness of transactions 
with a view to giving an opinion. 
2.2.1 The need for an audit 
The need for an audit arises out of the existence of [Gloeck and De Jager, 1993, 
p.2]: 
• inherent potential conflict of interests; 
• the consequences of incorrect information; 
• complexity; and 
• isolation of users. 
The role of auditing cannot be looked at purely in legal terms but in the greater 
context of financial reporting. Financial reporting reduces the risks and 
uncertainties that investors and creditors must deal with by providing relevant 
and reliable information [SAICA, 1994a]. An audit adds to the reliability of 
7 
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2.2.3 Auditing as a profession 
The practice of auditing is seen more as a profession than a business driven 
solely by profit making. The characteristics of a profession are [PAAB, 1994, 
p.24]: 
• a service ideal; 
• a body of specialised knowledge acquired by a formal and 
structured education and training process; 
• autonomy for the practitioners in the performance of their work; 
and 
• public recognition of authority in relation to the discipline of the 
profession as a consequence of the ethical standards maintained 
by the profession. 
Lee [ 1991] adds to the above list: 
• social prestige through charters of incorporation; 
• independence from the client; 
• the use of rituals, symbols, and specialist languages; and 
• the power and authority to self regulate . 
World-wide, regulatory bodies in different countries have as one of their express 
mandates the preservation of auditing as a profession, with an emphasis on the 
public service ideal [Lee, 1991]. The discussion of the regulatory framework of 
auditing in South Africa set out below bears this out. 
In spite of the dominant view that auditing is a profession, some members of the 
profession in the US have expressed doubts whether auditing can still be seen as 
a profession. Mason [1994, p.34] observes that other disciplines like law and 
medicine are still referred to as professions whilst auditing is now seen as a 
"business". He warns that the pursuit of profitability and application of 
business principles in accountancy are inappropriately dominating and 
influencing the behaviour of accountants to the detriment of users of financial 
statements. Armstrong and Vincent [ 1988, p.96] concur : 
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" When the public sees increasing evidence of firms scrambling for 
market share, vying to be number one through merger, adding unusual 
lines of services, offering product sales and other financial services, is 
it any wonder that the public might believe that the profession's 
public-service ideal has been replaced by a businessman's approach?". 
These concerns, whilst valid, do not recognise that quality services can only be, 
in the long run; delivered within the context of a successful business operation 
that is effectively and efficiently managed [CPA Journal, August 1994]. Profit-
making per se does not go against professionalism, at least as defined above. 
· 2.3 The development of auditing 
Auditing existed as far back as the early thirteenth century, if not earlier. It 
gradually evolved into the type required by the first English Companies Act in 
1844 [Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; Swemmer, 1987a]. From AD 1400 to 1800 
the auditors' activities concentrated on government type audits, although 
considerable growth was also apparent in the private sector [Swemmer, 1987b]. 
The focus of the audit then was the discovery of fraud and the detection of 
accounting errors [Swemmer, 1987b]. 
In the nineteenth century, professional accountancy appeared [Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1983; Swemmer, 1987c]. At the same time, financial crises in 
Britain led to many bankruptcies, thereby creating demand for accounting 
services. Around 1844, the Companies Act was enacted in England which 
required the appointment of auditors "as a form of monitoring for the activities 
of the company directors" [Swemmer, 1987c, p.65]. 
In the 1860s and 1870s, the demand for audits in the UK increased because the 
complexity of the accounts, the legal liability of directors, and the size, number 
and complexity of corporations all increased [Watts and Zimmerman, 1983, 
p.630]. The changes in organisational forms spurred the evolution of auditing. 
Specifically, the nature of companies changed as the "separation of ownership 
from control produced a condition where the interests of the owner and the 
ultimate manager may and often do diverge ... " [Berle and Means (1952] as 
quoted by Demsetz (1983, p.375]]. The importance of monitoring management 
activities became even more important. 
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A further factor was the increased use of credit. Swemmer [1987c, p.65] 
comments: 
" Creditors concerned about the security of their investment and loans, 
demanded the satisfaction of an expert audit of the books and records of 
the enterprise." 
Watts and Zimmerman [1983, p.627], however, found no direct evidence that 
audits were used to monitor debt contracts up to the mid-nineteenth century. In 
spite of this, there is indirect evidence that suggests that accounts were made 
available to debt holders as the 1862 Companies Act required that a statement of 
mortgages be available to creditors [Watts and Zimmerman, 1983, p.628]. 
From the beginning of the twentieth century, America took over as leader in the 
accountancy profession due to the rapid industrialisation together with the 
introduction of personal and company taxation during this period [Swemmer, 
1987c]. The Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 required that 
henceforth companies wishing to offer shares for sale to the public, had to 
provide audited financial statements when making such offers [Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1983; Swemmer, 1987c; Wooton and Wolk, 1992]. 
During this period, the attitude .of the auditing profession changed; detection of 
fraud became secondary whilst ascertainment of the financial condition and 
earnings of the particular business undertaking under review became the 
primary objective of the audit [Swemmer, 1987c]. This was influenced by the 
increase in litigation against auditing firms involving fraud in audit clients. The 
role of the auditor has not changed drastically since then in terms of focus, but 
the scope has increased slightly. There appears to be a need to refer to an audit 
i 
that goes further than \the traditional financial attestation applied [Swemmer, 
1987c]. 
The above historical overview suggests that it is only in later years that auditing 
became enshrined in statute. Some contest this view of the development of 
auditing stating that: 
" Public accounting as it is known today was the direct result of 
legislation ..... Birth by legislation implies the possibility of death by 
legislation." 
Buckley and O'Sullivan [1980, p.45] 
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Watts and Zimmerman [ 1986] dispute the above statement citing market forces 
, 
as the driving force of the development of auditing rather than legislation. 
Evidence from Chow (1982] and Merino, Mayper and Spiram (1994] suggests 
that the emergence of the audit was not driven by .legislation but by need for 
monitoring. Both studies analysed the incentives of firms to hire external 
auditors in an era where there were no mandatory audits. Chow (1982] found 
that leverage and the number of accounting-based covenants influenced the 
demand for external audit services. Merino et al [1994] generally concur with 
Chow's findings although they also add new equity issues to Chow's list. 
Merino et al [1994, p.636] also argue that market forces on their own were 
insufficient to make audits effective monitoring devices. Nevertheless, market. 
forces were the dominant factor in the demand for auditing. In some countries, 
auditing practice basically outran legal minima [Hunt (1935] as quoted by Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1983 and Buckley and O'Sullivan, 1980]. In effect, the law has 
, merely translated the best of professional practice into statute [Buckley and 
O'Sullivan, 1980, p.45]. This does not mean that the law has no impact on 
auditing. The existence of legal recourse in conjunction with auditing reduce_s 
the proportion of fraudulent disclosures and leads to greater economic 
efficiency than when auditing exists without legal recourse [Mallin, 1992] . 
. 
One of the latest developments in auditing is the debate about the abolition of a 
mandatory audit for small companies. This has been debated quite extensively in 
the UK and Ireland with the result that small firms which are owner-managed 
will not be required to have a statutory audit but only a limited review. If the 
statutory audit is the sole result of legal prescription then the abolition of the 
small company audit should result in no small company requiring an audit. A 
recent survey of small companies in Ireland indicates that two thirds of them 
would still want to maintain the statutory audit [Certified Accountant, October 
1994, p.13]. Furthermore, the companies believed that the absence of an audit 
would have an adverse effect on another party, usually the bank. This lends 
some support to Watts and Zimmerman and others who see auditing as a 
monitoring mechanism. 
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2.4 The regulation of auditing in South Africa 
The PAAB (the Board) is the statutory body responsible for the regulation of the 
accountancy profession. Its basic purpose is " to protect the financial interests 
of the people of South Africa, and other stakeholders, through services rendered 
~ by registered accountants and auditors" [PAAB, 1991, pp.2-3]. The Board is 
responsible for [PAAB, 1991, pp.2-4]: 
• providing the means and regulatory framework for the education 
and training of adequate numbers of competent and disciplined 
accountants and auditors, to serve the needs of South Africa; 
• maintenance and improvement of standards of registered 
accountants and auditors; and 
• protecting and supporting registered ac.countants and auditors 
who carry out their duties competently, fearlessly and in good 
faith. 
The values of the Board are independence, integrity, professionalism and equal 
opportunity. To maintain these values amongst members, the Board issued 
Disciplinary Rules with the full backing of the Public Accountants and Auditors 
Act of 1951 [PAA Act]. SAICA has also issued a Code of Professional Conduct 
which is in all significant aspects identical to the Disciplinary Rules. Members 
who do not comply with the Rules and Code are subject to disciplinary action by 
the Board. Although the Act is a proclamation of parliament, this gives the 
profession some form of self regulation which is more preferable to the 
profession than government intervention. 
The right to audit annual financial statements of any entity is re(itricted by law to 
registered accountants and auditors. A registered accountant is a person who 
performs the functions of an accountant and auditor; and for that purpose holds 
himself out as an accountant and auditor and places his services at the disposal 
of the public for reward [PAA Act, sl]. In order to be registered with the PAAB 
as a registered accountant and auditor, the member must have a Certificate of 
Theory of Accounting, plus a pass in the qualifying examination of the Board, 
plus a minimum three years in the office of a practising accountant and auditor. 
After this they are allowed to use the initials CA (SA) (Chartered Accountant 
(South Africa)) behind their names. 
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This privilege is protected by the Chartered Accountants Designation (Private) 
Act 67 of 1993. The PAA Act provides for exemption from this requirement for 
members of a club, institution or association that is not carried on with a view to 
profit; provided that the auditor is given honorary status and not entitled to any 
remuneration [sl4(ii)]. The Minister of State, Administrator or Officer charged 
with administration of any law is permitted by the PAA Act to appoint or 
authorise or approve the appointment of a person not registered as an 
accountant and auditor i~ terms of the Act, as auditor to any entity regulated by 
that law [s14(iii)]. The term "auditor," as used in this thesis refers to a 
registered accountant and auditor as defined above. In summary, the function of 
the Board is similar to that of an occupational licensing authority. 
Auditors in South Africa are all presently Chartered Accountants by training and 
qualification and most are members of SAICA which has an estimated 14 036 
members [PAAB, 1994]. The PAAB has 4 196 registrants (registered 
accountants and auditors) and 5 722 trainee accountants (those who are in the 
process of being trained as prospective registered accountants and auditors). The 
standards of entrance into the profession are considered to be high, ranking 
equally with the best in the world [Sunday Times, 2110194; Mockler, 1994]. The 
Board together with SAICA place particular importance on the use of the 
designation CA(SA) as it is a mark of a certain standard of competence and for 
those in public practice, of independence, integrity and objectivity [Mockler, 
1994]. The designation is a brand name for competence and quality and a 
·proxy for auditor reputation which the professional societies guard heavily 
. [Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p.316]. 
The restriction of the use of CA(SA) brand name is similar to defending a 
professional monopoly and its success invariably rests on the appeals that public 
interest is best served by restricting the title of CA(SA) [Lee, 1991]. In order to 
maintain the quality of the service offered by auditors in the country, the Board 
recently instituted a practice review programme whereby each ~uditor will be 
subject to a compulsory review once every five years. The Board wants to ensure 
that all audits comply with GAAS. This is in addition to the internal quality 
control reviews that auditors are required to perform in house. Auditors are also 
required to engage.in a process of continually updating their skills and 
competencies in light of the changing business environment. In this regard, 
SAICA instituted voluntary continuing professional education (CPE). A recently 
issued discussion paper, Discussion Paper 13 : Compulsory Continuing 
Education [SAICA, 1994b], indicates a possible shift towards compulsory CPE. 
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This paper noted the findings of surveys of SAICA members which indicated a 
strong feeling for mandatory CPE for members in public practice (i.e. those 
performing the attest function). So, it is not only the Board which is concerned 
about maintaining standards, even amongst members of the profession, there is a 
strong ethos of preserving and improving high standards of professionalism. 
2.5 The value of audited financial statements 
In terms of the efficient market hypothesis, security prices reflect all presently 
available financial information [Watts and Zimmerman, 1986]. The theory states 
that security markets receive all publicly available information and process it 
instantaneously. Therefore, since financial statements are historically based, they 
contain no new information. If so, then what is the value of audited financial 
information? 
Audited financial statements provide a means of confirming or correcting the 
information received earlier by the market [AICPA, 1978]. Audited information 
then serves to assure market efficiency by "limiting the life of inaccurate 
information or by deterring its dissemination" [AICPA, 1978, p.6]. 
The need for an external auditor does not arise only in the case of large and 
complex organisations, or where the interests of outside non-executive 
shareholders have to be protected. There are inherent advantages in having 
financial statements audited even where there is no statutory requirement. Below 
are three such examples of the usefulness of audited financial statements cited by 
Woolf [1979, pp.11-12]: 
1. Applications to banks and other parties for finance are greatly 
enhanced if supported by audited accounts. 
2. Audited accounts submitted to the Receiver of Revenue carry greater 
authority than accounts which have not been audited. 
3. The presence of a qualified auditor is useful because of the variety of 
other capacities in which he is able to assist. He can assist with 
valuations, implementation of computer systems or even act as an 
arbitrator in the event of a dispute. 
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2.6 The qualities of an auditor 
The importance of the role of the auditor is underpinned by certain qualities 
which govern their conduct. These are integrity, objectivity and independence. 
Integrity requires "a member to be straightforward, honest and sincere in his 
approach to professional work" [ET 030, para .03]. Objectivity "requires a 
member to be fair and not to allow prejudice or bias to override his fairness" 
[ET 030, para .04]. The auditor should maintain an impartial attitude when 
reporting on financial statements. 
Independence is not formally defined in the Code of Professional Conduct. 
Simunic [1984, p.679] explains that "any situation which alters incentives that a 
self-interested auditor is more likely to ignore, conceal, or misrepresent his 
findings is described as decreasing the auditor's independence." He further 
explains that a· setting where an auditor must evaluate (trade off) the benefits and 
costs of truthful reporting can also be described as a conflict of interest situation. 
Situations that may give rise to conflict of interests are [ET 030]: 
• financial involvement with client; 
• involvement in the affairs of the client; 
• incompatible and inconsistent businesses; 
• family relations; 
• undue hospitality; 
• excessive borrowings. 
Mautz and Sharaf [ 1962, p.49] in their discussion of the philosophy of auditing 
state that: 
" Independence is of the essence in auditing. It follows ... that anything 
that tends to infringe upon independence must be viewed with serious 
" concern. 
Latter day writers and researchers still hold on to this view. For instance, Pany 
and Reckers [1988, p.32) describe independence as the "raison de etre" of 
auditing. 
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Most concerns about the functions of the auditor in recent years centre around 
the apparent erosion of perception of auditor independence. This is due to the 
fact that perceptions of auditor independence are important since perceptions, 
not reality, determine the credibility of the audit report [Shockley, 1981]. 
2.7 The Audit Process 
In performing the attest function, GAAS Statement AUOOJ [SAICA, 1993, para 
.12] requires the auditor to comply with GAAS. These standards are defined 
broadly under three headings set out in AUOJO [SAICA, 1986]: general 
standards, fieldwork and reporting. 
The general standards require that: 
• the audit be performed by or under the supervision of persons 
with sufficient training and proficiency; 
• the auditor maintains an independent attitude in all matters 
relating to· the assignment; and 
• due professional care be exercised during the examination and in 
the preparation of the audit report. 
The fieldwork standards dictate that: 
• the auditor should gather sufficient evidence to enable him to 
support the audit opinion; 
• all work be adequately planned and supervised; 
• the auditor obtains an understanding of the entity's accounting 
systems and internal controls to assess their adequacy as a basis 
for the preparation of financial statements. If the auditor intends 
relying on any internal controls he should study and evaluate 
those controls. 
In presenting _his report, the auditor should: 
• identify the addressee, the information to which it refers, and the 
purpose of the report; 
• convey the scope of the examination and limitations thereto; 
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• report the opinion regarding the financial information. 
These standards may be a form of defence for the auditor in the case of a 
malpractice suit. In evaluating the performance of the auditor's work, a court of 
law would examine compliance with GAAS in all material respects [SAICA, 
1986b]. The court in Re Kingston Cotton Mill CO (No 2)[(1896) 2 Ch 279 at 
288] have elaborated on the role of the auditor and in fact affirmed the general 
standards as follows: 
" It is the duty of the auditor to bring to bear on the work he has to 
perfonn that skill, care and caution which a reasonably competent, 
careful cautious auditor would use. What is reasonable skill, care and 
caution must depend on the particular circumstances of each case. An 
auditor is not bound to be a detective, or, as was said, to approach his 
work with suspicion or with a forgone conclusion that there is 
something wrong. He is a watchdog, but not a blood hound ... " 
The specific standards that deal with more of the procedural items in the course 
of the audit are given separately. In the final analysis, the auditor is required to 
assess the fairness of financial information presented in the financial statements. 
The auditor then has to plan his work in distinct stages from pre engagement 
activities to the reporting phase as recommended in AU015 [SAICA, 1987]. The 
components of the audit process are given in Appendix 1. Audit practice has 
modified the implementation process to suit different contexts. During the 
planning phase the auditor's focus is on identifying factors that affect the 
likelihood of misstatements. The general risks assessed are economic, financial, 
industry and competitive risks that face the client. These are assessed by 
obtaining an understanding of the client, evaluating significant current-year 
events and performing an analytical review of the company's results, ratios and 
other indicators of potential risks. 
After identifying the significant risk areas, the auditor has to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the entity's internal controls. An assessment of the controls that 
mitigate against the risks of misstatement in specific accounts, and which he 
intends to rely, is undertaken. On this basis the auditor will decide whether to 
rely on controls, or extend his tests of detail in the fieldwork stage. At the 
completion of the fieldwork, results have to be evaluated to arrive at an opinion 
to be communicated in the audit report. 
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2.8 Legal prescriptions 
S269 to S283 of the Companies Act deal with the appointment, removal, 
resignation. rights duties and remuneration of the auditor in companies. The 
legal relationships are depicted in graphical fonn below extracted from Woolf 
[ 1979]. 
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2.8.1 Appointment and removal 
The duty to appoint or remove the auditor lies with the shareholders in the 
annual general meeting (s270 and 277). The directors and management can 
recommend a change in auditors but the final decision rests with the owners of 
the company. However, in practice it is the chief executive who controls the 
appointment of the auditor and negotiates the fee [SAICA, 1994a]. As a result, 
members of the company have a small influence in the appointment and 
remuneration of the auditor. The auditor then becomes more inclined to side 
with management on disputes over financial statement matters for fear of 
dismissal. This conflict is one of the reasons for the formation of audit 
committees which would strengthen the independence of auditors [SAICA, 
1991]. 
An auditor can resign at any time during the period of appointment, but he has 
to submit written notification to the Registrar of Companies confirming that 
there was no unresolved material irregularities when he resigned ( s281). 
2.8.2 Powers and duties of the auditor 
The auditor is given powers to (s283): 
• have the rights of access at all times to all accounting records, 
books and documents of the company, and all explariations from 
the directors and officers of thecompany; 
• have right of access to all current and former financial statements 
of any subsidiary and explanations in connection with the 
financial statements; and 
• attend the general meeting of the company and to be heard at the 
meeting. 
Both the Companies Act and the PAA Act define the scope of the auditor in 
similar terms. The Companies Act (s300) states that the duty of the auditor is: 
• to examine the annual financial statements and group 
financial statements; 





• to satisfy himself that the minute book and attendance 
registers in respect of company, directors and managers' 
meeting have been kept in accordance with the Act; 
• to satisfy himself that the register of directors' interests 
in contracts is kept and entries are in accord with 
minutes; 
• to examine or satisfy himself about the securities of the 
company; 
• to obtain all the information and explanations which, to 
the best of his knowledge and belief are necessary for 
carrying out the audit; 
• to satisfy himself that the company's annual financial 
statements are in agreement with its accounting records 
and returns; 
• to examine group financial statements and satisfy 
himself that they comply with the requirements of the Act; 
• to carry out tests of accounting records and entries to 
satisfy himself that the financial statements fairly present 
the position, performance and cash flow in accordance 
with GAAP, in the manner required by the Act and 
consistent with previous year; 
• to satisfy himself that the directors report is not in 
conflict with fair presentation or distort the annual 
financial statements and accompanying notes; 
• to report to the Registrar of Companies when he gets to know, or 
has reason to believe, that the company is not.in operation and has 
no intention of resuming operations in the foreseeable future; 
• to comply with any other duty imposed on him by the 
Act; and 
• to comply with the relevant sections of the PAA Act. 
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The PAA Act (s20(1)) does not differ substantially but adds that: 
• the audit should be carried out free of any restrictions; 
• the auditor should satisfy himself that all material irregularities 
have been resolved to his satisfaction; and 
• the auditor should also comply with other laws which may govern 
that entity. 
In summary, the PAA Act extends the bulk of the provisions laid down in the 
Companies Act to other entities, which may not be governed by the Companies 
Act after making the three important modifications mentioned above. 
If the audit is carried out free of any restrictions and matters referred to in s300 
of the Companies Act and s20(1) of the PAA Act are fully complied with, the 
auditor can issue an unqualified audit opinion. Otherwise, he should state that 
the report is qualified and set out the facts or circumstances leading to the 
qualifications. 
2.8.3 Recourse against the auditors 
If the auditors' work is negligent, the PAA Act (s20(9)) sets out strict conditions 
under which the auditor can be held liable by clients and third parties. Firstly, it 
has to be proven that the auditor issued a certificate which was malicious or 
\Jursuant to a negligent performance of his duties. In such circumstances the 
client can sue the auditors for breach of contract. Third parties can sue the 
auditor on the basis of negligence which means that they have to prove that they 
relied on the auditor's representations and as a result incurred a financial. loss. 
However, the auditor should have been reasonably expected to know that: 
I . the client would use the certificate or opinion to induce a third 
party to enter into a specific contract or any other transaction of a 
similar nature; or 
2. the third party would rely on such a certificate or opinion for the 
purposes of acting or refraining from entering into the 
transaction. 
The onus is on the third party or the client to prove negligence. 
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2.9 Organisation of audit pr~ctices 
Auditors may engage in public practice individually or in partnership [PAA Act, 
s21]. The PAA Act further allows auditors to organise themselves as a company 
without limited liability. In addition, only natural persons who are auditors can 
be members, shareholders or directors. The fact that auditors have to practice in 
the form of entities without limited liability leaves them open to malpractice suits 
by users of financial statements. The PAA Act (s27(1)(h)) authorises the PAAB 
to mandate at its discretion practising members who should take professional 
indemnity insurance at their own expense. Losses which may have arisen as a 
result of the auditors negligence are covered to varying degrees by the 
indemnity insurance. 
Whilst the continued existence of professional partnerships rriay appear to be 
rather risky in a litigious climate, contracting theorists argue that such 
partnerships are the best form of ensuring auditor independence. For instance, 
Watts and Zimmerman [ 1986] argue that if auditors incorporate with limited 
liability, this reduces the amount ofassets available as a bond for their actions. 
As a result there is greater incentive for them not to be independent of their 
clients. Partnerships also have mutual monitoring mechanisms because each 
partner is jointly and severally liable for the other partners' actions [Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a; 1983b]. This mutual monitoring increases the competence and 
reduces the probability of a given auditor's yielding to a manager's pressure. 
Being partnerships, audit firms are not obligated to disclose financial data. Firms 
may choose not to disclose cost data (employee costs, operating expenses, etc.) 
and output data (e.g. fees and billable hours). Read and Tomczyk [1988, pp.40-
42) put forward the following arguments for full disclosure by auditing firms. 
Firstly, the primary responsibility of the auditor is to the public. Therefore, 
public interest overrides private concerns. Secondly, knowledge of the workings 
of the accounting firms, particularly large ones, can boost public confidence and 
trust in the profession. Thirdly, the sheer size and complexity of operations of 
the large firms makes them similar to any other big businesses. Therefore, to 
deflect public criticism and further scrutiny by regulators, they should provide 
complete financial disclosure. Finally, complete data would allow researchers to 
evaluate allegations that the profe~sion is unduly concentrated and therefore 




Often auditing firms merely give the total amount of fee billings for each year. 
Firms that once issued complete financial statements are Arthur Andersen, 
Touche Ross and Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co .. However, all subsequently 
stopped. For research purposes, there is no doubt that the disclosure of direct · 
data would be vital to the study of the structure of the profession. 
Guidelines on audit fees 
The Code of Professional Conduct and the Disciplinary Rules sets guidelines for 
the basis of determining audit fees. The guidelines require that fees be a fair 
reflection of the value of the time spent taking into account 
• 
• 
the skill ~nd knowledge required for the type of work involved; 
the level of training and experience of the persons necessarily 
engaged on the work; 
• the time necessarily occupied by each person engaged on the 
work; and 
• the degree of responsibility which the work entails. 
Based on the above criteria, it is necessary for the auditor to keep time records as 
a basis for determining audit fees. The rates used to calculate the fees should be 
fair and reasonable in the circumstances. These guidelines are similar to those 
issued by the IFAC, the AICPA, ICAEW, NZCA and the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Australia. The IFAC [1985] adds that the rates used should be 
based on the fundamental premise that the or~anisation and conduct of the 
auditor and his client work are well planned, controlled and managed. The 
criteria set out above may be influenced by legal, social and economic 
conditions of each country. 
Whilst it is the duty of the individual auditor or audit firm to determine 
appropriate charge out rates [IFAC, 1985], SAICA, [1993b] issued Circular 1/93 
in January 1993 to explain the basis of calculating rates for staff. The circular 
states that rates should be calculated on an annual basis using the following 
formula: 
salaries+ related costs* 100% +percentage mark-up for overhead charges and margin 
Chargeable hours 
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Annexure A of the circular gives further guidance on the percentage mark-up 
for overheads, number of chargeable hours of staff and the rates for partners as 
follows: 
Percentage mark-up for overheads and margin: 120% to 150% 
Chargeable hours of staff: 1200 to 1550 per annum 
Rates for principals: R150 to R350 per hour excluding Value Added Tax 
Rates for specialists work would normally be higher than the normal rates for 
principals. 
The following example illustrates the determination of a chargeout rate for a 
trainee accountant. 
Example: 
If an auditing firm pays an articled clerk R45000 per annum with chargeable 
hours per annum of 1400 and has a mark-up of 150% for overhead and 
margin, then the charge out rate of the clerk would be: 
(R45000+R45000*150%)/1400 = R80 per hour. 
It is not particularly clear whether the Institute enforces these guidelines or 
whether firms are free to disregard them. One would expect firms to adhere to 
the guidelines as they are set by a body which governs their functions and which 
they have an influence over. A review of the 1995 PAAB Disciplinary 
Committee Report included in the Board's annual report, revealed cases 
. involving allegations of overcharging by auditors. It is not evident from the 
report whether the actions against the members was a result of a complaint from 
a client or the Board's monitoring activities. 
Auditors are precluded from fees in terms of an arrangement whereby no fee 
will be charged unless a specified finding is obtained or the payment of the fee 
is contingent on future results or findings. This prohibition apparently sterns 
from the possibility of compromise of independence in such circumstances. 
Along similar lines, ET030 on independence cautions that auditor independence 
may be undermined when one client disproportionately accounts for a high 
percentage of the auditor's income [para .21]. Similarly, an auditor's 
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independence may be impaired if fees due for professional services remain 
unpaid for an extended period of time [ET 030, para .23]. 
Whilst contingent fees are not allowed, fee estimates (or quotes) are allowed only 
if made truthfully at the time of setting the estimate [Circular 1193, para. 17]. 
From the above discussion it is clear that audit fees are a function of the time 
and seniority of the staff involved in the audit work. 
2.11 Chapter summary 
This chapter reviewed the history of auditing and the regulatory framework in 
which the profession operates. Although auditing has become enshrined in 
legislation, it would exist without such imposition. The value of the audit lies in 
minimising the risk of errors which may result in losses to investors and 
inefficient allocation of resources. 
The qualifications required to be a public accountant are critical, together with 
the threat of sanction by regulatory bodies, to ensure that the value of the audit 
is maintained if not improved. It has emerged that the role of the auditor is 
essentially one of monitoring in a self regulation environment. The role of the 
P AAB appears to be one of ensuring that the profession delivers a high quality 
product to the users of financial statements by creating an environment where 
high ethical and performance standards are maintained. The extent to which the 
auditing profession and regulatory bodies monitor the credibility and 
competence of practising auditors is important for the determination of the value 
of the services charged by auditors. The continual update of skills of practising 
professionals imposes a cost which has to be recovered in the audit fee. 
Having described the function of the auditor together with the regulatory 
environment in which the auditor operates, the st~ge is now set to describe the 
economic/business context within which auditors function. 
26 
"This issue of possible monopoly power of the large accountancy firms is of importance because in 
most countries the audit of the financial accounts of large limited companies is compulsory, and 
Governments legislate to ensure that these audits are only carried out by those with the appropriate 
professional qualifications in accountancy. Thus the profession obtains a legally protected monopoly in 
this area. Whilst companies are free to choose their audit firm, large multinational companies are 
almost all audited by one of the Big Six audit firms. The question which then arises is whether or not 
these dominant firms are operating, or moving towards operating, a cartel with all the negative 
consequences that entails; or whether there is considerable competition in the market for auditing." 
[Loft and Sjofors, 1993, p.156] 
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3 .1 Introduction 
The survey of the accounting services market provides an understanding of the 
framework in which audit fees are determined. In this chapter a discussion of the 
maj~r suppliers is undertaken with a view to providing an understanding of the 
way in which the firms attempt to distinguish themselves. A brief history of the 
development of the largest suppliers is included with the resultant implications 
on the competitiveness of the audit services market are discussed. 
3.2 The structure of the market , 
According to Pound and Francis [1981, p.354], the accounting services market 
is made up of two sub markets: the audit services market and other services. The 
audit services market is probably the largest, more structured and regulated of 
the two markets. Other services mainly comprise of basic accounting services 
like secretarial services, tax return preparation and advice, systems design and 
installations, executive recruitment, financial management advice and 
information systems design and implementation, to mention but a few. It is 
generally difficult to put a precise boundary around the more general consulting 
activities. 
The market for audit services is only open to qualified auditors who have met 
regulatory requirements needed to perform the attest function. The market for 
other services is open to auditors and other professions and there appears to be 
no minimum expertise requirements set by authorities for suppliers in this 
market. 
3.2.1 The demand and supply of audit services 
Regulation requiring compulsory audits substantially affects the structure of the 
audit services market by creating a demand for such services. This demand has 
been described as derived by Francis and Pound [1981], Christiansen and Loft 
[1992], and Maijoor [1994]. On the surface it may appear that auditors benefit 
from the effects of demand regulation on the market structure. Beneficial effects 
will only occur when such regulation increases the size of the market and, 
secondly, if beneficial effects are not competed away as a result of an increased 
number of auditors supplying services to the market [Maijoor, 1994]. The 
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conclusion reached in Chapter 2 was that the audit would exist even without 
legislative imposition. Therefore, if there is demand driven by legislation, it is 
likely to be minimal. Other bodies that require audits are stock exchanges and in 
some cases, banks and other credit institutions. These affect the demand for 
auditing although their reasons for requiring audited financial information are 
different to shareholders. 
Pong and Whittington [1994] explain that the demand for audit services is 
dependent on the size of the auditee. The statutory requirement for audit 
services in conjunction with professional standards, serves to set the minimum 
amount of work that the auditor should perform. As a result, the demand for 
audit services is inelastic to fee and mainly dependent upon the amount of work 
required. 
The users of audited financial information can be described as those defined as 
employees, lenders, suppliers, government and customers [SAICA, 1994a]. It is 
the users who will attach some value to the assurance offered by the audit 
although the cost of the audit is borne by the company. Without an audit the 
company would have to pay a higher cost for funds provided by shareholders 
and lenders [Elliott, 1994]. 
The supply of audit services· will be determined by the ,cost functions of the 
suppliers [Pong and Whittington, 1994]. This will be a function of the amount of 
work done, regardless of the identity of the auditee (although special 
characteristics of the auditee may cause additional costs, which will be discussed 
later). 
The set of relationships of supply and demand is illustrated in Figure 2 below 
[Pong and Whittington, 1994, p.1074]. S is the common cost function which 
applies across all audits. Dl, 02 etc. are the inelastic demand curves for audit 
services by auditees of different sizes. The intersections Fl, F2 etc. represent the 
equilibrium fees which will be charged. 
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Q11;1111ity = f (Size of auditcc) 
3.2.2 The suppliers of audit services 
s 
TI1e suppliers of audit services have traditionally been trealcd as dicholomous 
[DeAngelo. 198laj with one segment consisting of large. well known firms with 
international affiliations. now known as the "Big Six". The other group of 
suppliers consists of small and medium size firms some of which also have 
international affiliations but do not appear to hold the same level of visibility as 
the large ones. The Big Six are traditionally associated with a perception of high 
quality service whilst the other firms are seen more as lower quality [De Angelo, 
198laJ. 
A large proportion of clients of the Big Six arc large quoted multinationals 
whilst the client profile of the smaller firms tends to be made up of small 10 
medium size companies which may or may not be listed. As a result of this 
pairing. the concentration statistics normally used have focused on listed 
companies which tend to be clients of the Big Six, thus presenting a picture of 
high concentration in the audit services market [Moizer and Turley, 1987: 
Tomczyk and Read. 1989]. Evidence from Simunic [ 1980] shows that as the size 
of listed companies decreases, the proponion of companies audited by the Big 
Six decreases. Simunic [ 1980 I and Pound and Francis [ 1981 J argue that !he 
small comranies segment would be more comrctitivc as·a result of a greater 
number of suppliers. hence, the tenn "competitive fringe". 
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In order to provide an understanding of the development of the dichotomy in 
the audit services market, a historical overview of the Big Six will be provided 
based on the analysis by Wooton and Wolk (1992]. The development of the Big 
Six basically followed the industrial revolutions in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century. As the demands of clients increased in terms of size and complexity, the 
auditing firms grew with them. Up to the 1950s, the firms had generally 
followed a strategy of internal/organic growth. This strategy changed in the 
1950s and 1960s as the large firms began to merge with small firms. In the 
1960s and 1970s internationalisation became the buzzword and firms started 
merging with geographically diverse partners. 
The 1980s saw another spate of large mergers between the eight largest firms 
which were then Arthur Andersen, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Ernst and 
Whinney, Arthur Young, Touche Ross, Deloitte Haskins and Sells, KMG Main 
Hurdman and Price Waterhouse. In 1985, KMG Main Hurdman merged with 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. to form the largest firm, KPMG Peat Marwick. In 
1989, Ernst and Whinney and Arthur Young followed suit to form the second 
largest firm, Ernst and Young. Similarly, Touche Ross merged with Deloitte 
Haskins and Sells to become Deloitte and Touche. Deloitte and Touche later 
became Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu. 
As the 1990s began the Big Eight had become the Big Six which were KPMG 
Peat Marwick [KPMG], Arthur Andersen [AA], Ernst and Young [E&Y], 
Coopers and Lybrand [C&L], Deloitte Touche and Tohmatsu [D&T] and Price 
Waterhouse [PW]. It was nearly the Big 5 when AA and PW opened merger talks. 
However, these collapsed. There have been some mergers between the large . 
firms and medium sized firms, the most notable being between AA and BDO 
Binder in the UK. 
The reasons for these mergers appear to be founded on the importance of 
economies of scale and synergies. Minyard and Tabor [1991, pp.80-81] list the 
following reasons for the merger mania. 
The first reason is that stepped-up competition among the accounting firms 
necessitates the need to create critical mass to withstand competitive attacks. In 
his chronicle of the merger of KMG Main Hurdman and Peat, Marwick, Mitchell 
and Co, Cypert [1991] observed that given the advantages the eight largest firms 
enjoyed in capitalisation, marketing, recruiting, and virtually every other aspect 
of the profession, it would be impossible for one firm to overtake the others 
without a merger. 
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Secondly, the increase in specialisation of auditors requires scale economies 
which can be best exploited by a larger entity. 
Thirdly, the need for investment in capital expenditure to undertake big systems 
consulting work which requires more resources. One of the cheapest ways of 
developing a substantial resource base is to merge thus creating a larger base. 
Fourthly, clients put pressure on auditors to reduce audit fees. To satisfy client 
demand firms had to become low-cost producers. Low cost production may be 
made easier by large entities who have the required size to take advantage of 
economies of scale. 
Fee billings and fee growth of the Big Six in 1992 showed mixed fortunes for 
the firms. KPMG Peat Marwick took first place with $6,2 billion (7% increase), 
followed by Ernst and Young at $5,7 billion (5,5%), Arthur Andersen at $5,6 
billion (13%), Coopers and Lybrand at $5,4 billion (7,4%), Deloitte Tonche 
Tohmatsu at $4,8 billion (7%) and Price Waterhouse at $3,8 billion (4,4%) 
[Finance Week 200, March 18-24 1993, p.170]. 
The dominance of the Big Six has been documented by various researchers and 
all studies show a dominance intracountry, continental and world-wide. Ninety 
percent of the top 1000 multinational firms are audited by a Big Six auditing 
firm [Jacob, 1991]. More than 90% of the Fortune 500 companies are audited 
by the Big Six [Jacob, 1991]. Moizer [1992, p.334] cites European statistics 
showing that the audits of large European companies are heavily dominated by 
the international networks of the Big Six firms. In particular, the Big Six audit 
100 per cent of the top businesses in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. The 
firms also control more than half of the audit work in Germany and Portugal. In 
Denmark, the Big Six audits over two thirds of quoted companies [Christiansen 
and Loft, 1992, p.277]. 
Analysis of total billings by The Accountant [January 1992] show that the Big 
Six capture a large slice of fee income. In 1986, they had over 86% of the total 
fees generated by the top 12 audit firms and networks world-wide. By 1991, this 
had risen to nearly 88%. The extent of their market penetration is shown in 
Figure 3. The market share of each of the firms over the period 1986 to 1991 is 
shown in Figure 4. It is clear that Ernst and Young, Deloitte Tonche Tohmatsu 
and KPMG Peat Marwick lost market share whilst Price Waterhouse, Coopers and 
Lybrand and Arthur Andersen gained market share. 
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The international dominance of the big firms appear to have been the result of 
environmental and market forces [Buckley and O'Sullivan, 1980]. Firstly, 
financial statement user groups have pressured to have corporations audited by 
nationally known firms. This is not a new phenomenon but has been in existence 
since as early as 1914 when it was noted that : 
" Statements put out by mercantile concerns desiring credit are 
frequently accompanied by accountants' certificates, and banks which 
buy commercial paper iook with disfavour upon certificates audited by 
accountants unknown to them." 
[As quoted by Buckley and O'Sullivan (1980, p.30)]. 
Secondly, technological factors dictate that large clients require large auditors. 
Thirdly, auditors' professional norms of independence and their rational, 
strategic desire to diversify risk, will lead them to minimise financial dependency 
on any one client. 
Fourthly, regulatory and legal factors are expanding the scope of auditing. 
Consequently, the level of resources necessary to perform a given audit is 
increasing. 
Fifthly, the desire to attract and hold top-quality personnel is a factor, 
contributing to the growth of auditing firms. 
Sixthly, the growth of industry specialisation demands commitment of fixed 
resources to develop specialist .skills. A reasonable return on the investment is 
more likely when there is a high volume of audit hours worked. 
Seventhly, the merger of the accounting firms resulted in greater concentration. 
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Lastly, concentration may be due to legal and economic conditions peculiar to a 
particular country. Davison, Stening and Tai (1984] found that auditor 
concentration in Australia was influenced by interlocking directorates. Their 
results suggested that "the links between companies audited by the same public 
accounting firms (and, hence, an auditor's client profile) can be explained to a 
considerable extent by the links provided by those same companies having 
common directors" [p.316]. In South. Africa, the concentration could be 
influenced by the conglomerate structure of the big corporations. Tom Wixley 
of Ernst and Young [Financial Mail Top Companies Survey, July 26, 1991] 
states that audits do tend to follow control: 
"Strategically, the best audits are at the top of the tree. Audits tend to 
follow control. So controlling shareholders tend to appoint their own 
auditors and the bigger the tree the better because in time you tend to 
get that work." 
The individual firms have also adopted a deliberate strategy of internationalisation 
documented by Wu and Hackett (1977]. The firms' drive to go global was driven 
by the need to serve clients properly [p.81], which was considered to be more 
important than short-term profit objectives [p.85]. 
Entry into foreign countries tended to follow an evolutionary strategy although 
there were some exceptions. The international firm would establish a 
correspondent relationship with an existing local firm to minimise the risk and 
cost of entry while providing a base for learning and upgrading among the two 
parties. The local demand from multinational clients as well as local clients often 
grew to a level where the performance of the correspondent office could not be 
assured. To meet this demand with quality services, the international firm might 
then go into an affiliate relationship involving a licensing agreement where the 
local firm uses the international firms name and technical services in exchange 
for royalty or service fees. 
The international firms were very strict about the use of their brand names. Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986, p.316] also note that in the late nineteenth century, 
Price, Waterhouse and Company (already prominent in England) sent two non 
partner representatives, Jones and Caesar to establish offices in the US. However, 
it did not allow Jones and Caesar to use the firm's name explicitly for fear of 
damage to Price, Waterhouse's reputation. 
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The international dominance of the Big Six has led to the accounting services 
market being described as a mature oligopoly with a competitive fringe [Pound 
and Francis, 1981, p.356]. 
3.2.3 Competitiveness of audit services market 
ln a market that is dominated by few very large suppliers, concerns about the 
state of competition are bound to arise. In the audit services market, the US Staff 
Study charged that the US market was uncompetitive, whilst the AICPA [1978] 
hinted at the possible existence of excessive competition. Similar to the Cohen 
Commission, Bernstein [1978, p.92] noted a marked increase in competition, 
describing the market as "more cut-throat". A cursory review of accountancy 
journals by the author indicates that there is a perception amongst practitioners 
that competition in the audit services market is very intense. 
To support this claim, the lack of growth in fee income and some leaked 
information on audit firms' profitability are often cited as indications of intense 
competition. Empirical research done in the US [Simunic, 1980; Palmrose, 
1986a], Australia [Francis 1984; Francis and Stokes, 1986], Canada [Chung and 
Lindsay, 1988; Anderson and Zeghal, 1994], New Zealand [Firth, 1985] and in 
the UK [Chan et al, 1993] concluded that the audit services market was 
competitive. The question that has to be answered now is why the market for 
audit services is so competitive. 
The AICPA [1978, pp.110-111] contended that the users of financial statements . 
cannot distinguish audit quality differences between similar size firms. The 
Commission noted that, because of the influence of management in the 
appointment of auditors, the quality of the audit is of comparatively less concern 
to them. The Commission noted that: 
"A "clean" opinion obtained from one reputable firm is about as 
valuable to the competent, honest financial manager as one from 
another reputable firm."[p.111]. 
If there is no discernible difference in quality, then there will be more price 
competition as cost-conscious management can bargain for a lower fee. Whilst 
the observations of the Commission are valid, Shockley and Holt [1983] present 
contrary evidence showing that certain classes of use.rs of financial statements 
can distinguish between audit services rendered by audit firms in a similar size 
class. Whilst this would weaken the AICPA arguments, the fact remains that as 
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long as management has such strong influence over, the appointment of auditors 
there will be greater price competition. 
Linked to the influence of management in setting audit fees is the growing 
tendency of management opening audits for tender [The Chartered Accountant 
in Australia, August, 1990, p.36]. It is common knowledge in auditing circles 
world-wide that this has become one of the common ways of reducing the audit 
fee. Darnill [1992] provides evidence that companies which open their audits to 
tender invariably end up with a reduction in audit fee. 
The second reason for increased competition is the spate of corporate mergers 
that took place in the 1980s. This shrunk the pool ·of clients whilst the number 
of suppliers remained virtually unchanged. Also, the elimination of duplicate 
accounting functions in the merged firm meant that the audit fee could not be 
equal to the sum of the audit fees of the companies before the merger. 
Coiyorate mergers also resulted in a number of clients changing from small 
firms to the large ones [Haskins and Williams, 1988]. Competition amongst the 
large audit firms intensified as they vied for each other's clients [Bernstein, 
1978]. 
Thirdly, Damill [1992] notes that the audit services market has changed from 
being supply driven to being demand driven. This gives management more 
bargainiqg power in setting audit fees. In addition, in the past companies were 
reluctant to change auditors as there appeared to be a stigma attached to that. In 
the 1990s changes in auditors have become more frequent and clients are now 
placing demands on auditors beyond the requirement that the audit fee should 
be competitive. 
Fourthly, clients have become more sophisticated and are generally demanding 
better value for money [Accountant's Journal, February 1990, p.33]. As a result 
they are more prepared to shop around if they are not satisfied with their present 
auditor and now have a greater choice of firms to choose from. At the same 
time, clients have become more price sensitive, more willing to ask for estimates 
in advance and to dispute fees. This has taken place at a time when the costs of 
accounting firms have risen and there has been a significant demand for capital 
expenditure investment in technology and office facilities. 
Fifthly, the rules governing the marketing of audit services have been relaxed 
and in virtually all countries advertising is now allowed. Firms have been 
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scrambling more aggressively for a share of the market. They are now 
marketing a greater range of services than previously available from one firm. 
Sixthly, there is a greater focus on the quality of service provided by 
professional firms, their independence and ethical standards [Accountant's 
Journal, February 1990, p.33]. 
3.3 South African market : An overview 
Whilst there is a wealth of evidence on the structure of the audit services markets 
in the major English-speaking countries and continental Europe (including 
some Scandinavian countries), there are hardly any studies of the South African 
market. Part of the problem may lie in the lack of the availability of data due to 
auditing firms deciding not to divulge such information. Finance Week 
[Finance Week 200, March 18-24, 1993, p.170] in its annual survey of auditing 
firms noted that auditing firms refused to divulge information on the fee split, 
the split between chargeable and non chargeable staff, the number of trainees 
and some of their unlisted clients. Figures provided by the International 
Accounting Bulletin [February 22, 1995, p.8] are shown in table 1 below. 
Table 1: Leading accounting firms in South Africa· Fee data 
Firm International Fee Income Fee Income Growth 
Affiliation 1994 (R/m) 1993 (R/m) Rate (%) 
Deloitte & Touche Deloitte Touche 278.0 250.0 11.2 
Tohmatsu 
Coopers & Lybrand C&L 247.0 217.0 13.8 
Ernst& Young E&Y 216.0 204.0 5.9 
KPMG Aiken & Peat KPMG 215.01 190.01 n/a 
Price Waterhouse PW 188.01 . 165.01 n/a 
Arthur Andersen & Co AA 141.02 114.02 23.7 
Kessel Feinstein Grant Thornton 69.3 69.0 0.4 
Fisher Hoffman Stride Pannell Kerr 52.8 50.5 4.6 
Forster 
BDO Spencer Steward BDOBinder n/a n/a· n/a 
Moores Rowland MRI 29.93 . 26.43 13.3 
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Notes: 
1. Estimated by International Accounting Bulletin 
2. Includes Arthur Andersen and Andersen Consulting, separate business units of the 
Arthur Andersen Worldwide Organisation 
3. Figures refer to an association of firms comprising Baker Musikanth, Boulle Saad 
& Levin, Goldberg Jaffe and Cohen Morris now collectively known as Moores 
Rowland 
It is evident from the table that the Big Six network also permeate the South 
African market quite extensively. There is a fairly large gap between Arthur 
Andersen and Kessel Feinstein which is indicative of the dichotomy of the Big 
Six and the non-Big Six. In fact, all the major players in the market have 
international affiliates. The mergers of the international affiliates of the local 
firms also had the latter merging. Aiken and Carter, an affiliate of KMG Main 
Hurdman linked up with the local branch of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co to 
form KPMG Aiken and Peat. Similarly, the local operations of Arthur Young 
and Ernst Whinney merged to form Ernst and Young in South Africa. When 
Touche Ross merged with Deloitte Haskins and Sells, Pim Goldby which was 
affiliated to Touche Ross merged with Deloitte Haskins and Sells, to form 
Deloitte Pim Goldby which later changed its name to Deloitte and Touche. 
Coopers and Lybrand followed with a merger with the local network of Theron 
du Toit to form Coopers Theron du Toit which has subsequently reverted to 
Coopers and Lybrand. That was not the end. Price Waterhouse merged with 
Wiehan Meyernel to form Price Waterhouse Meyernel. 
One of the striking features of these mergers was the fact that the merged firm 
always had the name of the international affiliate prominently placed in its 
name. KPMG has the standard KPMG Peat Marwick logo and the international 
name precedes the local name. Similarly, Price Waterhouse Meyernel still uses 
the Price Waterhouse logo in its letterheads and external communications. 
The adoption of a uniform international label has taken on more importance in 
South Africa with a number of local firms adopting their international names. 
Deloitte Pim Golby changed to Deloitte and Touche, Coopers Theron du Toit to 
Coopers and Lybrand and KPMG Aiken and Peat is phasing out the Aiken and 
Peat to remain as simply KPMG. A very detailed explanation by KPMG Aiken 
and Peat makes it very clear that the reason for the nall!e change was motivated 
by the need to strengthen its identity as the global leader in providing quality 
professional services. The statement further explains that: 
40 
-· --------- -- - - ---------------------------------------
" Market research has revealed that our clients find it confusing to be 
presented with services ·under a different name from one country to the 
next. Presenting a clear and consistent image around the world will 
create and sustain a positive awareness of our services" [KPMG, 1994, 
p.2]. 
Other firms have always had the international names such as Arthur Andersen 
and Ernst and Young. 
International affiliation is not only common amongst the large firms but the 
small firms as well have international affiliation. Fisher Hoffman Stride is 
affiliated to Pannell Kerr Foster, Kessel Feinstein to Grant Thornton 
International, BOO Spencer Steward to BDO Binder, Goldberg Jaffe to the 
International Group of Accounting Firms. International links are touted as 
providing benefits in research, technology, audit methodologies, training, 
marketing and recruiting [Cypert, 1991]. 
An attempt was made to assess the extent of the dominance of the Big Six 
amongst listed companies, using ranked market capitalisation at the end of 1992 
and McGregor's Who Owns Whom [1993]. The table below shows the extent of 
the dominance : 
Table 2: Ranked market capitalisation and Big Six dominance. 
Rank Big Six Non Big Six 
I to 100 93 7 
101 to 200 92 8 
201 to 300 90 10 
301to400 82 18 
401 to 500 79 21 
501to600 73 27 
600 to 700 65 35 
700 + 6 10 
From the analysis, the dominance of the Big Six is more pronounced amongst 




3.4 Other services market 
Involvement of audit firms in nonattest capacity with their audit clients has been , 
plagued with controversy. This section analyses the origins of auditor 
involvement in such services, the reasons for involvement and criticisms of audit 
firms. A literature search for studies on the structure of this market were 
fruitless. A possible reason for this may be the fact that it is very difficult to put 
boundaries around the basic range of services and most of them tend to be client 
specific [Simunic, 1984]. As a result, no detailed analysis will be performed on 
the structure of this market. 
3.4.1 Origins 
Before independent audits became widespread, auditors were already ,performing 
a variety of other services [AICPA, 1978; Wooton and Wolk, 1992]. The 1960s 
was a period of a marked increase in auditor involvement in MAS which 
prompted the concern over their impact on the audit function [Wooton and 
Wolk, 1992]. The large accounting firms have continued to make substantial 
inroads into the other services market in recent years. The Accountant [3rd 
March, 1986, p.10] described the growth of MAS activities of large accounting 
firms as "spectacular and immodest". The ·growth in the proportion of total 
revenues sourced from MAS activities is shown in the table below extracted from 
Briloff [1994, p.31]. 
Table 3: Growth in the management consulting revenues of the six largest 
accounting firms 1987-1991 
Firm 1991 1987 1987-1991 
% Increase 
World World % World World % World 
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Gross MAS MAS Gross MAS MAS Gross MAS 
Revs Revs Revs Revs 
AA $4948 $2260 46% $2316 $838 36% 114% 170% 
C&L $5000 $930 19% $2000 $381 19% 150% 144% 
E&Y $5406 $862 16% $3480 $717 21% 55% 20% 
KPMG $6011 $801 13% $3250 $455 14% 85% 76% 
D&T $4500 $800 18% $2986 $565 19% 51% 42% 
PW $3603 $733 20% $1804 $345 19% 100% 133% 
I 
$ amounts in millions 
In 1992, the contribution of MAS to total revenues continued to increase as 
shown in Table 4 (adapted from Briloff, 1994, p.31). 
Table 4: Comparison of MAS revenues to total revenues for the six 
largest accounting firms for 1992 
Firm Gross MAS % 
Revenues Revenues MAS 
AA $5577 NIA NIA 
C&L $5350 $1498 28% 
E&Y $5701 $1425 25% 
KPMG $6153 $1661 27% 
D&T $4800 NIA NIA 
PW $3761 $1015 27% 
($ Amounts in millions) 
As a result of their involvement in MAS activities the Big Six accounting firms 
have grown to be amongst the largest consulting firms in the world [see Table 5 
Source: Briloff, 1994, p.4]. 
Table 5: Growth in management consulting revenue of the eight largest 
consulting firms 1978-1991 
Firm 1991 1987 
MAS MAS 
Revenues Revenues 
AA $2260 $838 
McKinsey $1050 $510 
C&L $930 $381 
Mercer $984 $530 
E&Y $862 $717 
KPMG $801 $455 
D&T $800 $565 
PW $733 $345 
$ Amounts in millions 
(a) Revenues for Ernst and Whinney only 
(b) Revenues for Peat Marwick only 
(c) Revenues for Touche Ross only 
% 1978 % 
Increase MAS Increase 
1987-91 Revs 1978-87 
170 $114 635 
106 $100 410 
144 $83 359 
86 - -
20 $51(a) NIA 
76 $70(b) NIA 
42 $72(c) NIA 
113 $33 946 
Ethical pronouncements do not preclude auditors from providing MAS services 
to their audit clients. ET 030 in fact argues that it may be "economical" for 
auditors to provide MAS to clients as they have intimate knowledge of the 
client's business, and many clients would be adversely affected if their auditors 
were banned from offering MAS. 
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3.4.2 Reasons for invol.vement 
It is important to look at the reasons why audit firms have become so heavily 
involved in MAS services. The Accoulltalll [January 1992, p.9) studied the 
accounting services and found that the audit services market had become 
saturated and there was very little growth. In addition. margins in this market 
were growing thin due to intense competition which was driving audit fees 
downwards. The other services market showed greater growth rates and therefore 
more profit appeal. although they are of a smaller size. The result of the survey 
was Figure 5. 
Figure 5: Market survey of accounting services market 











The growth/profitability matrix shows growl~ plotted against 
profitability for each market segment. The size of the bubblP, 
represents the valu.e of the market. Audit/accountancy is the largest 
area of business. although ii is of low growth potential and low 
profitability. Management consultancy a~d other ar~as of busin~ss 
are a relatively small part of overall business, but in the attractive 
position of being of medium/high growth and high profitablity 
Hillison and Kennelley [ 1988 J provide some economic reasons for auditor 
involvement in non audit services. Firstly, the growth opportunities apparent 
from the above graph makes !he non audit services (MAS) market attractive. 
13ccausc or tile ra111pa11t pricc-cutti11g 011 audits. audits 111ay not Ile as prnritalllc 
as they used to be. For some auditing fimis MAS may have a higher profit 
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margin per rand of billings than audit services. This observation is supported by 
comments from Rick Cottrell, Coopers and Lybrand deputy chairman and 
managing partner who attributed the increase in fee in.come to increased market 
share in MAS [International Accounting Bulletin, February 22, 1995, p.8]. In 
the same article, Cottrell added that competition in the audit segment is "stiff' 
and "activity has slowed down in this area". 
Secondly, audit firms may have been driven by a need to meet client needs. The 
ability of an audit firm to offer a well-balanced and developed package of 
ancillary services appears important in developing and maintaining a reputation 
as a service-oriented firm. 
Thirdly, MAS offer risk diversification opportunities. Through provision of 
MAS, audit finns do not become dependent on audit fees as the only source of 
income. Also in the US, there has been a great deal of malpractice suits against 
auditing firms arising out of audit failures. Given the risky environment faced in 
auditing, the movement of audit firms into non audit services can be viewed as a 
rational attempt to diversify risk faced by these professional partnersh_ips. 
Fourthly, non audit services broaden the career paths of trainee accountants, 
making the profession more appealing to a different group of persons than in 
the past. Providing alternative career paths may result in increasing the ability of 
audit firms to retain employees who have traditionally migrated to clients. As the 
responsibilities of auditors change and become broader, creative people with new 
ideas will be needed. Failure to attract and retain personnel capable of adapting 
to new demands could seriously impair the ability of the profession to remain 
relevant. 
3.4.3 Advantages of accounting firms 
There a number of distinct advantages which favour accounting firms when it 
comes to consultancy services. These are [The Accountant, 3rd March 1986, 
p.10]: 
Size This enables them to take on substantial projects. 
Client base The accountants have a captive market of audit clients who turn to 
them for MAS. 
Range of offices The geographical spread of accounting firms enables their 
consultancy arms to tap larger market. 
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·Availability of people The accounting firms can draw upon a vast pool of in-
house expertise built around their audit practices. The article quotes another 
consultant who said: 
"They [accounting firms] have some of the best brains in the country in some of 
their subject areas, and if that's what you want, they provide a very good service." 
Also the involvement of the accounting firms, particularly their large 
advertisements, has increased the size of the MAS market. 
3.4.4 Disadvantages of accounting firms 
Other than the independence issue, the style of the organisation and functioning 
of consultancies is different to that of audit firms [The Accountant, 3rd March 
1986, p.11]. Specifically, 
• 
• 
The firll! comes across as a general management consultancy and 
is not seen as credible by the client. 
Separate kinds of consultancy require different types of people, 
and each type needs a separate environment. One environment is 
just not appropriate for different kinds of consulting work. 
• The very best people want a high degree of freedom, and they will 
not work in a highly structured, bureaucratic environment. 
It is patently clear that audit firms do possess distinct advantages and capabilities 
particularly in delivering a quality service to the client. The disadvantages are 
more administrative than performance related. 
3.4.5 Criticisms 
The main criticisms for auditor involvement in MAS services for their own 
clients arises from a concern about independence, the raison de etre of auditing. 
One of the ironies of this debate is that in the 1920s and 1930s auditor 
involvement in MAS was very prevalent and in fact quite welcomed [Wooton, 
and Wolk, 1992, pp.6-8]. A survey of literature studies of the MAS debate [Pany 
and Reckers, 1988] did not focus on the competence of auditors, but on the 
effects of MAS on the audit function. The issue is really whether the auditor is 
actually negatively influenced by MAS. The focus is on the perception that users 
have of the auditors involvement in MAS. It is this perception of the lack of 
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independence that may lead to the public losing confidence in the integrity of 
audited financial statements. 
Those against the provision of MAS to audit clients argue that the auditor may in 
effect become an employee of the client, an advocate of the client, have financial 
interest in the success of the client, or be placed in the position of auditing his 
own decisions in which case he would be more dependent on the client [Gui, 
1991, p.164]. Briloff [1994, p.30] calls it a "nexus of perversity" which is not 
in line with the status of auditing as a profession. Austin Mitchell [1992], Labour 
. MP in the UK, further argues that: 
" It is unhealthy for auditors to offer non auditing services to their audit clients. 
It degrades the audit, making it a cut-price exercise to sell more lucrative 
services." 
Arguments in favour are that, most MAS work is non routine and increases the 
client's dependence on the auditor. This in tum will enhance the auditor's 
ability to resist management pressure and improve the auditor's independence 
[Gui, 1991, p.164]. Francis and Pound [1981, p.355] add that: 
l . An accounting firm which has provided an extensive audit service 
already has detailed knowledge of the client operations. Much of the 
preliminary work has been completed and avoids the inefficiency of 
introducing a new firm that would need to start again. 
2. MAS capabilities within an audit team will enhance audit quality. 
3. MAS increases the quality of young accounting staff. 
4. The auditor's review-and evaluation of the clients' internal control 
results in the identification of weaknesses in the system and a 
report to management on suggested improvements. This can facilitate 
an audit by improving the underlying structure of what is audited. 
A review of empirical research spanning over 20 years by Pany and Reckers -
[ 1988] confirms the existence of a per~eption problem, although there is also 
evidence to the contrary. Pany and Reckers also argue that the results of these 
studies may have been influenced by a demand effect because the focus of the 
researchers had been transparent to the subjects and the researchers' 
expectations were relatively obvious [Pany and Reckers, 1988, p.32]. Their own 
findings did not reveal a significant deterioration of perception of independence 
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among sophisticated financial statement users. Gul [1991] shows that the 
evidence on the effects of MAS on auditor independence is mixed and fairly 
inconclusive. 
The response of the regulators to the problem varies across different countries. 
The SEC in the US required proxy statements [Scheiner and Kiger, 1982; 
Palmrose, 1988] to: 
• describe each non-audit service provided by incumbent auditors; 
• state percentage relationships, individually and in aggregate 
between non-audit and audit fees for non-audit services greater 
than three percent; and 
• disclose whether non-audit services were approved by audit 
committees or boards of directors to consider the possible effects 
on independence. 
These regulations did not appear to have an impact on the quantity or mix of 
non-audit services purchased [Palmrose, 1988]. The Cadbury Commission in the 
UK has also followed the SEC route, requiring disclosure of payments to 
auditors for other services. 
3.5 Recent developments - Litigation 
Litigation against auditors has soared to levels where the auditing profession is 
describing it as an epidemic [Financial Mail, August 21, 1992, p.36]. This has 
been more prevale.nt in. the major English-speaking countries in the world 
particularly Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US. The increase in 
litigation has been closely linked to highly publicised frauds and failures such as 
the Ba_nk of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), the Robert Maxwell 
debacle and the savings and loans scams in the US. In 1991, the Big Six were 
estimated to have spent about 9% of their total revenues - some US$477 million 
- defending litigation suits against themselves [Financial. Mail, August 21, 1992, 
p36]. By 1993 litigation costs came to more than $1 billion or 19.4% of gross 
accounting and auditing revenues without the impact of insurance indemnity 
[International Accounting Bulletin, June 27, 1994, p.2J. The amount they paid 
for insurance coverage was equal to $111 million per firm [lnternatfonal 
. ' 
. Accounting Bulletin, June 27, 1994, p.2]. 
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The result has been an increase in premiums estimated at between 200 and 
400%. Consequently, insurance costs have climbed to where they are the second 
largest cost item faced by accounting firms after salaries [Goldwasser, 1992]. 
The risk of litigation and the attendant costs of insurance are now part and 
parcel of doing business for auditing firms [Wallace, 1989, p.5]. Wallace [1989, 
pp.5-6] cites the results of an international study of the nature and determinants 
of litigation which showed that: 
• public companies appeared in most litigation cases, and 
• risk of litigation was more prevalent in finance, insurance, investment 
and real estate. 
Entities falling into the above categories are therefore more risky and may 
require greater audit effort and hence pay higher audit fees [Wallace, 1989]. 
On a more general level, the increase in litigation increases the overhead of audit 
firms which leads to more expensive audits, all other things equal. For South 
African firms with international affiliation, the costs of insurance are determined 
internationally and each country contributes its share [Msibi and Pillay, 1992]. 
Therefore the effects of litigation in, say, the US could have an impact on the 
cost structure of the South African practice. Professional risk management 
procedures are more likely to be instituted on a global basis which impacts 
directly on South African member firms. Whilst in South Africa litigation has 
not reached the proportions in the developed econol'Il:ies, submissions made by 
the profession indicate that audit firms see the threat of litigation as serious, 
enough to warrant representation to the South African Law Commission 
regarding curbing the liability of auditing firms. 
3.6 Chapter summary 
It has emerged that the dominance of the Big Six in the audit services market has 
been driven by market forces. In spite of the dominance, there is ample evidence 
of competition which goes against popular expectations that monopolistic 
pricing tendencies would be prevalent. 
As the growth of demand for audit services has slowed down, auditors 
compensated for this by adopting a broader role as consultants. The issue which 
still has to be resolved is to establish the exact nature of the relationship between 
MAS and the attest function and the pricing of the latter. The following chapter 
of the literature survey sheds some light on these issues. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to present the current status of research on 
audit fees. There has been a growing body of research in this topic emanating 
from Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, 
the U.K. and the U.S .. The bulk of the research has come from the U.S. Major 
findings from the available studies are summarised with an emphasis on 
comparisons with prior research at the time each study was completed. 
The studies are by country and in order of precedence to demonstrate how 
earlier research became the foundation of future investigation, thus shedding 
more light into the factors that influence audit fees. Some studies on municipal 
and other public sector bodies are also included to assess whether the variables 
determining audit fees are different between private companies and public sector 
bodies. 
4.2 United States 
Research into audit fees began in the early 1970s in the U.S. and focused mainly 
on the calculation of audit fees as a percentage of sales or total assets and 
analysing differences by industry mainly. Hobgood and Sciarrino [1972a] 
surveyed 797 US manufacturing companies and found that in 1970, the average 
US company was paying 0.04% of its annual sales in audit fees. However, this 
percentage ranged from 0.18% for companies with sales under $50 million to 
0.03% for companies with sales over $1 billion. 
When the survey was extended to 798 non manufacturing companies [Hobgood 
and Sciarrino, 1972b], a similar pattern was observed with companies with sales 
less than $50 million paying 0.10% of their annual sales in audit fees whilst 
those with sales over $1 billion paying 0.02%. 
Both studi~s indicate that audit fees as a percentage of sales did not bear a 
positive relation with size as measured by sales. Unfortunately, the authors did 
not explain the reasons behind these observations. Also, there were no tests of 
significance on the averages to examine whether they were significantly different 
between company sizes as measured by sales. 
50 
When the management of the companies surveyed were asked about the 
reasonableness of the audit fee in relation to size and complexity of operations, 
some voiced their dissatisfaction charging that the "Big Eight firms, because of 
their monopolistic control of the profession, generally charge higher fees for 
their services" [Hobgood and Sciarrino, 1972a, p.28]. It is worth noting that the 
managers expressing this comment did not seem to relate the high prices to a 
perception of higher quality of services offered by the Big Eight. 
The managers then gave some factors that were most commonly used in judging 
the reasonableness of audit fees. These were [1972a, p.29]: 
• Size and calibre of audit firm staff; 
• Size of company and location of its audited units currently and in 
previous years; 
• Relation of audit fees to sales volume; 
• Comparison of audit fees paid with those paid by other companies of 
similar size in the same industry; 
• Comparison between budgeted and actual audit fee paid; and 
• Management's personal experiences with other audit firms. 
Elliott and Korpi [1978] analysed the effects of a number of variables, 
measuring size, industry and complexity on audit fees. Their sample was drawn 
from the clients of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and .Co. in the US. In general they 
were able to explain a significant amount of the variance in audit fees. Their 
most successful models used the size measures of total assets and sales. Overall, 
the most significant variables affecting audit fees were found to be [pp.18-19]: 
• The size (sales or total assets depending upon the primary or dominant 
nature of business); 
• The degree of complexity in locations and product lines; 
• The degree of accounting and financial centralisation; 
• The reduction in scope due to reliance on internal auditors; · 
• The number of audit reports required; and 
• The ratio of actual to standard fees. 
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Simunic [1980] provided the pre-eminent study in the identification of variables, 
explaining audit fees and the effect of the structure of the audit services market 
on audit fees. Furthermore, his model provided a framework for evaluating the 
competitiveness of the audit services market. The data used in this study 
consisted of 397 responses from a survey sent to publicly-held corporations in 
the US during 1977. The first step in the study was to identify factors affecting 
audit fees. Using these firm-specific factors as a control in the regression 
equation, the competitiveness of the audit services market was tested by first 
classifying auditees as either small or large and the auditors as either Big Eight 
or non-Big Eight. The assumption in this analysis wa~ that the market for small 
audits is competitive because of the greater number_of suppliers relative to large 
audits where the Big Eight were dominant suppliers. 
The variables that were hypothesised to have a relationship with audit fees were 
(a) size of the auditee, (b) the complexity of the auditee's operations, (c) 
auditing problems associated with certain financial statement components, 
especially, inventories and receivables, (d) the industry of the auditees and (e) 
whether the auditee is publicly or closely held. 
The size of the auditee (measured by total assets) was significant, and so was 
complexity (measured by number of subsidiaries, proportion of inventories and 
receivables, percentage of foreign assets). For the test of competition, emphasis 
was on the auditor variable which had a coefficient that was not significantly 
different from zero for all audit firms with the exception of Price Waterhouse 
(PW), which was significant across auditee size classes. Simunic explains that the 
significantly positive coefficient for PW may represent a price difference paid by 
auditees for a differentiated service [p.188]. 
The overall conclusion in this study was that the Big Eight firms tended to 
charge lower fees than non-Big Eight. firms. His conjecture was that the Big 
Eight firms enjoyed scale of economies which are passed on as lower prices to 
auditees [p.188]. The only weakness in this study was that the author did not 
investigate sufficiently the possible product differentiation within the Big Eight 
firms [Pound and Francis, 1981]. 
Shockley and Holt [ 1983] examined the basis of product-differentiation within 
the Big Eight group of auditors. Because of its exploratory nature the study was 
limited to the banking sector with a focus on the thirty largest banks in the US. 
' 
A questionnaire was sent to the chief financial officer of each bank and analysis 
of the responses was performed using multidimensional rank order. 
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The analysis revealed an ability to systematically differentiate between Big Eight 
auditing firms on the basis of qualitative attributes. The most important factor 
was market share of the banking industry. The reasons for this are quite 
speculative with the most plausible being that the subjects related market share 
and name recognition with industry expertise [p.560]. Of the ten desirability and 
usefulness factors tested, conservatism which was related to independence, 
professionalism and reliability was the most important. 
Wallace [1984a] sought to provide a benchmark for determining a reasonable 
audit fee [p.34]. The variables tested were the ratio of foreign assets to total 
assets, the number of separate operating locations and operating revenue. 
Seventy-one companies for the 1981 financial year end were used. 
For the total sample, all variables had a significant positive relationship with audit 
fee. When the results were sub analysed between different categories of size and 
industry, only the number of locations was significant across all categories. The 
descriptive power of operating revenue declined. When operating revenue is 
used as a basis for forming subgroups, the foreign asset variable was 
insignificant at 20% for financial institutions. Wallace suggests that assets may be 
a better indicator of size for financial institutions than revenue [p.39]. The 
model developed showed the effect of expanding operations, investment in fixed 
assets and decentralisation would have on the audit fee, i.e. increase the audit fee. 
Wallace [ 1984b] ascertained the relative costs of internal and external auditors in 
a study covering 32 companies with sales avera~ing $2.1 billion. The premise in 
this study was that internal auditors can lower external audit fees by improving a 
company's accounting controls, performing financial examinations on which 
the external auditors can rely and assisting in a number of ways [p.16]. The 
regression model used had a number of variables commonly associated with 
determination of audit fees: operating income, net income, total assets, foreign 
assets, type of audit report, type of ownership, number of subsidiaries and 
operating l_ocations. An additional variable that was of specific interest was the 
total expenditures on the internal audit department. 
Operating revenue, net income, type of audit report, number of operating 
locations and the internal audit costs were significantly related to audit fees. The 
coefficient of the internal audit costs variable was negative, adding support to the 
assertion that internal auditors can cut the external audit fee. In effect, per 
Wallace's research, on average, each dollar spent on internal audit costs would 
reduce the external audit fees by 4.5 cents [p.20]. 
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The evidence presented here suggested that savings on the external audit fee 
may be improved if more hours are allocated to internal audit assistance of the 
external auditors. 
Two glaring weakness in the study were the small size of the sample and the 
concentration on large companies. In fact, one would expect larger companies to 
have more elaborate control systems which would invariably include an internal 
audit department. Strangely enough, the author did not provide an analysis of 
how the size factor may have influenced her results. 
Simunic [1984] evaluated the relationship between the audit fees and the 
provision of non-audit services. He tested for the existence of pricing effects 
arising out of knowledge spillovers when the audit function and the provision of 
non-audit services are performed by the same firm. The thesis of the study was 
that the cost functions for the production of audit and non-audit services were 
interdependent because of favourable knowledge spillovers. The test of the 
hypothesis involved a comparison of fees, other things being held constant for a 
control group of companies which did not purchase non-audit services from 
their auditor, to a group which purchased both services. The data was taken from 
the 397 observations on audit fees covering the financial years ending in 1977 
used in Simunic [1980]. 
The hypothesis that .there were spillover effects between provision of non-audit 
services and audit services could not be rejected. The purchase of non-audit 
services from the auditor was associated with a significant increase in the audit 
fee. This was interpreted as arising from "a beneficial knowledge spillover 
between services"[p.699]. This observed relationship would arise if the 
provision of audit services gives rise to knowledge useful in non-audit fees 
provision and/or the provision of non-audit services reduces the marginal cost of 
auditing and audit demand is relatively elastic [p.698]. Therefore, economically 
auditors earn economic rents as a result of performing both services which they 
retain instead of passing them to their client in the· form of a reduced audit fee. 
It would appear from Simunic's analysis that these benefits were not being 
passed on to clients in the form of lower audit fees. The perception harboured 
by some critics of the auditing profession had been that the provision of audit 
services and non-audit services would result in lower audit fees used to gain 
market share [e.g. AICPA, 1978]. The only drawback of Simunic's work was 
that the types of non-audit services were not distinguished. Clearly, not all non-
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audit services have audit implications e.g. executive recruiting has no impact on 
auditing. 
Simon [1985] presented an extension of Simunic [ 1980 and 1984] on the 
determinants of audit fees and the relationship between audit fees and non-audit 
services. Audit fees for 79 firms resulting in 179 observations for the years 1978 
to 1983 were extracted from proxy statements kept in the libraries of several 
universities in the Chicago area. 
The findings in this study generally supported earlier studies showing that audit 
fees are related to (a) fi~m size (number of subsidiaries) and complexity 
(measured by inventory), (b) non-audit services. However the differentiated fee 
structure observed for Price Waterhouse by Simunic [1980] was non existent 
showing that it may have been a transitory phenomenon [p.71]. 
Palmrose [ 1986a] examined whether there is a systematic relation between audit 
firm size in terms of (a) absolute size, and (b) relative market shares, and (c) 
audit fees. The three hypotheses tested in this study related higher audit fees 
charged by large firms to (a) market (monopolistic) powers and (b) higher 
quality of services. On the other hand the third hypothesis related lower audit 
fees to economies of scale. The control variables were total assets, number of 
special reports other than annual financial statements required by the client, 
client participation through internal audit support, industry classification, report 
modifications, ownership structure, number of locations, auditor specialisation 
and auditor size. 
The significant variables for the total sample of 361 companies were assets, 
locations, number of reports, internal audit support, ownership structure and 
auditor size. With the exception of the report modification variable, industry 
classification did not affect the significance of the explanatory power of the 
variables. In effect, the results suggests that " higher audit fees are associated 
with Big Eight audit firms thus supporting either higher quality services or 
monopoly pricing by the large suppliers" [p.108]. 
To distinguish between the two competing explanations, data for the number of 
hours spent in each audit engagement for 302 companies were obtained and 
substituted in the regression model in place of the audit fee. Again the Big Eight 
auditor variable was significant. Therefore, overall the evidence weighed more 
towards Big Eight auditors being associated with higher quality services [p.108]. 
A test for monopoly pricing involved the segmentation of the clients by size and 
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testing the significance of the Big Eight variable. The Big Eight coefficient was 
found to be positive and significant for small auditees but not for large leading 
to the conclusion that the Big Eight offered a differentiated product. 
Palmrose's findings differ from Simunic [1980] who found that the. Big Eight 
firms tended to charge lower fees due to economies of scale. 
Palmrose [ l 986b] re-examined the effect of non-audit services on audit fees. 
Her approach differed slightly from Simunic [1984] in that the non-audit 
services were split between tax, accounting and non-accounting services. This 
decomposition allowed for investigation of whether the proximity of the service 
to auditing services influences the existence and magnitude of any beneficial 
effects from joint supply. An additional variation was the inclusion of non-audit 
services provided by auditing firms other than the incumbent auditor. The 
examination covered 298 public and closely held companies from twelve 
industries with Big Eight firms as the incumbent auditors. The time period 
covered October 1980 to October 1981 . 
.Audit fees were regressed against control variables assumed to affect their 
general level, together with four test variables for fees paid to incumbent auditors 
for tax, accounting-related services, non-accounting related services and fees 
paid for non-audit services to non-incumbent auditors. 87% of the companies 
purchased non-audit services from incumbent auditors and larger companies 
purchased non-audit services more frequently. 
All types of services showed a positive relationship with audit fees regardless of 
size. For small companies, only tax and accounting related services were 
statistically significant, whilst for large companies all were significant with the 
exception of tax services. Accounting related advisory services showed the most 
significant correlation with audit fees. A significant finding was that the variable 
for non-audit services rendered by audit firms other than the incumbent auditor 
was also significantly correlated to audit fees. This raises doubts about the joint-
supply explanation advanced by Simunic [1984] as there would be no joint-
supply benefits between audit services of the incumbent auditor and the non-
audit services of non incumbents [p.410]. As a result, audit fees should not 
really be affected by fees for non-audit services purchased from non-
incumbents. 
Palmrose ventures the explanation that the audit services acquired from the other 
audit firms may have audit implications, e.g. changes in organisation structure 
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necessitating changes in accounting and control systems requiring additional 
audit work for the incumbent auditor at the time of the change [p.410]. 
Nevertheless, Simunic's [1984] assertion of joint supply was weakened by these 
findings. 
Rubin [1987] applied research carried in the private sector to the public sector 
namely, municipalities. According to him, the environment and procedures 
surrounding the audit contracting process in the public sector differs from the 
private sector e.g. the financial statement users, accounting systems and the type 
of financial reports are all different in the public sector. Using Simunic's [1980] 
framework, he developed a model for the pricing of audit services on a sample 
of 189 cities. Each of the factors tested were based on previous studies 
particularly, Simunic [1980], Palmrose [1986a] and Francis [1984], and 
identified as having an effect on audit fees. The factors for size, complexity and 
audit risk were given measures applicable to municipalities. 
Municipal size, financial risk and complexity were the most important factors 
that explained audit fees. The dominance of the Big Eight auditing firms was 
less than in the private sector. The auditor variable was not significant, 
suggesting that "the Big Eight firms were not associated with significantly 
higher audit fees in either the large or small city market" [p.234]. Overall, the 
evidence showed that the municipal audit market was competitive at the time. 
Rubin's findings brought out some similarities in the determinants of audit fees 
between the private and public sectors. It showed that the size and complexity 
explain audit fees in both sectors of the audit market. The absence of a discount 
on initial engagements was consistent with the findings of Francis [1984] in 
Australia for the private sector. 
Baber, Brooks and Rucks [1987] also investigated the public sector market for 
audit services. Their emphasis was on the structure of audit fees paid by the 100 
North Carolina county governments during the period 1980 to 1984. Firstly, the 
study related differences in audit fees to differences in the financial and political 
characteristics of the county governments. Secondly, they investigated the 
structure of audit fees surrounding a change in auditor. The impact on audit fees 
of state and federal regulations, county size, audit firm size, change in auditor 
and auditor opinion were investigated with a view to providing more evidence on 
the findings of Rubin [ 1987]. Some financial factors namely, debt per capita 
and income per capita were also included together with political factors based on 
party memberships of the Board of County Commissioners and the turnover of 
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the Commissioners. In investigating the effect of auditor change, this study 
adopted a different approach by examining audit fees before the auditor change 
to test whether auditors anticipate such changes and then cut their fees. 
They observed significant relations between audit fees and the measures of audit 
firm size, audit scope and county population; but neither the auditor change nor 
the auditor's opinion variables were significant at conventional levels. Both the 
political and financial variables were also significant. Rubin [1987] also 
observed the significance of the size, complexity and financial risk variables. 
However, he did not find the auditor variable to be significant. 
New audit engagements showed a mean fee reduction of about 20% versus an 
average fee increase of 7,5% for continuing engagements. The audit fees did not 
immediately revert to their preswitch levels. The reduction in audit fees for initial 
engagements goes against Rubin's [1987] finding for the public sector and 
Francis [1984] for the Australian private sector which showed no marked 
differences in audit fees following auditor changes. A possible explanation 
advanced for this difference was that differences in audit markets could lead to 
differences in the relative magnitudes of audit fees for initial engagements. 
Maher, Tiessen, Colson and Broman [1987] investigated the behaviour of audit 
fees for 78 companies in the period 1978 to 1981. This was a period when the 
regulatory bodies (SEC and the AICPA) were looking closely at the 
competitiveness or lack thereof of auditing firms in the US. The main focus of 
the study was therefore to examine if audit fees were keeping up with inflation in 
light of the perceived intensity of competition observed by the Cohen 
Commission [AICPA, 1978]. 
The changes in audit fees were mainly explained by changes in accounts 
receivable and extent of diversification. After adjusting for inflation, audit fees 
were decreasing at a rate of 3,9% per annum from 1977 to 1981. The decrease 
was not particularly driven by any particular industry or auditing firm. The 
indication from this study was that the ongoing changes in the competitiveness 
of the auditing environment "could result in a downward trend in audit fees" 
[p.208]. 
Francis and Simon [1987] C<?ncentrated on the pricing of audit services in the 
small client segment of the market. The study sought to reconcile the findings of 
Simunic [1980] and Palmrose [1986a] over the existence of a premium charged 
by Big Eight audit firms in the small segment of the market. This study used 
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three classes of audit firm size other than the Big Eight/non-Big Eight 
dichotomy: (a) Big Eight firms, (b) other national firms and (c) other firms 
having local or regional offices. The sample selected had 220 companies of 
which twelve were initial engagements. 
The most significant variables were those representing size (total assets, number 
of consolidated subsidiaries), complexity (inventories and receivables, number of 
foreign subsidiaries), audit opinion and the Big Eight auditor variable. With 
regard to the auditor variable, this evidently implies the existence of a Big Eight 
premium over all non-Big Eight auditors. This finding is consistent with 
Palmrose's [1986b] study of the US market, with studies of the Australian 
market [Francis, 1984 and Francis and Stokes, 1986], and a study of the UK 
market by Taffler and Ramalinggam [1982]. There was no evidence of a 
"second tier" firm premium over local or regional auditors. 
The authors then evaluated the impact of price-cutting on the twelve initial 
engagements. Unlike Francis [1984], the fees for initial engagements were 
significantly lower than those of continuing engagements. No interpretation was 
made on the effect on audit quality of such price-cutting behaviour. 
Balachandran and Ramakrishnan [1987] analysed the effect of audit firm size 
on audit fees using an economic model based on the agency framework. Using 
mathematical derivations, they prove that merging of auditors when there is 
mutual monitoring results in an improvement in risk sharing which would tend 
to decrease expected audit fees. While their analysis present a useful framework 
within which audit fees can be studied, it has not been supported by real life 
data. It does, however, give some understanding of the relationship between audit 
firm size and audit fees. 
Simon and Francis [1988] expanded the research on price-cutting on initial 
engagements done by Francis and Simon [ 1987]. They sought to determine 
whether (a) price cutting systematically occurs on initial audit engagements; and 
(b) if it does, to determine when audit fees recover or return to normal. A large 
sample of 214 public companies changing auditors over the period 1979-1984 
was tested along with 226 control firms not changing auditors over the same 
. period. The presence of price cutting was tested for the initial year as well as the 
second through to the sixth year. 
The results showed an average discount of 24% in the initial year and 15% for 
each of the next two years. By the fourth year, audit fees were not significantly 
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different from normal levels for continuing engagements. The significance of 
this study wa5 that it affirmed the existence of "economically significant price-
cutting behaviour and that auditors use a multi-period pricing model" [p.267]. 
Therefore, these findings refute the notion based on economic theory that the 
initial price discount is a sunk cost which is irrelevant for subsequent decision 
making as suggested by DeAngelo [1981]. In effect, there is. a real possibility 
that auditor independence may be reduced until the initial fee discount is 
recovered [p.267]. 
It is interesting to note that Francis [ 1984] in Australia failed to find price 
cutting in initial engagements in the private sector whilst the evidence of the 
public sector yield mixed results (see Rubin [1987] for municipalities and Baber 
et al [1987] for counties). 
Palmrose [ 1989] investigated the relation between audit contract type to audit 
fees and audit hours. She suggested that contract type affected uncertainty of 
risk and incentives to the auditor and the client [p.489]. In a fixed fee contract, 
the audit fee is set and agreed upon before the audit starts. Therefore the auditor 
will bear the consequences of deviations between expected and actual fee. 
Furthermore, fixed fee contracts generally provide greater incentives for auditors 
to perform the audit in the minimum time because all the savings will accrue to 
the benefit of the auditor [p.489]. The alternative type of contract has audit fees 
based on hourly and daily charges normally referred to as cost-reimbursement 
contracts (i.e. "cost-plus"). In this case the risks shift to the client. Therefore 
the hours spent on a fixed fee contract should be less than in a cost-plus 
contract. Consequently the audit fee should be less for a fixed fee contract. 
Using multiple regression analysis, variables generally found to be related to 
audit fees were included in the model as independent variables, together with 
audit contract type as an additional variable. Audit fees and hours were used as 
dependent variables. The data consisted of 361 companies with 183 having fixed 
fee contracts and 178 having cost-plus contracts representing the 1980-81 time 
perfod. 
Contract type was significantly related to the audit fee only, but not to audit 
hours. Therefore audit hours did not significantly differ between different types 
of contracts. Although fixed fee contracts tended to be more common in the 
early years of auditor/client relations, the price cutting behaviour on initial 
engagements did not adequately explain lower fees associated with fixed fee 
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contracting. Fixed fee contracts therefore tend to have lower audit fees but the 
incentives do not result in reduction in audit hours. 
Wallace [ 1989] studied the association between unique business and audit risk 
and audit fees. In effect, Wallace had observed comments of some writers and 
practitioners about the changes in the environment in which auditors operated, 
and the possible impact that this might have on business and audit risk. A 
combination of covariance, factor and regression techniques were applied to a 
sample of 117 companies and the audit fees they reported in 1981. The major 
factors examined were total assets, number of subsidiaries and divisions, 
operating revenue, industry classification, percentage of foreign assets, quality 
control, vulnerability to litigation against the auditor, and the number of years 
the external auditor had been involved with the client as independent variables, 
with audit fees and audit hours being dependent variables. 
The regression model lacked significance [p.19] and there was no systematic 
association beyond size effects. Wallace notes that the results could have been 
contaminated by the use of seasonal billing rates, portfolio-based fees directed at 
the industry segment rather than at individual firms. Furthermore, adjustments 
for risk may be in the form of staff assignment and use of qualified opinions 
rather than billing rates [pp.30-31]. 
In summary, the evidence presented here indicates that the price of audit services 
has little correspondence with business risk. Risk appears to be tied more to the 
extent of work than pricing behaviour [p.30]. The bottom line is that audit fees 
were not sufficiently risk-adjusted. It is apt to note the concern raised by the 
author regarding the absence of market correction to offer lower fees in relation 
to lower risk [p.35]. There may be some profits to be made in bidding down 
fees to accrue profits. A speculative suggestion by the writer is that fees may 
have been driven down by clients who may perceive that their risk profile should 
be reflected in the audit fee. 
Ettredge and Greenberg [1990] extended Simon and Francis [1988] work on 
fee-cutting on initial engagements. They analysed the association between 
quality, industry expertise and technological efficiency of the auditor, 'low 
balling' and the number of audit tender offers with the percentage fee cut on 
initial engagements. All 389 auditor switches between 1984 and 1987 were 
covered of which 163 'bad full data available. 
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The mean and median fee cut reported were 25% and 23% respectively. Note 
that the average was similar to that of 24% reported by Francis and Simon 
[1988]. Also Francis and Simon [1987] found some evidence of fee cutting. 
Francis [1984] did not find any evidence of a price discount in Australia while 
the evidence from the public sector shows no discount for municipalities (Rubin, 
1987) and a 20% discount for counties. The key findings of this study were as 
follows [pp.207-209]: 
1. Firms switching from Big Eight to non-Big Eight auditors (or vice 
versa) received cuts that add (subtract) about 11 % to (from) the 
percentage fee cut expected for switches to auditors of the same class. 
" 
2. Larger fee cuts were associated with switches from an auditor who 
charged more than expected, given a client's characteristics to an 
auditor who charged less than expected. 
3. If the new auditor has more expertise than the old auditor, the client 
received a larger fee cut. 
4. Clients experience an additional fee cut of about 1 % for each 
additional bidding auditor. 
The results lend some weight to the existence of a Big Eight premium. They also 
suggest that.audit firms with a larger market share of a particular market enjoy a 
cost advantage in that industry which are at least passed on to clients in the form 
of lower audit fees [p.209]. 
; 
Given the conflicting findings of prior research regarding the impact of auditor 
change on audit fees in both the private (Francis [ 1984]; Francis and Simon 
[1987]; Simon and Francis [1988]) and public sectors (Baber et al [1987]; 
Rubin [ 1987]), Roberts, Glezen and Jones [1990] developed a model to explain 
auditor changes in a sample of 271 public independent schools in Texas with a 
view to reconciling these contradictory findings. Their study analysed the role of 
audit fees in the auditor change process, whilst the previous studies cited focused 
the effects of auditor change on audit fees. 
Auditor change was used as a dependent variable with the explanatory variables 
classified into the (1) client-auditor relations (auditor opinion, non-compliance 
reports for internal accounting control, school board and administration), (2) 
economic set (change in auditor, bonds issued in the current year, size of the 
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school district), and (3) the political set (changes in school board composition 
and superintendent tenure). 
Auditor changes were significantly related to changes in the audit fee, receipt of 
non-compliance reports for internal controls, the school board, and the size of 
the school district. These findings imply that reports by independent auditors of 
material weaknesses in internal accounting and irregularities by the school 
board, are likely to result in replacement of auditors. Secondly, school districts 
changing auditors are more likely to have current-year audit fees that are lower 
than their previous year's fees than school districts that did not change auditors. 
This supports earlier findings of apparent fee cutting like Baber et al [1987] and 
Simon and Francis [198~]. The relation between auditor change and a reduction 
in audit fees may mean that [p.228]: 
1. "Low-balling" activity occurred in the Texas school district audit 
market; 
2. School districts changed to firms that can perform the audit more 
efficiently; or 
3 . Differences in audit quality exist in the Texas school district audit 
market, and school district officials may have obtained lower fees by 
knowingly contracting for audits of a lower quality. 
In effect this study demonstrated that a change in auditor can be as a result of 
high audit fees and a cause for a change in audit fees. The evidence presented 
thus far does not give any pointers to the overall importance of each of the two 
observations. 
Abdel-Khalik [1990] evaluated the viability of explaining the relationship 
between management advisory services and audit fees in terms of knowledge 
spillovers as adopted by Simunic [1984] and Palmrose [1986b] from clients' 
viewpoint. He questioned the reasoning behind clients paying a "penalty" for 
acquiring two products from one supplier instead of two suppliers [p.296]. A 
priori, the presence of knowledge spillovers should not be expected to result in 
an upward pressure in the cost of audits due to the resultant cost savings. He 
suggests that [pp.300-301]: 
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1. A client's ability to capture the benefits of knowledge depend on the 
client's evaluation of the cost of search and displacement of the current 
auditor. 
2. The audit firm's incentive to pass on to the client the economic 
benefits of the knowledge spi~lovers depends on the audit firm's 
monopoly power in the relevant segment of audit markets. 
3. Determinants of both type of incentives include the client's assessment 
of localised economic growth and competitive conditions. 
The methodology adopted used an econometric analysis of the client's cost of 
self-selecting the incumbent auditor to provide both the advisory and audit 
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services, by evaluating the probability that a client will self-select into either 
selecting the incumbent auditor or another auditor/consultant. Eighty four non-
financial companies from five states were used in the analysis for the fiscal years 
relating to 1987. 
The results obtained in this study differed from those of Simunic [1984] and 
Palmrose [ 1986b]: audit fees of the sample companies were not affected by the 
choice of sourcing management advisory services. This signified an absence of 
cost or benefit accruing to clients for selecting the incumbent auditors to supply 
management advisory services. The author concludes that [p.320]: 
"The results are consistent with expectations in that it would not be 
rational for clients to pay higher audit fees simply because they also 
pay the firms of their auditors for additional sums of money for 
management advisory services." 
Solomon [ 1990] questioned the methodology adopted by Abdel~ Khalik [ 1990] 
·and hence the generalisation of the findings beyond the sample of 84 firms. 
Some of the key criticisms raised were: 
1 . The statistical analysis adopted did not adequately take into account 
demand for advisory services. 
2. The study was designed such that failure to reject the null hypothesis 
effectively confirms the author's position, i.e. that audit fees do not 
differ because of the decision to acquire non-audit services from either 
the incumbent auditor or some other choice. 
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3. No tests for non-response bias were performed as Abdel-Khalik had 
used' a survey to gather the data. 
4. No information was given on the criteria for inclusion in the sample of 
clients to which the questionnaires were sent. 
In effect, Solomon suggests that the findings of Abdel-Khalik do not repudiate 
the basic reasoning given by Simunic [1984] and Palmrose [1986b]. Therefore, 
Solomon reasons that the cause of Abdel-Khalik's results was due to four 
primary reasons. Firstly, clients who purchased both audit and other services 
from the external auditor could have been problem firms that required other 
services along with an extraordinary quantity of audit services. Secondly, some 
advisory services can create changes in the client's organisation that have 
significant audit implications. Thirdly, the MAS market may not be competitive. 
Finally, the categorisation of fees may be arbitrary. The suggestion made was 
that the audit firm partners may manipulate the fee categorisation due to the 
compensation schemes and the power traditionally held by audit partners relative 
to management consulting partners. 
Gist [1992] focused on regulatory aspects of the client that may explain 
variation in external audit fees. His approach involved inclusion of variables 
proxying regulatory aspects of the client over and above the standard control 
variables used by Simunic [1980] and Palmrose [1986a]. The inclusion of these 
regulatory variables was based on the premise that economies of scale exist for 
the audit firm in dealing with the regulatory complexity faced by the client. 
The assumption made based on the work of Arnett and Danos [1979] and Danos 
and Eichenseher [1981], was that "once .the auditor acquires the specialised 
knowledge necessary to service clients with increased regulation and disclosure 
requirements, he can service additional clients at a lower marginal cost than it. 
took to service the first few"[pp.80-81]. This would give rise to economies of 
scale which would be reflected in a lower audit fee. Gist also linked regulatory 
complexity with the number of registration forms filed by the auditor on behalf 
of the client with the SEC. The nature of the client industry was used as a binary 
variable, with one assigned to companies in regulated industries and zero if the 
company is a member of a non regulated industry. 
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In a usable sample of 95 listed publicly-held companies, firms representing 263 
observations supplied audit fee data for the period 1983 to 1985. Multiple 
regression analysis was applied to the variables using the audit fee as a 
dependent variable. 
The variables for the regulatory aspects were all significant The number of 
filings made with the SEC was negatively related to the audit fee, indicating 
possible knowledge spillovers in which work from registration of statements 
overlaps with audit work such that the latter is reduced. The industry regulatory 
complexity variable was positive, indicating that firstly, as regulation demands 
greater auditor experience, auditors will price in order to recover their 
investment. Secondly, the need for specialisation can create a barrier to entry in 
fewer auditing firms willing to perform a given audit. Therefore with only a few 
firms servicing this demand (or as this demand increases), the effect should be 
an increase in audit fees. 
This study shed more light on the effect of regulation on audit fees. Whilst the 
evidence is rather mixed, there are some pointers to further research to examine 
which of the two explanations, scale economies or specialisation effects, is more 
dominant in explaining the relationship between regulation and audit fees. 
Margheim and Kelley [1992] extended the work of Palmrose [1989] by 
surveying the perceptions of audit partners of the positive and negative effects of 
fixed fee billing arrangements and audit firms' responses to those effects. A 
questionnaire was sent to the partners of Big Six audit firms. A total sample of 
203 usable responses were received from partners with an average of 20 years in 
public practice, who had participated in the setting of audit fees for an average 
of 13 years and were currently setting fees for approximately 21 clients per 
year. 
Overall, the results showed a shift towards fixed fee billings as opposed to hourly 
billed arrangements. The respondents believed that fixed fee audits had lower 
fees and profits. Auditors responded by being more efficient in their work. This 
efficiency resulted from reducing work in low risk areas and asking the client 
personnel to do more audit work. In addition, the respondents believed that audit 
firms would reduce audit time budgets and that staff would feel more time 
budget pressure which could result in increased underreporting of time. There 
was disagreement on the effects of fixed fee billing arrangements on audit 
quality. 
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The results of the above study were not entirely consistent with Palmrose [1989]. 
She found that billing arrangements had no effect on external audit hours, whilst 
the perception of partners was that audit hours had been reduced. This may have 
been influenced by the sources of data: Palmrose gathered audit hours from 
client personnel whilst Margheim and Kelley surveyed partner opinions. 
However, the fact that fixed fee audits had lower fees than hourly billed audits 
was consistent with her finding. 
Therefore, it is clear from these studies that the method of setting the audit fee is 
an important determinant of audit fees. Information on such arrangements can 
only be gathered through communications with auditors and their clients. 
Davis, Richiutte and Trompeter [1993] replicated the work of Simunic [1984] 
and Palmrose [l986a] on the association between audit fees and non-audit 
services. Unlike preceding studies, they relied on actual audit hour and billing 
rates data provided by an accounting firm. The relation analysed was between 
(a) ·non-audit services and audit effort measured in terms of audit hours; and (b) 
non-audit services and audit fees. 
The findings replicated the finding of Simunic [1984] and Palmrose [1986b] in 
finding a positive association between audit fees and non-audit services. Firms 
purchasing non-audit services required additional audit effort in terms of audit 
hours than those that did not. Secondly, all the non-audit services variables were 
not significantly related to audit fees. 
Based on the assumption that demand for audit services is inelastic, these results 
were inconsistent with audit production efficiencies arising from knowledge 
spillovers, or that such benefits from efficiencies are passed on to the clients 
[p.147]. However, if the demand for auditing is elastic as suggested by Simunic 
[ 1984], then the evidence would be supportive of that notion. 
Ward, Elder and Kattelus [1994] extended the existing municipal audit fee 
models (e.g. Baber et al 1987, Rubin 1987), by incorporating additional 
variables that reflect the unique aspects of the municipal accounting and 
auditing environment. These measures related to auditor expertise, year end · 
adjustments passed by the auditor and the type of audit qualifications, and 
measures of agency costs related to the level of taxpayer funding services. 
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A multiple regression model was developed using 1988 audit fees from 92 cities 
and villages and 79 townships in the Michigan area: Generally a large 
proportion of the variables previously examined in Rubin [1987] and Baber et 
al [1987] were also found to be significant in explaining audit fees. A 
significant finding in this study was the statistically significant coefficient of the 
auditor experience variable. The fact that it was also positive suggests the 
existence of a fee premium for auditor industry experience [p.407]. 
Private sector studies give mixed evidence on the existence of a premium for 
auditor industry specialisation. For instance, Palmrose [1986a] was unable to 
detect a fee premium for publicly traded companies using a dichotomous 
measure of industry expertise based on client sales. On the contrary, Ettredge 
and Greenberg [1990] found that the first-year fee reduction was larger with the 
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change to a more experienced auditor. This was consistent with lower fees due to 
auditor experience. 
The explanation advanced for the difference in the findings seems to rest on the 
manner in which the auditor experience variable in measured. Fee premiums for 
experience were detected using dichotomous measures , and lower fees have 
been detected using a continuous variable [Ward et al, 1994, p.408]. Ward et al 
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[1994, p.408] then argue that dichotomous measures capture reputation effects 
while continuous measures may better capture economies of scale. 
The number of adjusting entries passed by the auditor at year end was also 
positively related to the audit fee. These adjustments therefore form an 
important element of the auditor's cost function in the public sector. The 
opinion qualifications were. not significant and therefore supporting the evidence 
provided by Rubin [1987] and Baber et al [1987]. The agency costs were 
positively related to the audit fee. The findings were interpreted as meaning that 
higher audit fees are more prevalent in highly taxed environment, where public 
officials have incentives to demonstrate accountability. 
The political variables showed no significant relation to the audit fee. The 
finding here confirmed the comment made by Baber et al [1987] that the link 
between audit fees and political competition is tenuous. The findings by Ward et 
al would seem to reinforce the argument that "auditing may not be the most 
effective monitoring device for many forms of political behaviour" [p.409]. 
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Ward et al certainly added a new dimension to the nature of auditing in the 
public sector. One similarity between the public sector findings and private 
sector findings is the importance of auditing as a form of monitoring contracts. 
Copley, Doucet and Gaver [1994] demonstrate that the audit quality and audit 
fees are mutually determined by the interaction of the client's demands for, and 
the audit firm's supply of, audit quality. Their approach used simultaneous 
equation estimation procedures based on the proposition that the audit fee and 
audit quality are simultaneously determined through the selection of the auditor. 
The first equation used a proxy for quality as the dependent variable with the 
audit fee as one on the independent variables. The proxy for quality was defined 
as "a latent variable" which was "unobserved," but only with respect to sign. 
[p.248]. The quality index was assumed to be linked to the outcome of the 
quality review by the responsible government official. In the second equation, 
the audit fee was the dependent variable, with the quality index used in the first 
equation as one of the independent variables. The data for the equations was 
drawn from 188 audit reports drawn from a population of audited federal 
assistance programmes and reviewed by the U.S. General Accounting Office in 
1985. 
Their results show that audit quality is negatively related to the audit fee. This 
suggests that the demand for audit quality is sensitive to the fee, and that higher 
audit fees may therefore reduce the levels of quality demanded· [p.253]. In 
addition, the quality index coefficient was positive, suggesting that differences in 
quality are reflected in audit fees. This added further evidence to the existence 
of a brand premium for quality differentiated audits. 
As far as prior research methodologies relying on single ordinary least squares 
equation, the authors results showed that the a two stage estimation procedure 
would results in differences in inferences between the two estimation procedures. 
These differences suggest "the presence of simultaneous equation bias within 
the audit fee/quality relation, which may explain the inconsistent results obtained 
for other quality measures employed in single equation audit fee 
. analyses"[p.254]. 
Whilst the methodology adopted in this study has some· merit, it is not possible to 
identify a similar measure that could be used in private sector studies that is 
available to individuals. This limits the practical applications of their 
methodology in research efforts focusing on the private sector. 
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Gist [ 1994] attempted to examine some specific factors that lead to large firms' 
economies of scale. The hypothesis tested were: 
H 1: There is a significant and positive interaction effect between variables 
measuring audit firm size and client capital market activity on external 
audit fees. 
H2: There is a significant and positive interaction effect between variables 
measuring audit firm size and client industry membership on external 
audit fees. 
These hypotheses were tested using a sample of 107 companies covering the 
years 1983-1985. The sample was split between the large companies (total assets 
greater than $150 million) and small companies (total assets less than $150 
million) and by auditor size (Big Eight and non-Big Eight). Five regulated 
industries and five non-regulated industries were included in the sample. The 
regulatory variables were included in a multiple regression equation as test 
variables, in addition to those that had been identified (e.g .. by Simunic [1980], 
Wallace [1984a] Simon [1985] and Palmrose [1986a]) as affecting audit fees. 
The results supported the hypotheses stated above. The coefficient for capital 
market activity was negative and significant for clients with Big Eight auditors. 
In addition, the audit fee for clients with Big Eight auditors and involved in 
security registrations, had lower mean audit fees compared to when the auditors 
were .not involved. The mean audit fee analysis also showed that the mean fee 
when a non-Big Eight audit fee was involved was higher than when a Big Eight 
audit firm had been engaged. The author states that this observation may be due 
to the fact that the security registration process may reflect the volume of work 
by the Big Eight firms and their specialisation [p.391]. 
The audit fees charged by both Big Eight and non-Big Eight audit firms 
appeared to be lower in regulated industries as compared to non regulated 
industries. The analysis of interactive effects showed that the relationship 
between audit fees and industry complexity was stronger for Big Eight auditors. 
The conclusion reached by this study was that client regulatory complexity 
confers greater scale economies and opportunities to larger firms compared to 
small ones. This study confirmed the work of Gist [1992], Eichenseher and 
Danos [ 1981] and Danos and Eichenseher [ 1982, 1986] on the relationship 
between auditor concentration in certain industry and possible scale economies. 
These economies are passed to clients in the form of a lower audit fee. 
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A recent study by Pearson and Trompeter [1994] investigated the relationship 
between supplier concentration and competition in the market for audit services. 
This study concentrated on the unregulated industries, since the work of Danos 
and Eichenseher [1982, 1986] and Eichenseher and Danos [1981] showed that 
concentration is higher and more sustainable in regulated industries. They 
picked 140 life and health insurance companies and 101 property and casualty 
insurance companies for detailed examination of the following key issues: 
1. The relationship between concentration and audit fees. 
2. The validity of· concentration as a surrogate for competition by 
examining competition among the market leaders (defined as industry 
specialists). 
3. The effect of industry specialisation on fees by clients that switch 
auditors between market leaders and non leaders. 
The methodology adopted did not differ substantially to the regression analysis 
used in all the other similar studies, which incorporated control variables found 
to have a significant effect on audit fees by, among others, Simunic [1980], 
Francis [1984], Palmrose [1986a] and Wallace [1989]. The surrogate for 
industry concentration was computed by summing the market shares of the three 
largest providers of audit services within an industry. A positive coefficient for 
this variable would indicate that high industry concentration is associated with 
high audit fees. 
Their results showed that audit fees are significantly and negatively associated 
with concentration. This finding was consistent with the claim that high 
concentration leads to reduced price competition. The finding provided "more 
evidence of significant economies of scale accruing to market. leaders" [pp.124-
125]. A possible explanation rendered for this is that market leaders are able to 
use industry specialists more efficiently, thus providing "economies of 
expertise" (p.125]. Non leaders would then be forced to keep their fees down to 
compete with market leaders. 
~heir examination of auditor switches followed the same methodology as 
Ettredge and Greenberg [1990]. In the sample of 47 auditor switches, there was 
roughly an equal proportion of switches between market leaders and from non 
leaders to market leaders. Auditor changes between market leaders showed a 
significant reduction in audit fees and also in switches between non leaders. All 
had statistically significant negative coefficients. Unlike Ettredge and Greenberg 
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[ 1990], they did not detect a statistically significant fee cut for companies 
switching to market leaders from' non leaders. 
The above findings provided evid<?nce of significant price competition among 
market leaders for each other's clients. Further, they support the claim that 
market leaders are able to earn a return on an investment in reputation. This 
interpretation "would support the argument that the market for audit services 
can be characterised as monopolistically competitive in which there is limited 
product differentiation and that certain clients are willing to trade off the 
opportunity to receive the audit services of a specialist" [p.128]. Additionally, 
market leaders do not have to offer significantly lower fees relative to non 
leaders to attract clients away from nonleader. They can maintain their relatively 
high audit fees by cashing in on their higher reputations. 
Summary of US Studies 
The research from the US is growing in number and in sophistication of 
methodologies used in studies on audit fees. The variables used to explain audit 
fees have been extended and the analysis of audit fees has been extended to 
cover the public sector. The body of literature examined above is unanimous in 
certain explanatory variables of audit fees, whilst in others the evidence is mixed 
and there are a number of unresolved issues. Specifically, in both the public and 
private sectors, audit fees are found to be significantly influenced by auditee size 
(measured in terms of assets, turnover, population) and complexity (number of 
audit reports, receivables, inventories, number of subsidiaries). In the private 
sector, the effect of auditor changes leads to a significant reduction in audit fees 
which may extend beyond the initial year of engagement. The public sector 
evidence is mixed with some studies showing a reduction whilst others do not. 
The existence of the Big Six premium is unresolved although there is strong a 
priori justification for its possible existence. Simunic's early study identified 
one firm as charging a premium. Subsequent studies in the private sector 
(Palmrose [1986a], Francis and Simon [1987] and Ettredge and Greenberg 
[1990]) all point out the existence of a premium. In contrast, public sector 
studies do not find a Big Eight premium. 
Auditor expertise/ industry specialisation also yields mixed results. The two 
competing explanations are the reputational effects which would result in higher 
fees, and the economies of scale argument which· leads to lower fees for industry 
specialists. The earliest study on this issue by Palmrose [ 1986] found ,no 
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premium or fee reduction whilst later studies by Gist [1992, 1994] and Pearson 
~ 
and Trompeter [ 1994] all found a premium albeit for different reasons. The 
major point of departure in this studies is that Gist explains the existence of a 
premium in terms of reputation and auditor expertise, whilst the latter argue that 
concentration in certain industries leads to a premium for market leaders. 
The influence of MAS on audit fees also remains unresolved. Abdel-Khalik 
[1990] contradicts the findings of both Simunic [1984] and Palmrose [1986b]. 
However, the joint-supply theory advanced by Simunic [1984] was severely 
weakened by Palmrose [ 1986b] results. What is perhaps needed is input by 
practitioners on whether there is a link between the cost function of audit fees 
and MAS. 
The proxies of audit risk are not yet clear. Financial risk identified in public 
sector studies is significantly related to audit fees. Other measures such as losses, 
ownership structure and audit report qualification, yield mixed results. This 
points to difficulty in identifying the nature of audit risk. 
4.2 United Kingdom 
Briston and Perks [ 1977] estimated the level of audit fees paid to external 
auditors in the U.K. for the period 1976-77. A sample of 50% of the largest 500 
companies was used to establish the average audit fee as a percentage of turnover 
along the same lines as.done by Hobgood and Sciarrino [1972a, 1972b]. Using 
this percentage as a standard for companies of different sizes (as measured by 
turnover), the total audit fee for listed companies were put at £109,7 million for 
1975-76. The authors also stated that the estimate could have been understated 
by as much as 20%. 
Fanning [1978] criticised the approach used by Briston and Perks on the basis 
that in his (Fanning's) survey of 450 listed companies, "there was no such thing 
as a common percentage of sales used to assess charges" [p.47]. Fanning's 
analysis showed that fees charged ranged from 0,02% to 0,09% of turnover. 
Generally, companies with turnovers between £45 and £55 million had audit fees 
averaging 0,08% of turnover. Companies with turnover of £5 million or less had 
an average of 0,38% of turnover. His estimate of total audit costs for all listed 
c·ompanies (excluding the top 100 companies ranked by market capitalisation) 
was £212,85 million for the 1976-77 period. This was well above the estimate of 
Briston and Perks [1977] even after taking into account the approximated 
underestimate extent of 20%. Fanning assumed a general increase in audit fees 
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ranging from 15 to 30% to compute the estimated audit fees of listed companies 
as between £307 and £347 million for 1978. 
This study showed that there was a variation in the percentage as had been 
observed in Hobgood and Sciarrino [1972a, 1972b]. However, the work of 
Hobgood and Sciarrino [ 1972a, 1972b] showed larger firms having a lower 
average of audit fees as a proportion of sales. It would seem that the work of 
Fanning indicated that audit fees, as a percentage of sales, bore a positive relation 
with size as measured by sales. 
Taylor and Baker [1981] investigated major publicly available variables which 
would explain variation of audit fees of manufacturing companies in the UK. 
Using a sample of 126 companies with sales greater than £100 million and 
applying factor and regression analysis, they observed that total assets and the 
number of subsidiaries explained the most variance in the two factors of size and 
complexity. The correlation with the audit fee improved for each of the size 
variables when the square root transformation was used [p.58]. An interesting 
observation was that the intercept term was consistently negative, contrary to the 
expectation that there is a fixed cost to an audit [p.60]. The authors speculate 
that the reason for this could be that the fixed cost is small or negligible [p.60]. 
Taffler and Ramalinggam [1982] designed a three variable model based on a 
sample of 192 British manufacturing firms. The model used turnover, auditor 
size and industry affiliation as measures of firm size, auditor reputation and 
complexity respectively. Industry and turnover showed a significant positive 
correlation with the audit fee, whereas auditor size showed a negative correlation. 
In addition, the study revealed that small companies were associated with lower 
audit fees, and joint audits with higher ones. In the period covered by the study 
(1973-1977) audit fees increased by 29%. The results suggested that there were 
economies of scale to large auditing firms. 
Ramzy [ 1988) solicited opinions from financial directors and auditing firm 
partners through a questionnaire on the determinants and the procedure for 
setting audit fees. The factors which both parties considered to be important 
were used to design a model for predicting audit fees for a sample of 65 
manufacturing companies in the UK. Debtors, the number of subsidiaries, and 
employment costs were the most significant explanatory variables affecting audit 
fees. The increase in audit fees was not at the same rate as the increase in size 
due to economies of scale. 
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Chan, Ezzamel and Gwilliam [1993] extended the research on the determination 
of audit fees done in the UK by including extent of ownership control, location 
of client and diversification as additional variables. Secondly, semi-structured 
interviews were carried out with partners of Big Six firms to solicit other 
"relevant issues." A sample of 280 companies was chosen for audit fees relating 
to the year ending 31st December 1987. 
The most important variables were sales, profitability, audit delay (the length of 
time between year end and the signing of the audit report), diversification, 
ownership control, location, auditor size and number of subsidiaries. The auditor 
variable was significant across all size of entities indicating the existence of a Big 
Eight premium in both large and small segments of the market. This observation 
provided further evidence in the UK that large auditors offer a differentiated 
. product in terms of quality and degree of sophistication which is reflected in the 
price. Contradictory to Firth [1985], the audit delay and unsystematic risk (risk 
specific to the client) are significant. 
Pong and Whittington [1994] charged that the linear regression model was a 
deficient ad hoc model which prior researchers had only discussed cursorily. 
They argued that the transformation of the dependent variable to a logarithm 
implies a multiplicative model when in essence linear regression is additive. They 
added that prior models did not adequately capture the interaction of 
independent variables such as auditor size, client size and complexity. 
To deal with these shortcomings they suggested that a quadratic model would be 
more suitable for capturing size effects, especially economies of scale. Also, the 
interaction between independent variables was captured by taking the product of 
these variables. This model was applied to 3349 observations gathered between 
1981 and 1988 amongst listed companies on the London Stock Exchange. The 
longer time period allowed for analysis of the possibility of a time trend in the 
real (inflation-adjusted) level of audit fees. 
The overall results were not significantly different from prior international 
research. Auditee size as measured by either total assets or stock plus debtors 
had a significant effect on audit fees. Note that other researchers such as 
Simunic [1980], Francis [1984], Firth [1985] and Chan et al [1993] among 
others, used debtors and stock as measures of balance sheet complexity. Of 
particular interest was that the quadratic term for assets had a significant negative 
coefficient, suggesting fairly strong evidence of economies of scale with respect 
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to auditee size. Similar to Chan et al [1993], the results identified a Big Eight 
premium and a higher charge for clients with a greater number of subsidiaries. 
"Lowballing" was also prevalent especially for newly-appointed auditors who 
were not members of the Big Eight. The profit variable had an effect which was 
sensitive to model specification. In its unadjusted form, it tended to have a 
positive effect on audit fees suggesting that the audit fee may be based on the 
client's ability to pay. When it was reduced to a dummy variable, small loss 
making auditee firms receive a discount on their audit fee, but larger loss-
making firms are charged a premium by their auditors. 
·Probably, the most significant finding of this study was the existence of 
economies of scale in auditing. However, in the final analysis, the modified 
version of the usually adopted regression analysis used in this study did not 
offer any major difference to previous studies. 
4.3 Australia 
Pound and Francis [1981] investigated the extent of differential pricing between 
(a) Big Eight and non-Big Eight firms and (b) within the Big Eight group of 
accounting firms. The sample covered 458 listed companies covering six 
industry groupings. Using a Spearman Rank Correlation analysis, asset size was 
found to be a satisfactory explanatory variable for audit fees. Only one industry, 
builders supplies, evidenced systematic price differences. In general the Big 
Eight group had higher prices than the non-Big Eight group of accounting 
firms. Within the Big Eight group, there was no evidence of systematic pricing 
policy difference. 
The overall conclusion was that in the accounting services market, the emphasis 
may be on non-price rather than price competition [p.363], which means that 
accounting firms seek to differentiate their products through other means, such 
as non-audit services [p.368]. 
William and Turpie [ 1983] criticised the conclusions reached by Francis and 
Pound [1981], charging that the methodology employed and the data used 
could not support their propositions. Specifically, they charged that: 
l. the data used did not include costs and mark-up which shows 
translation of profit goals into pricing behaviour; 
2. no attempt was made to measure homogeneity of quality within each 
group of auditors; and · 
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3. there was no presentation of comparisons of non-audit services for 
non-Big Eight auditors. 
As far as the critics were concerned, they doubted whether differences in the 
level of non-audit fees amount to product differentiation of audit services as 
both are separate and divisible [p.319]. The reason for this was that it is possible 
a company can employ a non-Big Eight firm for audit work, and a Big Eight 
firm for non-audit services. 
Francis [1984] addressed the empirical question, how audit prices are affected 
by auditing firm size. A secondary investigation assessed the impact of a change 
in auditor on audit fees. Thirty companies were selected from each of the years 
1974 to 1978 for a total sample of 150 companies. Companies were selected at 
random from the industrials listing of the Sydney Stock Exchange. The intent 
was to replicate the seminal work of Simunic [1980] in the Australian context. 
Three control variables were not available: percentages of foreign assets, number 
of operating subsidiaries and number of years the audit firm had been engaged 
by the client. In addition, percentage of assets in current assets was used rather 
than percentages of assets in receivables and inventories. The remaining five 
control variables used by Simunic were retained. Three additional control 
variables were used. These pertained to liquidity and financial structure: the 
quick ratio and equity to debt ratio. The third new variable, month of year end, 
was introduced to control for off-peak pricing. 
Assets, number of subsidiaries, percentage of assets in current assets and auditor 
variables, were all significant for the total sample. When the sample was divided 
between the small and large companies, only the percentage of assets in current 
assets was not significant for small companies. It is worth noting that the auditing 
firm size was significant across company size and was positively related to audit 
fees. 
Of the twenty six auditor changes examined, twenty one had higher than 
predicted fees and five had lower than predicted. A time series analysis of audit 
fees was performed to compare the audit fee for the first and second years of the 
engagement following the change in auditor. A price level adjustment was made 
to compare audit fees between consecutive years. In effect, the results did not 
support the existence of price cutting. 
77 
Francis' s findings reinforced the argument that there is a differentiated demand 
for audit quality. The higher audit prices by the large audit firms were an 
indication of product differentiation by the large audit firms. This Australian 
finding was consistent with the finding of Taffler and Ramalinggam [1982] in 
Britain, but contradictory to Simunic [1980] for US research. Reconciling his 
findings with those of Simunic [1980], Francis states that the main reason behind 
the differences could be due to the fact that there are economies of scale in the 
US market which offset higher prices related to product differentiation [p.148]. 
Hence, "if such scale economies do not exist in the British or Australian 
markets, pricing there would only reflect product differentiation; whereas, the 
effect of product differentiation on US audit prices may be offset by scale 
economies" [p.148]. 
The test results in price cutting were at variance with the alleged price cutting 
behaviour to gain new clients. The higher initial audit fees indicate that there are 
initial audit start-up costs which are recovered immediately [p.148]. There was 
no evidence of future fee raising. Francis states that the findings are not 
necessarily inconsistent with low-balling because "it would still be possible for 
initial audit costs to exceed initial audit fees, even if initial audit fees are higher 
than subsequent fees" [p.148]. 
Francis and Stokes [1986] attempted to reconcile the contradictory findings of 
Simunic [1980] and Francis [1984]. Simunic [1980] found no significant 
differences in audit prices between Big Eight and non-Big Eight audit firms in 
the US market for both a sample of small (defined as sales less than $125 
million) and large (sales greater than $125- million) companies. On the other 
hand, Francis [1984] observed higher Big Eight prices in samples of both small 
and large companies. Control variables used were similar to those in Francis 
[1984], with an additional variable to control for off-peak pricing. The total 
sample was 192 companies split equally between large and small. 
Again, the size and complexity control variables (assets, number of subsidiaries, 
inventories and receivables), audit firm and audit risk proxy variables (gearing 
and audit qualification), were significant in the small auditee segment, whilst the 
audit risk and auditor variables were not significant for the large segment. 
Moreover, for the large auditees, auditee profitability was significant. 
The results indicated that Big Eight firms charge significantly higher audit fees 
in the small auditee market. This was consistent with Palmrose [1986a] and 
Francis [1984] but contradictory to Simunic [1980]. However, the insignificance 
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of the auditor variable in the large segment was in line with Simunic's [1980] 
finding., The finding in the small client segment indicated the existence of 
product-differentiation by the Big Eight firms [p.392]. In the large auditee 
segment, the finding would tend to refute the evidence of cartel pricing by the 
Big Eight firms. 
Referring to the inconsistency between Francis [ 1984] and Simunic [ 1980], 
Francis and Stokes showed that the Big Eight premium is sensitive to the 
definition of auditee size. Therefore, Simunic's sample of small audit firms may 
have been influenced by the presence of large firms [p.392]. 
Barkess and Simnet [1994] provided Australian evidence on the as_sociation 
between audit fees and non-audit services. The model, based on information 
from 2094 observations over the period 1986-1990, specified non-audit fees as 
a dependent variable regressed against assets, sales, audit report qualification, 
auditor size, industry classification and audit fees. The results of their regressions 
were that audit fees were significantly and positively correlated with other 
services similar to Simunic [1984] and Palmrose [1986a]. This did not support 
Abdel-Khalik's [1990] expectation that clients are more sophisticated and are 
unwilling to pay more for the provision of both services from the same supplier, 
than from two different sources. 
4.4 New Zealand 
Firth [ 1985] focused on explaining cross-sectional differences in the audit fees 
of companies whose shares were traded on the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
(NZSE). The sample consisted of 96 companies listed in the manufacturing 
sector of the NZSE. The other sectors were omitted because they could weaken 
the explanatory power of explanatory variables due to different operating 
characteristics [p.28]. Compared to the studies done before this one, Firth 
included a variable for unsystematic risk, as a proxy for audit risk that may be 
borne by the auditor. Total assets, accounts receivable and unsystematic risk 
were all found to be statistically important in explaining audit fees. The 
significance of total assets concurred with the findings ·of Simunic [ 1980], 
Wallace [ l 984a, l 984b] and Taffler and Ramalinggam [ 1981]. 
To test for the existence of a Big Eight premium, the sample was divided into 
small and large firms and the regression rerun with auditor size as the dummy 
variable. Similar to Simunic [1980] but contrary to Taffler and Ramalinggam 
[ 1981] the auditor variable was not significant, adding to the suggestion that 
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large audit firms do not charge a premium for their services. A possible reason 
advanced for this is that the use of international names of accounting firms was 
allowed only after 1983. This may indicate less "brand-name" recognition and 
thus partially explain the lack of evidence of product differentiation in New 
Zealand [p.34]. The author concludes that although there was a high level of 
concentration within the auditing profession in New Zealand, this did not lead to 
monopoly pricing [p.36]. 
4.5 Canada 
As part of their survey of US manufacturing companies' audit fees, Hobgood 
and Sciarrino [1972a] included 133 Canadian companies. A similar trend to the 
US companies was observed with smaller companies paying on average 0.07% 
of their annual sales in audit fees whilst larger companies paid between 0.02% 
and 0.05% of their annual sales. 
Chung and Lindsay [1988] replicated Simunic's [1980] study in the Canadian 
context. All variables used by Simunic were included, with the exception of the 
"subject to" opinion which was discontinued in Canada in 1980 [p.30]. The 
variables measuring size, using the number of subsidiaries and complexity, using 
percentages of foreign assets, accounts receivable and inventories, proved to be 
the best predictors of the audit fee. When the sample was partitioned on the basis 
of size, there was no change in the significance of the variables. 
Of special interest was the auditor variable which was positive, but not significant 
in the small auditee market, but negative and still not significant in the large 
auditee market. In general, the results did not support the allegation that the Big 
Eight audit firms are monopolising the market for audit services in Canada 
[p.43]. This finding is similar to the conclusion of Simunic [1980] and Firth 
[1985] about the US and New Zealand audit services markets respectively. This 
finding goes against observations in the UK [Taffler and Ramalinggam, 1982], 
US [Palmrose, 1986a; Francis and Simon, 1987] and Australia [Francis, 1984]. 
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A more comprehensive study of the determination of audit fees was done by 
Anderson and Zeghal [ 1994]. This paper examined in a greater depth pricing 
differences between Big Eight auditing firms after controlling for auditor size , 
industry effects and the relationships between internal and external auditor as 
done by Wallace [1984a], Simunic [1980] and Chung and Lindsay [1988]. In 
addition, the analyses was structured to examine'the two competing hypothesis 
for audit quality: audit firm size model and reputation or brand name model. 
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The study covered data from 172 firms giving 374 observations for the years 
1980, 1982 and 1984. The period 1980 covered a time period when auditing 
firms were not allowed to advertise, whilst 1982 and 1984 observations capture 
the post change structure. 
Similar to Chung and Lindsay [1988], Anderson and Zeghal found that the size 
(measured by total assets) and complexity (number of subsidiaries, inventories 
and receivables) were significant determinants regardless of company size. The 
regression coefficient of the audit quality variable was positive and statistically 
significant for the small auditees and insignificant for the large group when the 
variable was measured using a continuous metric. This was interpreted as 
suggesting evidence of price competition, product differentiation across all 
market segments, and economies of scale in the large auditee market [p.202]. 
Further analysis of pricing differences across the Big Eight firms showed no 
significant pricing differences across firms in the large auditee segment, but 
pricing differences were detected in the small auditee segment. This indicated 
that the pricing structures for small auditees are distinctive within the Big Eight 
group which is normally treated as a homogeneous group in most studies. The 
industry variable was only significant in the small auditee segment and only the 
transport, communication and utilities industry proved to be significant. The 
authors do not venture a probable explanation based on the uniqueness of the 
industry for the observation. 
This study shed some more light onto the effects of audit firm size, industry, and 
reputational effects on Canadian audit fees. One of its major contributions was 
demonstrating the superiority of using a continuous variable for measuring audit 
quality over the widely used dummy variable. Moreover, it confirmed the 
significance of auditee size and complexity as key determinants of audit fees. 
4.6 India 
Simon, Ramanan and Duger [1986] applied the methodology developed in prior 
studies to 117 nongovemment-owned Indian companies. The audit fee was 
regressed against assets, inventory, receivables, number of subsidiaries, 
profitability, audit report opinion and auditor size. A variation from prior studies 
involved the allocation of the binary variable to the audit report variable. All 
prior studies which included this variable had not distinguished between reasons 
for qualification. This study only gave "1" if the qualification related to 
weaknesses in internal controls. Profitability and audit opinion were the only 
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insignificant variables. In essence, audit fees demonstrated a close association 
with company size, complexity and risk [p.35]. Furthermore, the existence of a 
Big Eight premium implied that the Big Eight firms in India commanded higher 
fees due to product differentiation, as also observed by Francis [1984] and 
Francis and Simon [1987]. 
4. 7 Singapore 
Low, Tan and Koh [1990] applied earlier pricing models to a sample of 291 
companies during 1986. The minor variation on prior models was the inclusion 
of contingent liabilities as indicators, together with gearing and liquidity, of 
going concern difficulties. 
The models predictive power ranged from 11 % for industrial and commercial 
concerns to 98% for property companies. The size variable measured by total 
assets was the most important variable across all sectors , thereby supporting 
evidence from the US, UK, India, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The 
gearing variable was significant only in the properties and mining sectors, whilst 
the inventories and complexity variable were only significant in the hotel 
industry. A breakdown of the industrial and commercial sectors revealed that 
liquidity is an important determinant in construction companies, complexity in 
manufacturing, loss and complexity for service entities and contingent liabilities 
and inventories for trading sector. 
A curious omission in this study was the auditor type variable which had been 
examined in all previous studies. The authors did not even make a passing 
comment on the possible effects of this variable on the level of audit fees. 
4.8 International 
Haskins and Williams [ 1988] investigated whether factors identified by 
preceding researchers as being associated with audit fees were consistent (a) 
across countries and (b) amongst Big Eight firms (across firms). Audit fees from 
410 large companies in Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK and the US were 
analysed. 
Size and complexity variables were significant in four out of the five countries, 
with New Zealand being the only exception. This is rather surprising as Firth 
[1985] had found size and complexity variables to be an important determinant 
of audit fees. However, both sets of variables were significant across all Big Eight 
firms. 
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These results demonstrated that, firstly, pricing may be related to homogeneity 
of accounting practices and professional accounting environments. Secondly, 
the theory of product differentiation via price may not be valid among Big Eight 
firms. It would thus appear that "there is a great deal of uniformity in Big Eight 
fees across countries with similar accounting and auditing environments and 
across the firms" [p.190]. 
Simon, Teo and Trompeter (1992] provided a comparative study of audit 
services market using 357 companies from Hong Kong, Malaysia and 
Singapore. The basic research approach relied on linear regression models of 
audit fees determinants similar to that of Simunic (1980] and all the work that 
flowed from that piece of research. Each country had its own separate estimated 
regression equation with the following variables included: total assets, 
inventories, receivables, subsidiaries and auditor size. All the variables included 
were significant in all three countries, with the exception of the auditor variable 
which was not significant in Malaysia. Furthermore, the Big Eight audit fees were 
26% and 31 % higher in Singapore and Hong Kong respectively. 
The explanation for the insignificance of the auditor size variable in Malaysia 
was based on the regulatory and business environment in that country. In 
substance, the results implied less or reduced demand for quality differentiated 
audits because [p.239-240]: 
1. The national regulatory environment results in international investors 
being less involved in the financial markets. Therefore, there is less 
perceived need for financial statements to be audited by firms with an 
international reputation. 
2. Many Malaysian companies are family-controlled, which may result in 
less demand for financial statements audited by a reputable firm since 
the majority of shareholders have other sources of information on the 
performance of these companies. 
The results of this study suggest that there is considerable similarity in the 
influence of size and complexity variables in these developing countries and the 
developed ones [p.239]. The influence of the size of the auditor, continues to 
give mixed and inconclusive evidence which may be influenced by socio-legal 
factors. 
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4.9 Chapter summary 
The chapter demonstrates that the techniques used in the study of audit fees have 
improved from merely comparing averages, to using more powerful factor, 
probit, and multiple regression analyses to understand the determination of audit 
fees. Due to these advancements there has been a marked improvement in the 
usefulness of research in this area. 
''The results of the studies give evidence of some consistencies in the 
determination of audit fees, but also leave certain issues unresolved. The most 
consistent similarity across different countries is that audit fees are , as expected, 
a function of size, complexity and risk [Simon, et al, 1986, p.35]. Although most 
studies suggest that complexity is important, it is not particularly clear whether 
this is complexity in terms of the scope of the operations, or the balance sheet 
composition which has the most significant effect on the level of audit fees 
[Chan et al, 1993,p.765]. Evidence as to the effect of auditee risk measured in 
terms of gearing, liquidity and profitability is also mixed. There is also no 
consensus on the impact of auditor size on audit fees. The most common results 
show that the size may be irrelevant, i.e. clients do not distinguish between 
different firms, or relevant in which case there would be economies of scale and 
reputational effects which will be captured in the audit fee. The existence of the 
auditor size premium may be influenced by country-specific factors in spite of 
increasing globalisation of auditing. 
Therefore, major research findings on audit fees so far indicate that: 
• The size of the audit fee is largely explained by client characteristics 
associated with audit effort and audit risk; 
• Companies appear to be willing to pay a premium for audits performed 
by Big Six firms; 
• Auditors may not fully adjust audit fees to reflect underlying client 
risk; and 
• Auditors discount the fees they charge new audit clients. 




However, the evidence is far from being reasonably conclusive. It therefore 
means that this study will focus to some degree on the unresolved issues in prior 
studies whilst adding further weight to existing determinants. 
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5.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to identify the theoretical framework within which audit fees 
are determined. An a priori justification for a link between audit fees and 
various factors is presented together with the definitions Of the variables 
expected to affect audit fees. In essence, the framework links the fee 
considerations listed in the Code of Professional Conduct for auditors with 
specific measurable client and auditor characteristics. 
Audit fees have three primary components [Wallace, 1989, p.4]: 
1. number of hours of auditing service; 
2. price per hour; and 
3. percentage realisation rates (i.e., collection of billings) 
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In developing an explanatory model of the audit fee function, three classes of 
factors exist: auditor-specific factors, general factors affecting the auditee 
company, and auditor-specific effects [Pound and Francis, 1981, p.360]. These 
factors are expected to influence the primary components of the audit fee. 
General factors (e.g. economic conditions) are assumed to be randomly 
distributed with no significant predictable effect on individual auditee 
companies. 
5.2 Factors determining audit fees 
The factors expected to influence audit fees can be split broadly between those> 
relating to the company being audited, and the ·auditor carrying out the audit. 
This being an analytical and exploratory study, the variables included in the 
model were based solely on prior research in overseas countries. Whilst the 
practice of auditing in those countries may be influenced by cultural, legal and 
socio-economic factors [Simon et al, 1992], these may be offset by the growing 
internationalisation of auditing. As a result there are bound to be similarities 
between different countries irrespective of the state of development. 
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As a matter of fact, historically, the South African cultural, legal and socio-
economic structure has been largely influenced by events in the developed· 
world, particularly the UK. The Companies Act, which prescribes governance 
issues in business, was largely moulded by UK legislation and case law. Hence 
there is an expectation that the UK research may be more representative of what 
' 
could happen in South Africa. Due to a similar link with the UK, research from 
Australia, Canada, Hong Kong and New Zealand may also be of more relevance 
to the thesis than the Indian, Malaysian and US research. This is despite of the 
fact that the former two countries are in a similar stage of economic 
development as South Africa. 
5.2.1 Client factors 
5.2.1.1 Size 
Larger organisations enter into more transactions that may require more review 
time. Agency theorists [Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1983] who view the audit as means of reducing agency costs, deduce that when 
agency costs are greater, there is increased demand for a higher level of audit 
quality. Their proposition is that as firm size increases, so do agency costs. An 
effective monitoring mechanism would be to engage a high quality auditor to 
monitor contracts. This analysis leads to the conclusion that larger firms are 
more likely to engage large high quality auditors who will charge a premium. 
Johnson and Lys [1990, p.283] also argue that large auditors are expected to 
mix with clients of a similar size to achieve efficient utilisation of resources. 
Comments by partners in South Africa indicate that large audit firms prefer 
large clients because they are relatively cost-efficient as clients. Larger 
companies are generally better organised with a better infrastructure, their own 
computer systems, and often their own internal auditors [Financial Mail Top 
Companies Survey, July 26, 1991, p.289]. Tom Wixley, Senior Partner at Ernst 
and Young, adds that 
"Big clients are more efficient if you look at it on a per partner basis. 
Our scarce resources are partners and one partner can handle more in 
the way of large fees in large audits than in small audits" [Financial 
Mail Top Companies Survey, July 26, 1991, p.290]. 
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However, Francis and Wilson's [1988] analysis of agency costs, client size and 
auditor choice leads them to conclude that "neither client size/growth nor 
agency costs explain a large portion of the demand for larger-sized Big Eight 
auditors." This is in spite of the general finding of research dealing with auditor 
selection which found that larger corporations are more likely to select larger 
well known auditing firms [Danos and Eichenseher, 1986]. It is still a valid 
proposition to expect the audit fee to be directly related to size, even within the 
agency theory framework. 
The choice of the best proxy for size is problematic as there is insufficient 
guidance on a generally accepted measure of size. Elements of financial 
statements that may be used as indicators of size are turnover, total assets, gross 
profit, net profit and shareholders equity [SAICA, 1984]. Prior research in audit 
fees shows lack of consensus on the acceptable measure of size. Wallace [1984a] 
used operating revenue, Simunic [1980,1984] used total assets, Elliott and Korpi 
[1978] used sales, net income before tax, equity and net income, Francis [1984] 
used sales. 
According to Simunic [1980, p.172], total assets is more of a reliable measure 
because "auditors have traditionally approached the audit process through the 
balance sheet relying on the fact that verification of balance sheet indirectly 
verifies reported income." In contrast, sales is related to an audit of transactions 
[Pong and Whittington, 1994, p.1075]. SAICA [1984, para. 103] prefers the use 
of more stable indicators naming sales and total assets as such stable indicators. 
compared to net profit. The choice of the size variable is also 'dependent on the 
dominant nature of the auditee' s business [Elliott and Korpi, 1978]. Ramzy' s 
[1988] survey of auditors and financial directors found a strong preference for 
the use of total assets and sales as indicators of size [p .115]. This study uses total 
assets (ASSETS), turnover (SALES), and net income before tax (NIBT) for 
measuring size. 
Size variables have been found to be the most consistent and significant 
explanatory variables for audit fees across different countries. A positive 
relationship between auditee size and audit fees has been documented in many 
prior studies: Simunic [1980], Palmrose [1986a, 1986b] in the US; Francis 
(1984] in Australia; Firth (1985] in New Zealand; Taylor and Baker (1981] and 
Taffler and Ramalinggam (1981] in the UK; Low et al (1990] in Hong Kong; 
Chung and Lindsay [ 1988] and Anderson and Zeghal [1994] in Canada; Simon 
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et al [1993] in Malaysia and Simon et al [1986] in India. This relationship was 
also observed in public sector organisations by Baber [1983] and Rubin [1987]. 
These studies detected a non-linear relation between audit fees and size which 
justifies a logarithmic transformation of the SALES and ASSETS measures in 
this model. (NIBT cannot be transformed either by the logarithm or square root 
functions as profits can negative). In addition, because auditing is based largely 
on statistical sampling, the sample size required to keep audit risk at an 
acceptable level increases at a decreasing rate [Simunic, 1980, p.172]. 
Empirically, Hobgood and Sciarrino [1972a, 1972b] showed that the audit fee 
increases at a decreasing rate when size increases. Firth [1975, p.26] explains 
that economies of scale in the auditor's production function and the fact that 
large companies are likely to have more sophisticated internal audit procedures 
that may reduce the workload of the external auditor, the audit fee is likely to be 
a decreasing function of size. 
Gloeck, De Jager and Venter (1993, p. 105 & p.121] regressed total assets and 
turnover against the audit fee for 200 listed companies featured in the Financial 
Mail Top Companies Survey. The graphs depicted below indicate a reasonably 
direct correlation between the two size variables and audit fees. 
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The graph for the relationship between turnover and audit fees (figure 7) shows 
that the angle of the general trend line for the assets/ audit fees graph, was 
significantly flatter than the same line representing the turnover/audit fee 
relationship. The above discussion leads to the first null hypothesis stated below: 
Hypothesis 1 : Audit fees are not related to client size. 
Hypothesis la: Audit fees are positively related to client size. 
5.2.1.2 Complexity 
Complexity arises from the organisational structure of the client. Two aspects of 
complexity dealt with in literature are: scope of the client operations and balance 
sheet composition [Chan et al, 1993]. Ramzy [1988] detected some similarities 
in the measure of complexity between financial directors and auditors: both 
chose the number of subsidiaries and the number of countries in which the client 
operates as key indicators of complexity. These attributes are used more as 
measures of scope complexity. 
Scope complexity 
Scope complexity measures the degree of centralisation and diversification of an 
entity's operations [Chan et al, 1993]. S289 of The Companies Act requires 
any company that holds control in another company to produce consolidated 
financial statements consisting of a balance sheet, income statement and cash 
flow statement incorporating the assets, liabilities, income, expenses and cash 
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flow of the company it controls. GAAP Statement AC 110 [SAICA, 1992] also 
requires the equity accounting of associate companies (i.e. where there is 
significant influence) and producing equity accounted financial statements. The 
auditor of the investor company is required to report on the consolidated 
financial statements. The auditor has to ensure that generally accepted auditing 
standards are fully applied by the auditors of the entities that have to be 
consolidated and equity accounted [SAICA, 1990]. 
There is considerable effort involved in co-ordinating an audit of such a 
diversified group. Describing the task of the lead auditor in a group audit, Tom 
Wixley, Senior Partner of Ernst and Young, says, 
" It amounts to project management. For a client like Transnet 
where we are the lead auditors, our lead partner is engaged full time 
[in] simply co-ordinating all the auditors in the group." [Financial 
Mail Top Companies Survey, July 26, 1991, p.290) 
It is expected that the audit fee will be related to the number of entities 
consolidated and/or equity accounted. There are a number of reasons why a 
group with a large number of subsidiaries might pay a higher audit fee than a 
single company of comparable size. Reasons given by some audit partners in the 
UK interviewed in Chan et al [1993, p.767] are that: 
l. There are costs associated with the audit of separate financial statements 
each of which has to comply with a variety of statutory and 
professional requirements for disclosure. These statutory levels may 
also act to reduce materiality levels for each subsidiary below those in 
force for the group as a whole and therefore require a greater extent of 
audit testing. 
2. There may also be additional monitoring and inquiry costs if not all 
subsidiaries and associates are audited by the group auditor. 
3. The group auditor may have to pay particular attention to intragroup 
transactions, the taxation implications of pricing policies and existence 
of related party transactions. These concerns will be more pressing if 
subsidiaries are not wholly owned and the need to protect minorities 
has to be taken into account. 
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4. If subsidiaries operate in a variety of different fields there are likely to 
be additional learning and expertise costs and some economies of scale 
in testing may be lost. 
Measures which can be used as proxies for scope complexity are the number of 
operating locations [Wallace 1984a], number of principal subsidiaries, location 
of plants, the degree of centralisation of financial control, the degree of 
computerisation of accounting records, nature of the client's business, type of 
industry, number of product lines, changes in client's structure, complexity of 
transactions [Ramzy, 1988], extent of diversification [Chan et al, 1993], number 
of business segments [Chung and Lindsay, 1988], and proportion of foreign 
subsidiaries to total subsidiaries [Simunic, 1980; Simon, 1985]. 
For the purposes of this study, the scope complexity variable will be captured 
using the number of consolidated subsidiaries and equity accounted associate 
companies (ENTITIES). These are preferable because they are easily available 
and observable. A problem with subsidiary companies is that financial statements 
do not make a distinction between operating and dormant subsidiaries. Dormant 
subsidiaries should not contribute significantly to the level of audit fees. In 
addition there is no indication of the different sizes of the subsidiaries. 
An obvious omission in the discussion of consolidated financial statements in the 
preceding paragraph are joint ventures. GAAP Statement AC 119 on joint 
ventures [SAICA, 1993] requires that entities which are proportionately 
controlled be proportionately consolidated. The basic reason for the omission 
was that ill the period covered by the study there were fairly few joint ventures. 
In the sample, there is only one company that had a joint venture. 
Taylor and Baker [1981, p.57] argue that complexity variables should not show 
economies of scale, although the auditor may experience a learning curve in 
dealing with numerous subsidiaries and foreign operations. However, due to 
heteroscedasticity problems, the variable for scope complexity was transformed 
using the square root function. 
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Balance sheet complexity 
With respect to complexity of the balance sheet, the focus is on asset items 
traditionally perceived to be more problematic to audit. Debtors and inventories · 
pose the greatest verification problems for auditors [Woolf, 1979]. 
Stock 
Taylor, Kritzinger and Puttick [1992, p.263] emphasise the importance of stock 
verification because : 
" As a general rule stock represents a substantial portion of the 
total current assets of a business. It follows that the value placed 
on stock has a very material effect on the reported profits .... " 
Woolf [1979, pp.190-191] concurs and expounds this further, giving more 
reasons for the difficulty in auditing stock. He notes that: 
1 . The amount at which stocks are stated in the financial statements is 
almost always material in relation to the accounts as a whole. 
Materiality is bound to increase the dimension of the verification 
problem. 
2. The amount of stock affects profits as any overstatement 
(understatement) of the stock figure represents an overstatement 
(understatement) of equal amount of the profit figure. 
3. Companies using the periodic system of inventory recording would 
tend to rely on physical stocktaking procedures for the determination 
of closing stock. The absence of perpetual records makes the stock 
figure more susceptible to manipulation. 
4. In manufacturing companies, stock categories may increase as the total 
stock amount consists of raw materials, bought out components, work-
in progress and finished goods, and each of these (together with further 
subdivisions) creates its own valuation difficulties. 
5. The verification process may involve a special and highly technical 
approach as some items of stock require careful identification for the 
determination of quality and technical specifications. 
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6. The assessment of condition of stock maybe quite difficult, especially 
the identification and provision for slow-moving, obsolete or scrap 
items. 
• 7. Stocks may be held in a variety of locations, in all of which 
countingmust proceed simultaneously to avoid omissions and/or 
double counting caused by subsequent movement of goods between 
locations. Certain goods may be held by outside parties, as agents, 
consignees, or on a sale or return basis, in which event the auditor may 
be obliged to accept certificates from third parties. 
8. Manufactured goods pose a special problem as the auditor has to deal 
with allocation of overheads in accordance with GAAP Statement 
AC108 on inventories, which requires an appropriate portion of 
overhead to be absorbed into inventory [SAICA, 1983]. The decision 
on the absorption of overheads requires an assessment of suitable bases 
Debtors 
· with some element of subjectivity on the part of management. This 
adds to the auditor's difficulties. 
Debtors in certain instances may require more effort because of the nature of the 
balance. The auditor evaluating receivables must form qualitative as well as 
quantitative judgements and must, for the most part, utilise indirect rather than 
direct evidence. Receivables have to be audited in conjunction with sales and 
cash receipts. Some of the retailing and wholesale companies have large debtors 
books which consist of thousands of customers with fairly small balances. For 
example, The Edgars Group has about 2,7 million account holders [Edgars 
Report Annual Report 1993] whilst the Foschini Group has about 1,45 million 
[Foschini Group Annual Report 1993]. In such concerns debtors may be the 
key asset, e.g. the Edgars Group has debtors· of R895,9 million on total assets of 
R1667,5 million [Edgars Group, 1993 Annual Report]. 
The auditor has to verify whether the balances are recoverable based on past 
experiences and future expectations of items of disposable income, and state of 
the economy, among other items. The provision for any doubtful debts then 
requires a subjective assessment of future events which is unpredictable and 
therefore more risky. This would require the auditor to engage more qualified 




Hourly fees increase with complexity because auditors with greater skill and 
superior judgement are required in more complex situations and extended audit 
procedures are required as audit complexity increases [Thornton and Moore, 
I 
1993, pp.342-343]. The audit fee is therefore expected to be positively related 
to client complexity. 
The relative size of debtors and inventory in relation to total assets is a more 
accurate indicator of audit effort, as the audit effort required will be measured 
by the materiality of the balance in relation to the size of the entity. So the 
complexity of the balance sheet is measured by the proportion of total assets in 
debtors and inventory (INV+DEBTOR). This is not the only way that balance 
sheet complexity can be measured. Francis [1984] used the percentage of total 
assets in current assets, Simunic [1980], Maher et al (1987], Chung and Lindsay 
(1990] used the proportion of assets in debtors and the proportion of assets in 
inventories. 
Wallace [1984], Simunic [1980], Simon [1985], Firth [1985], Francis and Stokes 
(1986] and Palmrose [1986a] found the level of inventories and debtors to be 
significant explanatory variables. In contrast, Firth (1985] found receivables to 
be a significant variable, but not inventory, in his pricing model. He described 
this finding as puzzling and offered no plausible explanation for it. The second 
null hypothesis is then stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: The audit fee is not affected by the complexity of the 
client. 
Hypothesis 2a: The audit fee is positively related to client complexity. 
5.2.1.3 Audit opinion 
It is believed that audit effort is affected by the type of opinion included in the 
annual report. A qualified report may convey a negative signal to investors 
[Firth, 1985]. For the auditor, it may signal an increased risk of adverse actions 
against the auditor [Simunic, 1980; Palmrose, 1986a, 1986b; Francis and Simon, 
1987]. The time spent on an audit where a qualified opinion is issued will be 
longer, due to the increased extent of audit procedures to eliminate any 
uncertainties or disagreements [Ng and Tai, 1994]. 
Auditors try to avoid. a qualification and will issue a qualified one if the 
extended audit work does not resolve the uncertainty or the disagreement [Ng 
and Tai, 1994]. It also appears that management does not welcome a qualified 
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report, so they try to negotiate or exert pressure on the auditor to waive the 
qualification [Whittred, 1980]. This is likely to be dealt with by the most senior 
person in the audit, i.e. the partner in charge, which may be more costly because 
of the higher charge out rate. 
Simunic [1980], Wallace [1984a], Francis and Stokes [1986], Palmrose [1986a], 
Francis and Simon [1987] and Simon and Francis [1988] found the audit 
opinion to be a significant explanatory variable. In contrast Francis [1984], 
Maher et al [1987] and Simon [1985] in their studies found the audit opinion 
variable not significant. For the purposes of this study, audit opinions are 
classified as either qualified or unqualified. Companies receiving a qualified 
audit opinion (except for, adverse and disclaimer) are a assigned a 1. Companies 
receiving an unqualified report are assigned a 0. 
Hypothesis 3 : The audit fee is unaffected by the audit report opinion. 
Hypothesis 3a : An adverse audit opinion results in a higher audit fee 
5.2.1.4 Auditee Risk 
Two types of risk that would have to be discussed under auditee risk are the 
auditor's business risk and audit risk. Definitions are given as follows: 
Business risk is "the probability that the auditor will suffer loss to his 
professional practice" [Brumfield, Elliott and Jacobson, 1983, p.60]. 
Audit risk is "the risk that the auditor will unknowingly express an inappropriate 
opinion on financial information" [SAICA, 1986, para. 02]. 
Audit risk can influence business risk because an inappropriate opinion can be a 
major consideration in the events that lead to loss or injury to the auditor's 
professional practice. Conversely, business risk may affect the assessment of 
audit risk by the auditor. 
The principal elements of business risk are [Brumfield et al, 1983, p.60]: 
• Litigation; 
• Sanctions imposed by regulatory bodies; 
• Impaired professional reputation as a result of litigation; and 
• sanctions or adverse publicity. 
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On the other hand, audit risk is affected by [SAICA, 1986]: 
• Intrinsic susceptibility of an assertion to material error; 
• Effectiveness of internal controls in preventing material errors; 
• Effectiveness of the auditor's procedures in detecting material errors. 
Brumfield et al [1983, p.65] provide a guide on factors, shown in table 6, which 
gives some factors which the auditor has to take cognisance of in assessing 
business risk. 
It is interesting to note that most of the factors included in the guide can also be 
used as an assessment of the inherent susceptibility to material error, a key 
component of audit risk. 
One of the more easily identifiable and measurable factors, relates to the client's 
existing financial position and operating performance. Relating business risk to 
audit fees Brumfield et al [1983] state that: 
"Billing rates for clients could be adjusted based on the assessed level 
of business risk (i.e., higher rates for clients with greater business · 
risk). Because adjusting the rate structure in this manner could affect a 
firm's competitive position, the trade off between potential loss from 
a diminished competitive position would have to be considered" 
[p.68]. 
A survey of UK auditors by Ramzy [1988] indicated that the risk involved in the 
audit was one of the key factors used in determining audit fees. She concludes 
that the risk which the auditor accepts will increase the level of the fee [p.114]. 
A rather unfortunate aspect of this study is that there is no exact explanation of 
the term "risk". (The summary of the responses referred to "risk in the audit 
work" without any further elaboration or definition [Appendix 4, p.208]). 
The state of the financial position and performance of the client can be linked to 
business risk through the consideration of risk of failure of the client (i.e. going 
concern difficulties). GAAS Statement AU294 on going concern [SAICA; 
1986a, para. 08), gives some guidance on some key financial indicators to be 
considered for assessing going concern difficulties. These are: 
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Business risk factors· 
Ln·cl of l111si11c.1s ri~_k _______ _ 
Lm 11 · I F to QC r 
I 
ver !.!!.8..!E --- --




The industry in which the company Established; stable; Relatively new; unstable; 
operates. relatively uninnuenced by greatly innuenced by 
I external conditions. ex tern al conditions. ---
The company's management philosophy Conservative. Aggressive. 
with regard to both operation:il rmd 
accounting mal!crs. 
The company's control environment, I Strong administrative Weak administrative 
including the possibility of management ··ontrols; control-conscious controls; man:igement isn't 
override. m.'.· ·~gement; low control conscious: high 
possibility of management possibility of management 
I override. override. 
The company's previous audit history. 
I 
Unqualified opinions for No prior audit history; 
previous audits; no prior qualified or adverse 
I disagreements with opinions for previous 
I auditors; few adjustments. audits; prior disagreements 
I 
with auditors: numerous 
adjustments. 
I 
Rate of turnover for top manage:-nent arid Low. High. 
the board of directors. 
I 
The company's financial position and I Strong. Weak. 
operating performance. I 
! 
The company's existing or pote::tial 
I 
I nsigni ficanl. Significant. 
litigation. -
The business reputation of the company's Good. Poor. 
management and principal owners. 
The relevant experience of the company's 
I 
lligh. Low. 
management and principal owners. 
Ownership of the company. Nonpublic. Public. 
Ciient understanding of the auditor's Clear. Unclear. 
responsibilities. t 
Conflicts of interest, regulatory p~oblems . Insignificant. Significant. 
or auditor independence problems. 
The location of the company. Large city. Small co111111uniry. 
The level of business acuity or Low. High. 
sophistication within the commun:ty in 
which the company operates. 
'£3ccause 1he 1erms used in 1his exhibi1 2:~ general, the risk levels indicarcd may be suhjcc1 10 individual in1crpre1ation. In 
addition. many of the lisred factors may !l~o indicale 1he level of inherenl or cnnlrnl ri<k 
.. ' 
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• Net liability or net current liability position; 
• Substantial fixed term borrowings approaching maturity without 
reasonable prospects of renewal or repayment, or excessive reliance on 
short term borrowings to finance long term assets; 
• Adverse key financial ratios; 
• Substantial losses; 
• Arrears or discontinuance of dividends; 
• Inability to pay creditors on due debts or difficulty in complying with 
loan covenants; 
• Changes from credit to cash on delivery at the request of suppliers; and 
• Inability to obtain financing for necessary new product developments 
or other necessary investments; 
For this study the emphasis will be on adverse key financial ratios which are 
commonly used to predict company failures. 
One of the models developed in South Africa to predict bankruptcy is the De La 
Rey model. It includes debt to equity ratio, current ratio, return on assets, cash 
flow profit after tax as a proportion of total assets, and total stocks divided by 
inflation-adjusted assets [Correia, Flynn, Uliana and Wormald, 1993, p.197]. The 
model appears to have emphasis on liquidity, profitability and gearing. It gives a 
reasonably reliable indication of the predictors of going concern difficulties that 
a client may face. 
It is useful to discuss the three factors separately, to understand their individual 
implications for the audit fee. Although professional ethics governing the 
conduct of auditors indirectly forbid auditors from charging audit fees based on 
the client profitability, Firth [ 1985] intimates that the level of profitability may 
be an indicator of the client's ability to bear audit costs. This could be defined 
on the basis that audit firms may charge low fees when their client is going 
through difficult financial times, and correspondingly, will charge high fees 
when economic circumstances are good [Firth, 1985; Taylor and Baker, 1981]. 




premium above cost if the client is 1thought to be able to bear it. Therefore, the 
more profitable a client, the less the burden of the audit fee and hence an 
increased fee will not be challenged. 
Conversely, a profitable company may be indicative of one that keeps extremely 
tight control of its costs, and this could be used as an argument against expecting 
a premium in the audit fee. Additionally, very profitable firms may have above 
average accounting and control systems and this could make the audit easier and 
cheaper to conduct [Firth, 1985, Footnote 6, p.28]. In a similar vein, Wallace 
(1989, p.4] notes that, ironically, loss-making clients may incur lower actual fees 
although they pose a higher risk to the auditor due to the uncertainty over 
collection of the audit fee billings. In order to assess, rather crudely, the 
relationship between profitability and audit fee, Gloeck et al (1993, p.116] 
plotted the audit fee against the log of net income before tax for 200 companies 
listed in the Financial Mail 1992 Top Companies Survey. Their graph, shown 
below, indicates a weak correlation between the audit fee and client profitability. 
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They note that net income does not have the same direct correlation to audit fees 
as does turnover [p.116].As far as this thesis is concerned, the focus on the 
relationship between the audit fee and profitability is analysed on the basis of 
risk of client failure only. 
Liquidity could be construed as a means of measuring a client's ability to pay its 
debts. Whilst clients with low liquidity may indicate a greater risk of failure, 
Wallace [1989, p.4] suggests that clients with liquidity pressures will often 
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increase fee pressures, resulting in reduced audit fees in the presence of what is 
likely to be a higher audit risk. 
Gearing refers to the percentage of debt in the capital structure of the entity 
[Correia et al, 1993]. The higher the level of debt, the greater the risk of default 
and hence bankruptcy. Along similar lines, agency theorists like Chow [1982] 
argue that firms with higher debt to equity ratios are more likely to be audited. 
Because an increase in debt results in an increase in agency costs [Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a], it is more likely that higher quality auditors would be engaged 
which would translate to a higher audit fee [Watts and Zimmerman, 1983]. 
Looking at financial distress of the client as a whole, Chan et al [1993, p.782] 
express the opposite view that some auditors in seeking to improve goodwill may 
charge lower fees to distressed clients which could mitigate the effect of client 
risk on audit fees. Thornton and Moore [1993] further suggest that high risk 
clients may select lower quality auditors who charge less per hour because, "the 
supply price of the audit increases as the uncertainty of cash flows increases" 
[p.340]. This in turn motivates management to demand an overall lower level of 
credibility and reduces the likelihood of selecting a high quality auditor [Copley 
et al, 1994]. It is clear that any hint of the use of the client's ability to pay as 
basis for determining audit fees, implies lack of compliance with the Code of 
Professional Conduct and hence unethical conduct of the auditor. The author 
expects that South African auditors would be beyond reproach in this area, 
basing audit fees on the level of effort. It is therefore expected that the audit fee 
will vary positively with indicators of going concern difficulties. 
The level of gearing (GEARING), liquidity (LIQUIDITY) and profitability 
(PROFIT) are employed in this study as indicators of auditee risk. These are 
measured by the debt to equity ratio, current ratio and return on assets as 
calculated in McGregor's Who Owns Whom [1991, 1992, 1993]. Clearly, these 
measures are not without criticism, particularly because they are reliant qn book 
values which are influenced by age of assets, accounting policy choices and 
capital structure. These criticisms are not deemed to be serious enough to render 
the results totally unreliable. In any event, these ratios are still widely used in 
practice which is evidence of their usefulness. 
Other researchers [e.g. Simunic, 1980; Taffler and Ramalinggam, 1982; Francis, 
1984; Wallace 1984a; Maher et al, 1987; Chung and Lindsay, 1988] have used 
the presence of a loss in the previous three years as indicators of financial 
difficulty. Simunic [1980] and Maher et al [1987] found this variable to be a 
significant explanatory variable for audit fees, whilst the remainder of the 
authors quoted above did not detect any significance. 
Hypothesis 4: The audit fee is not affected by client going concern 
difficulties. 
Hypothesis 4a: The audit fee is positively related to client going concern 
difficulties. 
Note that profitability and liquidity ratios are expected to bear an inverse 
relationship with audit fees whilst gearing should have a positive relation. 
5.2.1.5 Ownership 
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Large companies tend to have a greater number and diversity of shareholders. 
Furthermore, in larger companies there is more likely to be a greater separation 
of ownership and control. In terms of agency theory, as ownership becomes 
more divorced from control, there would be more extensive, and therefore more 
costly auditing [Chan et al, 1993, p.780]. The choice of the auditor may also be 
influenced by the structure of control. Evidence from Malaysia suggests that in 
instances where there is minimal separation of ownership, control and managing, 
firms tend to choose lower (smaller) audit firms which would translate to a lower 
audit fee [Simon et al, 1992]. 
It could, on the other hand, be argued that the thoroughness of audit work is a 
reflection of the legal obligation in the audit firms relationship with the client 
company; and that this will be invariant across different levels of ownership 
control. Whilst this may be true, this paper is more concerned with the scope 
rather than the intensity of the audit work. Chan et al (1993] found ownership 
structure to be a significant variable across the whole sample and for the large 
auditee subsegment, but not for small size auditees. 
It is hypothesised that the extent of audit services demanded will be a function of 
the ownership control variable, with companies having a diverse ownership 
requiring a more extensive and higher quality audit over and above that 
necessary to fulfil the minimum necessary requirements. In this study, the proxy 
for ownership (OWNERSHIP) was based on directors beneficial and 
nonbeneficial holdings exceeding 50% of the issued ordinary share capital. 
McGregor's Who Own Whom (1991, 1992, 1993] was used to gather 
· information on directors holding. Companies where the directors holding 
exceeded 50% were allocated 0, where it was less than 50% it was designated 1. 
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Arguably, directors can exercise de facto control even if they own less than 50%, 
if the shareholding of the company is widespread with a large number of 
shareholders owning small parcels of shares. For our purposes, the Companies 
Act deems control to be when one person controls more than 50% of the voting 
power and the letter of the law will be followed. 
Hypothesis 5 : Audit fees are unrelated to company control. 
Hypothesis Sa: Companies controlled by directors have lower audit fees than 
companies that are not. 
5.2.1.6 Audit delay 
Audit delay is a timing variable that attempts to capture the effects of tight 
reporting deadlines. It measures the lag between the accounting year end and the 
audit report date. Cross-sectional differences in audit delay may indicate cross-
sectional differences in the relative extensiveness of the year end field work [Ng 
and Tai, 1994, p.44]. 
The effect of time-deadline pressures was recognised by the AICPA [1978] as 
one of the underlying factors in audit failures. The study noted that the most 
pervasive picture of audit failures involved "one partner supervising fifteen to 
twenty engagements, many with identical year ends, working considerable 
overtime, unable to find adequate time to review work papers, and faced with 
several crucial decisions, some of which were ultimately made incorrectly" 
[AICPA, 1978, p.115]. The report further adds that some of the errors are 
caused by auditors "working too many hours for too many clients" [p.119]. 
In a market like the JSE, timely reporting is important as timeliness of financial 
information is one of the key attributes of useful financial information [SAICA, 
1990]. Investors would prefer timely information for making economic 
decisions. Companies are therefore more likely to push for the release of annual 
financial statements within the "normal" expected period. It is common 
knowledge that the investment community to expects interim and annual results 
within a certain time period after the end of the financial period. A cursory 
re.view of press comments indicates that after about a month and a half of the 
financial period, there is speculation about the results to be issued. Often undue 
delay tends to be surrounded by speculation of bad results. 
_J 
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From an auditing point of view, short lags could be a reflection of tight 
reporting deadlines which might only be met with inefficient auditing [Chan et 
al, 1993, p.770]. Differences among companies may also be due to (a) some 
companies agreeing to a delay in the audit until it is suitable for the auditor; (b) 
some companies accounting systems and final accounts preparation taking 
• longer; and (c) the audit taking a long time [Firth, 1985]. Longer lags might 
reflect audit problems requiring additional audit work to resolve. Reason (a) 
may suggest that a lower audit fee may be bargained for, and reason (c) may 
suggest a higher audit fee. Thus the effect of audit delay is unclear. Chan et al 
[1993] observed a significant negative correlation between audit fees and audit 
delay. Their study did not support the hypothesis that tight deadlines impose 
additional audit costs. In contrast, Firth [1985] did not observe any effect on 
audit fees by audit delay. 
Studies on determinants of audit delay indicate that some of the factors which 
are hypothesised to affect audit fees, such as auditee size, complexity and risk, 
are also determinants of audit delay [Ng and Tai, 1994]. This could result in 
confounding effects. Such effects are more likely to manifest themselves in a 
high correlation between the independent variables which can be corrected in the 
analysis of results. 
This variable <DELAY) was proxied in terms of the number of days between the 
client's financial year end and the date of its audit report. A possible variation 
would have been to measure time lag in weeks as done by Chan et al [1993]. 
The choice of this metric is favoured because it is easy to measure and 
understand. The use of this metric, however, may require assumptions about 
scheduling of work among clients, differences in timing of audit work among 
clients in making their audited financial statements available, the number of 
auditors assigned to the engagements, and the degree of overtime actually 
experienced in the jobs [Ng and Tai, 1994, p.44]. These factors are hardly 
observable or measurable. Therefore, it is more logical and more practical to use 
publicly available and observable information than unobservable or 
unmeasurable data. 
Hypothesis 6 : Audit delay does not affect the audit fee. 




Whilst the auditor expresses an opinion of financial statements consisting of a 
directors' report, income statement, balance sheet and cashflow statement, some 
listed companies issue additional reports upon which the auditor may be 
required to issue an opinion. Typically, the reports include a value added 
statement, segmental analysis, current cost adjusted financial statements, 
supplementary inflation adjusted financial statements, five year or ten year 
review of performance, financial summaries or highlights, analysis of operating 
and other expenses, employment data, planned capital expenditure and financial 
ratios. In some instances there may not be a directors report, but an elaborate 
chairman's and/or a managing director review of the operations. 
Although the additional reports do not form piJ.rt of financial statements as 
defined in the Companies Act, the auditor is expected to review the financial 
information referred to in the chairman's review for consistency with the audited 
financial statements [SAICA, 1984]. Some of the reports, such as inflation 
accounting adjustments, involve a considerable workload that is of a high 
technical nature [Firth, 1985]. This requires additional audit effort and such 
reports would be reviewed by more senior staff resulting in a higher cost and 
hence audit fee. 
This variable was tested and found to be significant by Palmrose [1986a] and 
Rubin [1987]. Similarly, Firth (1985] included current cost adjusted financial 
statements in his model, which he found to be significant. Where a company 
provided basic financial statements (historical cost balance sheet, income 
~tatement, directors report and a cash flow statement) this was denoted by 0. 
Each additional report was given 1. Both Palmrose [1986a] and Rubin (1987] 
transformed the number of reports variable using the log function to linearise it, 
thereby minimising heteroscedasticity problems, whilst Firth (1985] did not. In 
this study, this variable (REPORTS) is not transformed as the transformation of 
the size and scope complexity variables appears to sufficiently address 
heteroscedasticity. 
Hypothesis 7: The audit fee is unrelated to the number of additional reports 
issued by the client. 
Hypothesis 7a: The audit fee is positively related to the number of additional 
reports issued by the client. 
5.2.2 Auditor factors 
5.2.2.1 • Size 
Audit fees are affected by auditor size in three ways [Simunic, 1980; Francis, 
1984; And~rson and Zeghal, 1994]: 
• By product differentiation; 
• By economies of scale; and 
• By non-competitive pricing. 
Product differentiation 
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Product differentiation is said to exist where there are perceptions of differing 
quality of the product offered [Simunic, 1980]. As a result, researchers' analysis 
of product differentiation among auditors has depended on the notion of audit 
quality [Francis, 1984]. Audit quality is defined as the probability that an 
auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the client's accounting system and (b) 
report the breach [De Angelo, 198la, p.186; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986]. This 
in tum is a function of the auditor's competence and independence. There is no 
reason for believing that there are differing capabilities amongst auditors to 
detect breaches because their competence standards are uniform, although Chow 
:\ 
and Wong-Boren [1986, p.7] suggest that such abilities could differ. Differences 
are therefore more likely to lie in the incentives of auditors to be independent 
[De Angelo, 198la, p.189]. 
De Angelo [198la] suggests that large audit firms have a greater incentive to 
,, , report breaches than small firms. This is due to the existence of client-specific 
quasi-rents which are defined as "the excess of a given period's revenues over 
the avoidable costs incurred in that period, including the opportunity cost of 
auditing the next-best alternative" [p.188]. These rents result from 
technological advantages that accrue to the incumbent auditor. Larger firms 
stand to lose more client-specific rents if a loss in reputation occurs because they 
have more clients. For this reason, there is a greater incentive for larger audit 
firms to supply higher quality audits in order to avoid a loss in reputation, and 
thus accounting firm size serves as a proxy for audit quality. 
Alternatively, large firms have a larger number of clients and are therefore less 
dependent on one particular client. Such a relationship enhances audit quality 
[De Angelo, 1981a, p.193]. Another reason advanced relates to the structure of 
professional firms. It argues that Big Eight firms have more collective wealth 
among partners, and therefore outsiders are more likely to search financial 
statements certified by larger audit firms for indications of negligence and 
misconduct [Chow and Wong-Boren, 1986, p.6] 
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Differences in audit quality show the existence of product differentiation. The 
perception of audit quality is more important for large clients compared to small 
and medium sized ones [Deis and Giroux, 1992]. Such differentiation is not 
observed directly [Simunic, 1980; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1986; Pound and 
Francis, 1981], but it is reflected in price differentials [Pound and Francis, 1981, 
p.358] with the identity of the supplier being the principal differentiating 
characteristic of service [Simunic, 1980, p.170]. Firms which have invested in 
"reputation capital" ( e.g. employee training programmes, firm publications 
and advertising) are able to earn a return on this investment through higher 
prices for their services [Simon et al, 1992, p.235]. It follows then that, all other 
things equal, the audit fees charged by large audit firms are expected to be 
higher than those charged by small relatively low profile firms. 
There is empirical evidence from the US to support the perception that audit 
quality is related to audit firm size. The AICPA [1978] conducted extensive 
discussions with users and found that users considered the name and reputation 
of the audit firm to be their principal source of information about the quality of 
the audit. Knapp [ 1991] found that audit committee members assessments of 
audit quality are significantly influenced by auditor size. Although the results 
may have been influenced by exposure of audit committee members to audit . 
firms of different sizes, the data showed a perception that Big Eight auditors 
were more likely to discover and report a breach than smaller audit firms. 
Wilson and Grimlund [1990] observed a switch of clients from auditors who 
were facing disciplinary action from the SEC. Such actions damage the 
reputation of the auditor, casting doubt on his credibility which may taint the 
credibility of the client's financial statements [p.47]. Such losses of clients 
would be inore detrimental to large firms, which adds support to De Angelo's 
propositions. Barlev [1974] found that audit quality was observed in the new 
i~sues market with Big Eight firms used as signals of greater audit quality. 
Big Six firms make sizeable investments to build and maintain visibility of their 
brand names [Pound and Francis, 1981]. All else equal, higher quality auditors 
command higher fees per hour than lower quality auditors, because they provide 
more assurance to users of financial statements for each hour worked [Thornton 
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and Moore, 1993, p.336]. Given a competitive market structure, the absence of 
scale economies, and the existence of differentiated demand, it is expected that 
audit fees will be positively related to the size of the audit firm. 
Economies of scale 
Economies of scale may accrue to auditors, particularly those of large 
companies [Schiff and Fried, 1976. p.14]. This is due to the fact that 
technological considerations require an appropriate matchup of auditee size and 
auditor ability to conduct the audit [Johnson and Lys, 1990]. The large audit 
firms [Pound and Francis, 1981, p.357; Financial Mail, 26/0711991, p.289]: 
• Have the expertise and resources to develop and implement a 
standard audit methodology applicable to a large proportion of 
their clientele; 
• Are more readily able to service firms which employ advanced 
technology; and 
• Have an infrastructure to efficiently service clients with a wide 
geographical spread and the need for complex accounting rules. 
Balachandran and Ramakrishnan [1987, p.116] add that the partnership 
structures of large audit firms gives them a more optimal risk sharing ratio, 
which lowers agency costs with a resultant decrease in audit fees. In addition to 
the above factors, economies of scale can arise in recruiting employees, 
developing general and specialised audit and accounting expertise, managing the 
audit firm, marketing the firm's services, and providing for partners' retirement 
[Danos and Eichenseher, 1981, p.605]. 
The change in market conditions may also give large firms a competitive 
advantage [Danos and Eichenseher, 1986, p.637] viz.: increasing advertisements 
and marketing sophistication, rising litigation costs, and the advent of audit 
committees formally reviewing audit proposals. Arnett and Danos [1979, pp.98-
105] suggest that audit technology may also render client size per se an 
important variable in determining audit-firm differentials. Larger audit firms 
have a greater percentage of inexperienced personnel and finer in personnel 
ranks. These phenomena may indicate differences in cost structure according to 
audit firm size, with larger firms applying less costly human resources and more 
sophisticated management systems. 
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Johnson and Lys [1990, p.283] attempt to explain the common tendency of 
large firms to be audited by large auditors. They explain that market 
competition induces the pairing of large firms with large clients as audit firms 
that normally audit small clients may be unable to offer their services at 
competitive prices to large geographically dispersed companies, because they 
lack economies available to firms already serving this market. Conversely, firms 
that typically audit large geographically dispersed clients will be unwilling to 
allocate productive resources to small localised corporations (at competitive 
prices), unless this reduces the cost of resources that would otherwise be idle. 
Hence, large auditors will naturally pair .with large companies. 
Small firms on the other hand, are inefficient producers of large audits because 
of the need to develop more client specific (rather than standardised) audit 
methodology, and extensive travelling or subcontracting with other auditors to 
deal with auditee size and multiple location problems [Gist, 1994]. Also, 
complex accounting transactions and reporting requirements may require 
specialised auditor expertise. The cost of human capital investment required for 
these skill specialisations can be spread over more audits, thus creating scale 
economies. However, small firms face diseconomies of scale because these costs 
cannot be recouped over a larger number of audits. 
Johnson and Lys (1990, p.282] warn that, although branch office investments 
reduce the incremental cost of auditing clients with geographi~ally dispersed 
division, fixed costs may be increased because of the need to co-ordinate and 
monitor multi-office activities. 
Cost advantages of large firms over small firms may be present across all client 
sizes, but the cost advantages should certainly increase with the size of the client 
if larger clients involve greater time spent on routine tasks [Danos and 
Eichenseher, 1986, p.637]. Such savings should be passed on to the client in the 
form of lower audit fees to be observed in the pricing model. Lower audit fees 
being charged by large audit firms is evidence of economies of scale effects, 
ceteris paribus [Anderson and Zeghal, 1994, p.197]. 
Monopoly pricing 
The effect of market structure on audit fees was first postulated and empirically 
tested by Simunic [1980]. Intuitively, the competitiveness of the market for audit 
services would have an impact on audit fees. The test for competition was based 
primarily on the observed signs of the auditor v.:riable in two separate 
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regressions formed by partitioning all observations into two audit market 
segments for large and small auditees. The small auditee market was assumed to 
be competitive because of the large number of suppliers. This segment forms a 
. benchmark for competitiveness by which findings in the large auditee segment 
were interpreted. The nine different outcomes used to interpret price 
differentials are given below: 
Table 7: Framework for studying audit prices [as adapted by Francis and 
Stokes, 1986] 
Large Small Auditees 
Audi tees 
B8>b8 B8=b8 B8<b8 
B8>b8 [1] C,P [2] M [3] M,S 
* B8=b8 [4] C,P,D [5] c [6] M,S 
* * B8<b8 [7] C,P,D [S] C,D [9] C,S 
Legend: 
BS = Big Eight audit fees 
bS = Non Big Eight audit fees 
c = Competitive pricing for large auditees 
M = Monopolistic pricing for large auditees 
p = Big Eight product differentiation 
s = Big Eight economies of scale 
D = Non-Big Eight diseconomies of scale 
Explanation _of the nine scenarios 
[l] BS>bS in both market segments indicates that pricing is 
competitive throughout the market, and because BS>bS, the 
higher price indicates BS product differentiation. 
[2] Since prices are the same in the same small market segment and 
BS>bS in the large segment, BS monopolistic pricir:1g exists in the 
large segment of the market. 
[3] [6] B8<b8 in the small segment indicates that scale economies exist 
for large producers throughout the market, but because B8;;::b8 
,in the large segment, B8 monopolistic pricing exists in the large 
segment. 
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[4] [7] B8>b8 in the small segment indicates B8 product differentiation 
throughout the market, but since B8g,8 in the large segment, the 
b8 have diseconomies of scale (higher prices) in the large 
segment. 
[5] B8=b8 in both market segments indicates a competitive structure 
with no product differentiation or scale economies. 
[8] B8=b8 in the small segment indicates competition throughout the 
market and B8<b8 in the large segment indicates the b8 have 
diseconomies of scale (higher prices) in the large segment. 
[9] B8<b8 in both segments indicates competitive pricing throughout 
the market, and because B8<b8 scale economies favour large 
producers throughout the market. 
* These are characterised as diseconomies of scale to non Big Eight firms, 
rather than economies to the Big Eight because they pertain only to one 
segment (large clients) of the market. Simunic [1980, p.171] argues that 
under traditional economic theory, scale economies, if they exist, would be 
applicable to all production, not just related to specific market segments. 
However, if two distinctly different audit markets exist, then these scenarios 
would be appropriately characterised as Big Eight scale economies, rather 
than diseconomies to the non Big Eight in the large auditee market 
segment [Francis and Stokes, 1986, p.384]. 
In a competitive market, systematically higher prices charged by one group of 
suppliers would be consistent with product differentiation in that group. Any 
such product differentiation presumably would exist in the services of well-
known, larger brand name suppliers as the Big Six auditing firms [Francis and 
Stokes, 1986, p.384]. Further, such product differentiation should be observable 
both in the small and large market segments. Product differentiation by Big Six 
firms may be confounded by the presence of Big Six economies of scale 
Contradictory evidence on the effects of auditor size have been presented in 
p_revious studies. In the US, Simunic [1980], found no price difference between 
big and small auditors, while Palmrose [1986a], Francis and Simon [1987] 
found that audit fees for Big Eight firms were higher than non-Big Eight firms 
for small auditees. Higher audit fees reported for relatively small companies 
audited by the Big Eight were also reported in Australia by Francis and Stokes 
[1986], in Canada by Anderson and Zeghal [1994] and in the UK by Taffler 
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and Ramalinggam [1981]. In addition, public sector evidence from Rubin 
[1987] and Baber et al [1987] supports the existence of a Big Eight premium. 
Francis [1984] on the other hand, reported that Big Eight audit fees were 
significantly higher than non-Big Eight prices in samples of both small and 
large companies in the Australian markets. In New Zealand, Firth [1985], in 
Canada, Chung and Linsdsay [1988], and in Malaysia, Simon et al [1990] found 
no significant pricing differences. 
Auditor size (AUDITOR) is measured by whether a firm is affiliated to one of 
the Big Six international firms or not. Audit firms with an affiliation to the Big 
Six international network were given 1 whilst the rest were given 0. This is 
consistent with most prior studies such as, Simunic [1980], Francis [1984],Firth 
[1985], Palmrose [1986a], Chung and Lindsay [1988] and Chan et al [1993]. A 
continuous metric used in Anderson and Zeghal [ 1994] could not be used 
because the audit billings of all the firms in the study were not publicly 
available. The relationship of audit fees with the size of the auditor can thus be 
negative or positive. 
Hypothesis 8 : The audit fee is not affected by auditor size. 
Hypothesis 8a : The effect of audit firm size on audit fees is · 
indeterminate. 
5.2.2.2 Management advisory services 
Audit clients have a choice of using the incumbent auditor to supply MAS or 
another auditor. There appears to be a general preference by audit clients to use 
their own auditors for MAS [Palmrose, 1988]. Review of literature and general 
press clippings, implies that there are definite profit considerations on the 
auditor's part in the provision of non-audit services to audit clients [Hillison and 
Kennelley, 1988]. Auditing and other services unavoidably overlap. The 
provision of both audit and MAS to the client may be beneficial to the client 
[AICPA, 1978, p.95]. The beneficial effects emanate from potential cost 
advantages to the client arising out of "knowledge spillovers," which are 
transfers of knowledge that may occur when the auditor provides both audit and 
MAS. 
Knowledge spillover is hypothesised to occur when "the total costs of one firm 
jointly performing both non-auditing and auditing services are less than the sum 
of the costs when each service is performed by a different firm" [Barkess and 
Simnet, 1994, p.99]. This belief exi.sts because certain types of MAS demanded 
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by clients require the provider to have a detailed understanding of the 
company's operations, personnel, etc. [Hillison and Kennely, 1988]. If the 
auditor can avoid information-gathering costs to carry out the non-audit 
engagement, the client may benefit as the additional knowledge gained through 
the conduct of the non-audit service may reduce the amount of audit time 
necessary [Hillison and Kennely, 1988]. The form of knowledge spillover, and 
the resulting cost interdependency can be complex. Specifically [Simunic, 1984, 
p.681]: 
(1) Knowledge can flow from auditing to non-audit services or vice versa; 
(2) The fixed cost, variable cost or both costs of the services may be 
affected; 
(3) The knowledge spillover can be client-specific or general. 
Explaining the spillovers from non-audit to audit services, Simunic [1984, 
p.684] observes that: 
"When MAS produces auditing knowledge as a by-product, a potential 
auditor, who can (but may not be asked to) perform both services, will assess 
a joint total cost function as well as separate costs for each services. As with 
all externalities, the benefit from knowledge spillover is a joint effect in the 
sense that unless both services are performed, the cost savings cannot occur. 
However, since the two services are billed to clients separately, the cost 
savings must somehow be assigned to one, or perhaps both of the services." 
Evidence from the US and Australia indicates that such cost savings, if they exist, 
are not necessarily passed onto the client in the form of a lower audit fee 
[Simunic, 1984; Palmrose 1986b; Turpen 1990; Barkess and Simnet, 1994]. In 
contrast, results from Davis et al [ 1993] using more direct evidence and 
therefore providing stronger proof, suggest that "either that knowledge 
spillovers from non-audit services do not lead to auditing efficiencies or, 
alternatively, that the benefits of efficiencies are passed on to clients" [p.147]. 
This confirmed, albeit partially, Abdel-Khalik's [1990]finding of the absence 
of either costs or benefits accruing to purchasers of other services from the 
incumbent auditor. 
The positive association between audit fees and MAS is founded on the notion 
that if auditors do not pass on cost savings, as a result of knowledge spillover 
effects, they in effect earn economic rents in the form of higher audit fees for a 
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given level of effort [Davis et al, 1993]. Knowledge spillovers permit joint 
suppliers to provide services at a lower overall cost [Beck et al, 1988, p.54] 
irrespective of changes in audit quality. To justify this, Beck et al [1988, p.53] 
use the following example. Suppose that knowledge spillovers enhance audit 
quality and that all market participants are aware of this fact. Given these 
circumstances, competitors would face additional costs if they attempted to 
provide audit services of equivalent audit quality. Alternatively, suppose that 
competitors are unwilling to increase the quality of their audit services due to 
lack of perceived demand or market participants' inability to discern quality 
differences. In such an environment, a joint supplier would have incentives to 
modify the nature, timing and extent of tests as a means of reducing audit costs. 
Since cost-saving measures could not be implemented without jeopardising the 
existing (equilibrium) quality level, a joint supplier would enjoy a cost 
advantage. 
Evidence from the US suggests that some audit firms assess the decision to offer 
audit services at a price which takes into account non-audit services [Wallace, 
1989, p.4]. This implies that the pricing of audit services would be affected by 
the pricing of MAS, as originally stated in Simunic's supposition. The 
hypothesis to be tested are : 
Hypothesis 9 : For a given client in a given period, the cost functions of 
MAS and audit services are independent. 
Hypothesis 9a : For a given client in a given period, the cost functions are 
interdependent because of favourable knowledge spillovers 
between services. 
The basic test for the relationship between audit and non-audit services involves 
a comparison of fees, other things held constant, for a control group of 
companies which did not purchase non-audit services from their auditor, to one 
which purchased both services [Simunic, 1984). In the absence of non-audit fees 
paid to non auditors in the control group, the tests are based on differences in 
audit fees which are interpreted as follows [Simunic, 1984, p.689]: 
Basic test 
Audit fee difference (MAS purchasers minus non purchasers). 
Interpretation 
Positive : Net spillover from auditing to MAS and/or a net spillover from 
MAS to auditing with price elastic audit demand. 
Negative : Net spillover from MAS to auditing. 
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The collection of data for non-audit services is not without limitations. Some of 
the large audit firms have formed consultancy companies which provide other 
(consultancy) services to audit clients. The amounts paid to such companies are 
in some cases, not disclosed as part of auditors remuneration, although such 
companies are in substance co,ntrolled by the same accounting firm performing 
the audit [Glqeck et al, 1993. p.95]. There may be a serious drawback in using 
only the amount paid to auditors (labelled MAS) for other services to capture 
the relationship between audit fees and management advisory services. 
5.2.2.3 Location 
The auditors fee is a function of the cost involved in carrying out the audit. 
These costs include salaries of audit and non-audit staff, rent, equipment, 
insurance, etc., [Ramzy, 1988]. The cost structure of each audit firm is expected 
to vary according to the location of the auditor, due to the differences in the 
costs of salaries and rent which are perceived to make up the biggest proportion 
of the auditor's expenses [Christiansen and Loft, 1992, p.287]. The major 
centres in South Africa have different cost structures, as the salaries and rentals 
are influenced by location between different centres. 
Informal discussions between the author and some first year trainee accountants 
in Johannesburg and Cape Town showed that the starting salary in 1994 in 
Johannesburg was between R2400 and R2800, whilst Cape Town had a range of 
R1900 and R2100. As a matter of fact, a survey of starting salaries by a 
personnel agency showed starting salaries to be higher in Johannesburg than in 
any other major city in South Africa [Sunday Times Cape Metro, 1715192] In 
addition the cost of living in the Johannesburg area appears to be the highest 
[The Star, 7/1192]. Because of the higher cost of living in Johannesburg in 
general, it is expected that salaries would be generally higher in this area to 
compensate for the higher cost of living. Because labour is the largest 
component of the auditor's costs [CPA Journal, August 1994], the cost structure 
has to bear some resemblance to the wage disparities between major centres. 
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Christiansen and Loft [1992, p.287] posit that the important costs of the audit 
are now less variable; they include those of hiring specialised consultants, 
investments in the education of staff, research and development, and tangible 
fixed assets. Whilst the nature of the costs may be changing, their determination 
is likely to be influenced by the location of the auditor's office base as these 
costs have a high labour component. 
It is expected that auditors with offices in Johannesburg will have a higher cost 
structure which will be reflected in higher .audit fees. The location variable 
(LOCATION) was captured using a binary variable, 1 for Johannesburg and 0 
for other centres. 
Hypothesis 10: The audit fee is not affected by the location of the 
auditor's office. 
Hypothesis lOa: Johannesburg-based auditors charge higher fees compared 
to other auditors in the country. 
5.2.2.4 Expertise 
The advertising efforts of some of the country's firms emphasise a certain 
degree of specialisation in some industries. Judging from the tone of the 
advertisements, the link between specialist focus and expertise is obvious. Three 
advertisements inserted in the Financial Mail are included to demonstrate the 
emphasis on specialist skills. All three inserts were in special editions dealing 
with a particular industry. 
("Specialisation of auditors" as used in this study, refers to auditors holding a 
relatively large market share for audits of clients within certain industries. It is 
not implied that auditors have devoted a substantial portion of their resources to 
the auditing of certain industries.) 
This trend in specialisation in certain industries by audit firms was first noted in 
the US by Zeff and Keller [1967]. Subsequent studies showed that specialisation 
did not vary over an extended time period [Rhode et al, 1971; Schiff and Fried, 
1976; Dopuch and Simunic, 1980; Danos and Eichenseher, 1986]. From 
another perspective, audit firm's industry expertise has been found to be a 
prominent differentiating attribute reported by buyers of Big Eight audit 
services [Shockley and Holt, 1983]. This obviously begs the question, why 
would auditing firms specialise in certain industries? 
- ------- ---------------------------------------------
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Eichenseher and Danos [1981, p.486] suggest that specialisation arises due to 
the desire "to exploit economies of scale." But then how would such economies 
of scale arise? The acquisition of expertise in the accounting, economic, tax, and 
managerial characteristics of an industry is a type of fixed cost which, up to a 
certain point, results in declining average costs in the supply of that expertise 
[Buckley and O'Sullivan, 1980, pp.32-33]. The audit firm hires individuals with 
the required expertise to service more than one client [Danos and Eichenseher, 
1981]. The experts are required to : 
• acquire a detailed knowledge of the industry; 
• understand the needs of the clients; and 
• develop a range of products and services to meet those needs 
[The Chartered Accountant in Australia, April 1991, p.42]. 
So, an auditor who already has experience in an industry can- offer more 
efficient and lower cost audits to other firms in the same industry. Eichenseher 
and Danos [1981] analysis of the audit services market demonstrates that the 
viability of audit firms in the context of industries requires the servicing of a 
large number of clients. As a result, Danos and Eichenseher [1982, p.605] 
advanced a "survivorship" hypothesis for pursuing economies of scale. Their 
thesis is that in a competitive environment, the survival of audit firms is 
dependent on firms operating at a minimum cost level. Scale economies will 
create an environment where survival is a function of size. 
The AICPA [1978, p.112] suggest that the economies of scale are related to the 
regulatory complexity of the client. Such complexity requires the auditor to 
have the technical know-how of how to deal with them. The resultant technical 
economies of scale for audit firms are sourced from the specific format and 
measurement rules that regulatory bodies mandate for accounting reports of 
firms subject to their jurisdiction [Eichenseher and Danos, 1981, p.488]. Similar 
scale effects can be expected to occur within the contexts of clients issuing new 
securities and complying with industry specific regulation [Eichenseher and 
Danos, 1981, p.488]. 
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Contrary to the above sentiment, audit firms with specialist industry experience 
might see industries in which they are leaders as an opportunity to recoup the 
eroding profit margins by charging higher fees [Sanders, Allen and Korte, 
1995]. Empirically, Gist [ 1992, 1994] provides evidence for the existence of a 
premium for auditor expertise in regulated industries. 
To measure the effects of industry specialisation (EXPERTISE), the percentage 
of firms audited in the sectors covered by the study is used. If an audit firm 
audited one client this is designated 0. If more than one client is audited, the 
variable was denoted 1. Other researchers [Palmrose, 1986a] used auditee sales 
to compute market shares. This measure is unsuitable for this study because not 
all listed companies disclosed turnover within the sample period. Prior to 1993, 
companies could choose not to disclose turnover. From 1993 onwards, this 
privilege fell away. Furthermore, market share measures based on client sales are 
dominated by large-client relationships [Eichenseher and Danos, 1981, p.484]. 
Prior research on the influence of auditor specialisation is mixed. Palmrose 
[1986a] found this variable to be insignificant whilst Ettredge and Greenberg 
[ 1990] found that the reduction in first year fees is larger when a client changes 
to a more specialist auditor. This result is more consistent with lower fees due to 
auditor expertise. Ward et al [1994] on the other hand, detected a premium for 
auditor experience when measured by a dichotomous variable. It appears that 
the expertise premium is associated with a dichotomous measure whilst lower 
fees have been associated with continuous measures. To test for the sensitivity of 
results to this classification scheme,· the analysis will be performed using a binary 
code and a continuous measure. The continuous measure uses the percentage of 
companies audited in a particular sector. 
Hypothesis 11: The audit fee is not affected by the number of audit 
clients in the auditee's sector. 
Hypothesis lla: The number of clients in a particular sector can either 
positively or negatively affect the audit fee. 
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5.2.2.5 Change in auditors 
The impact of auditor switching on audit fees appears to arouse professional and 
regulatory concern. One of the earliest concerns over the charging of low audit 
fees for new audit clients was expressed by the Cohen Commission [AICPA, 
1978]. The Commission referred to allegations that some firms charged lower 
fees for the first year or first few years of an audit, with an expectation of 
recovering the initial loss in subsequent years [AICPA, 1978, p.121]. The 
Commission expressed concern over the threat that such a practice posed to the 
auditor's independence. 
De Angelo [1981b] provides a model for explaining why audit firms would set 
the initial cost of an audit lower than the true cost of the audit. In auditing circles 
this practice is referred to as "low balling". The economics-based analysis 
adopted recognises the existence of significant start-up costs for initial audit 
engagements. These costs may be due'to [De Angelo, 1981b, p.118] 
• the necessity to verify the details making up those balance sheet 
accounts that are of a permanent nature, such as fixed assets, patents and 
retained earnings; 
• the lack of familiarity with the client's operations by the auditor in 
initial engagement; 
• balances brought forward have to be verified in more detail in an 
initial engagement. 
an 
The initial costs would only be incurred by other auditors, thus giving the 
incumbent auditor an advantage. The auditor-client bonding gives rise to client-
specific quasi rents in the form of future profits to the incumbent auditor. The 
expected profit for the auditor will thus be based on the profit on the initial year 
of the audit plus the present value of quasi rents from future audits. Auditors 
bidding for the initial engagement hold rational expectations about the future 
advantages to incumbency and submit bids based on these expectations. 
Competition for the initial audit forces auditors to lower their bids until zero 
profits (in net present value terms) are expected. 
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This can only happen when the future profits from the audit are positive and the 
initial audit fee is set below actual cost. The supposition in this framework is that 
auditors will only bid for an audit if the future profits from the audit are greater 
than zero. The amount of the initial "discount" is directly related to the 
expected future profits, i.e. the greater the future profits the greater the discount, 
ceteris paribus. 
Watts and Zimmerman [1986, pp.314-315] provide a numerical example of 
quasi rents and lowballing. Assuming that there are start up costs for the initial 
year of the audit, take the auditor's costs for the initial year to be R150 and 
RlOO for each subsequent year. If the client changes auditors, the new auditor 
will incur costs of R150, some of which will be passed to the client in a higher 
fee in later years. Suppose the auditor can charge R102 without triggering an 
auditor change. The R2 difference between fees and costs represents future-quasi 
rent that the auditor is able to capture because the R50 start-up costs have 
already been incurred. This rent is specific to this client. 
Given the existence of price competition in the audit services market, the future 
quasi rent is bid away at the time of the initial audit. If the present value of future 
quasi rents is expected to be RlO, the potential auditor's minimum bid will be 
R140. Competition ensures that at the initial bid, no auditor earns a return in 
excess of total costs. 
Cursory review of world-wide auditing journals reveals that price cutting on 
initial engagements is rife. In the UK, Price Waterhouse were accused of 
lowballing when they tendered for the audit of Prudential Insurance at a 
"discount" of £700,000 [Accountancy, July 1992, p.27]. In South Africa, 
comments from a local partner of a Big Six affiliate indicated the suspicions of 
the existence of low balling [Msibi and Pillay, 1992]. The increase in low balling 
appears to have been spurred on by general cost consciousness of clients who 
now open audits to tender. The admission of the existence of lowballing has 
become more brazen even among auditors. For instance, a panel of partners 
interviewed by the CPA Journal [August 1994, p.20] admitted that: 
"We [auditors] have made the audit a loss leader to gain access to 
clients", 
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and further adds that: 
"If you price the audit properly, you will get none of the business." 
Changes in auditors may also be motivated by reasons other than fee pressures. 
These are listed by Addams and Davis [1994] and Francis and Wilson [1988]. 
According to these studies, the audit fee may not be the most important factor in 
choosing an auditor. However, it is worth noting that it is one of the more 
important factors in choosing an auditor for small firms, per the research by 
Addams and Davis. 
Ettredge and Greenberg [ 1990] suggest that the extent of initial fee cut will be 
determined by the financial health of the client, change in auditor class, 
technological efficiency of the auditor. and industry expertise, and the number 
of bidding auditors. Observe the similarity in industry expertise cited as a reason 
for choosing an audit firm and the extent of fee cutting in the initial year. 
The AICPA [1978] described evidence of lowballing as anecdotal, althou,gh 
there is a perception that it is widespread in practice. Prior empirical studies have 
either failed to detect price cutting [Francis, 1984; Palmrose 1986a and Simunic, 
1980] or cannot be generalised, due to very small sample sizes [Baber et al, 
1987; and Francis and Simon, 1987]. 
Whilst more and more recent research indicates price cutting, it is possible that 
the extent of low balling can be obscured by a change in perceived risk. If an 
auditor resigns from a client because of some perceived cost or risk, the 
successor auditor may require a higher fee [Roberts et al, 1990, p.221]. This 
situation is more likely to occur if the variables capturing risk in the audit fee 
model do not sufficiently cater for the perceived changes in risk. 
The major problem with examining the impact of changes in auditors on audit 
fees, is the size of the sample, especially amongst large corporations 
[Eichenseher, Hagigi, and Shields, p.30). For example, Francis [1984) had 26 
auditor changes in a sample of 136 companies, Francis and Simon [1987) had 
12 initial engagements out of a total sample of 220. This could be explained by 
the fact that companies change auditors rather infrequently and 'after careful 
consideration[Eichenseher et al, 1989). 
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In this study, the number of observations involving auditor changes is 5 out of 
208 total observations. Therefore, the size of observations in this sample is more 
severe than in other cross-sectional studies. This implies that a better 
examination of this variable could be a separate study investigating this variable 
as its prime focus. 
Hypothesis 12: Auditor changes have no influence on audit fees. 
Hypothesis 12a: Audit fees are negatively related to auditor changes. 
5.3 Dependent variable 
The audit fee is the dependent variable. For the purposes of this study, the audit 
fee is the amount paid to the auditor, excluding any prior year over or under 
provision. In principle the prior year over or under provision relates to the year 
in which the services were rendered. It is brought into account in the following 
year because it is more of an inaccurate estimate than a fundamental error 
[SAICA,1985]. This prior year over or under provision is in principle an amount 
that relates to the audit effort expended in the prior year. The prior year over or 
under provision was thus added back or deducted from the prior year's audit 
fee. Auditor expenses were also included as part of the audit fee as these form 
part of the auditor's efforts to carry out the audit. The Companies Act of 1973 
s283(2) as amended requires all payments made to the auditor for the audit, 
other specified services, the auditor's. expenses and payments in respect of the 
audit, be disclosed separately in the income statement . Since audit fees and 
related auditor remuneration are required disclosure in South Africa, it was not 
necessary to obtain fee data by means of questionnaires, as has been necessary in 
similar studies in Canada and the US. 
This gathering of audit fee data relies on the assumptions that both auditors and 
auditees have no biases about disclosing the audit fee. Simon [1985, p.74] 
observed that it is not clear whether auditors or clients would be more likely to 
disclose audit fees if they were higher or lower than expected, given the size of 
tbe auditee and their complexity. It is equally plausible that, a priori, a firm 
would like to disclose "low" audit fees to demonstrate that it is careful about 
spending or "high" fees to indicate that the audit is of high quality [Simon, 
1985]. Similarly, auditors may have an interest in reporting only low fees to 
prevent audit clients seeking fee reductions, while to report high fees might 
cause other auditors to attempt to obtain the client by offering a lower fee. 
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It should also be noted that a study of this nature does not sufficiently recognise 
the impact of reliance on other auditors. The appearance of an auditor's opinion 
in the annual financial statements of a company, does not necessarily signify that 
one public auditing firm audited all the consolidated subsidiaries and equity 
accounted associates, as well as the parent [Zeff and Fosum, 1967, p.299]. As 
companies diversify and disperse their operations, the auditor of the parent 
company may need to rely on audits conducted by other firms. The statistical 
data tends to overstate the role of the principal auditor and understates the roles 
of other auditors. For this reason, complexity of an audit client may be masked 
by the use of consolidated (aggregated) financial statements. Great care has to 
be exercised in interpreting the exact implications of this thesis. 
To correct for heteroscedasticity, researchers transform the dependent variable 
by deflating it with total assets [Simunic, 1980; Chung and Lindsay, 1988; 
Anderson and Zeghal, 1994], taking the natural logarithm [Palmrose, 1986a] 
and the logarithm to base 10 [Taffler and Ramalinggam, 1981; Francis, 1984]. 
Firth (1985] did not make any adjustments. For the purposes of this research the 
log of base 10 will be used. 
The variables discussed above are summarised in Table 8 below: 
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Table 8: Description of variables 
Measure Exp. Descnpt10n 
sign 
Dependent variable 
AUDIT FEE • Total fees paid to auditors excluding prior year 
over or under provision including expenses. 
Independent variable 
ASSETS + Sum of fixed assets, current assets, 
investments and loans advanced at year end. 
SALES + Total sales excluding value added tax. 
NIBT + Net profit before tax including earnings 
from associates. 
INV+DEBTOR + All stock items including raw materials, 
finished goods, work in progress less provision 
for slow-moving and obsolete stock PLUS 
Trade debtors (less any bad debt provisions) and 
any other amounts owed by third parties 
payable within one year. 
ENTITIES + Number of consolidated subsidiaries and equity 
accounted associates. 
DELAY + Number of days between audit report signing 
and year end. 
REPORTS + Number of financial reports in addition to basic 
financial statements. 
OPINION + Qualification of audit opinion, designated 1 if 
qualified and 0 otherwise. 
OWNERSHIP* + Percentage of equity held by directors 
(beneficial and non beneficial). 
GEARING + Ratio of total liabilities to ordinary 
shareholders' interest. 
PROFIT Ratio of Net income to total assets. 
LIQUIDITY Ratio of current assets to current liabilities. 
AUDITOR ? International affiliation of audit firm, 
designated 1 if Big Six affiliate and 0 
otherwise. 
EXPERTISE The number of audit clients in the auditee's 
JSE sector, designated 1 if auditor has more 
than one client in the sector., otherwise 0 
LOCATION + Cityffown at which audit report is signed, 
designated 1 for Johannesburg and 0 for any 
other city. 
MAS + Fees paid to auditor for other services 
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McGregor's Who Owns Whom [1993] provides the following definitions-used in 
the calculations of the debt to equity ratio, current ratio and return on assets : 
Ordinary shareholders interest - The sum of ordinary share capital, share 
premium, non-distributable reserves and distributable reserves. 
Long term liabilities - The sum of convertible debentures, directors/shareholders 
loans, non interest bearing and interest bearing liabilities. 
Current liabilities - The sum of trade creditors, dividends payable, taxation 
payable, interest bearing and non interest bearing liabilities payable within 12 
months. 
Total liabilities - The sum of preference shares, outside shareholders interest, 
deferred tax, other, current liabilities and long-term liabilities 
Current assets - The sum of inventory, debtors, cash and near cash, dividends, tax 
and other short term assets. 
The return on assets ratio is computed thus 
(Jn vestment Income + Operating profit + Interest received + Income from Associated Companies)* 100 
Total assets 
All the data relating to the above variables was gleaned from the annual reports 
with the exception of the auditee risk and auditor expertise measures obtained 
from McGregor's Who Owns Whom [1991, 1992, 1993]. 
5.4 Omitted variables 
The above list of variables is not the comprehensive list of variables that will 
explain the variability of audit fees. 
5.4.1 Internal audit costs 
Previous research [Wallace, 1984b] has identified, amongst other factors,_ internal 
audit costs as having a relationship with audit fees. These studies were based on 
questionnaires where respondent companies provided the amount of 
expenditures on the internal audit function. This research has not adopted that 
approach but recognises that practically, there should be a relationship between 
external audit costs and internal audit costs. 
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As a matter of fact, Margheim [ 1986] found that external auditors reduced 
planned audit hours if the internal auditors had a high level of competence and 
work performance. The internal auditors had to perform documented work in a 
specific area, before the external auditors would reduce the amount of planned 
hours. A further point that should be made is that internal audit departments are 
more likely to exist in large corporations, which are more likely to be audited by 
large audit firms. The extent of the prevalence of internal audit departments 
amongst listed companies appears to be unknown. Therefore, for practical 
reasons, the internal audit variable was left out. 
5.4.2 Industry 
Industry variables are also expected to affect audit fees [Wallace, 1989]. It would 
be very difficult to assess the exact nature of the underlying business areas as it 
has become exceedingly difficult to draw lines between industries. Although the 
companies in similar industries fall under the same sector, the sectorial listings of 
some of the companies do not necessarily conform to the underlying business 
nature with some element of fluidity in the nature of industry categories [Rhode, 
Whitsell and Kelsey, 1974, p.773]. For instance, a company like South African 
Breweries is listed under beverages but has extensive interests in hotels and 
retailing. This problem was compounded by the lack of segmental information 
in annual reports. In the absence of an authoritative source, the industry effects 
on audit fees were not modelled into the regression analysis. An additional 
problem is the relatively small sizes for each industry and a small number of 
observations for some types of auditors (e.g. non-Big Six) within industries. 
5.4.3 Foreign subsidiaries 
A significant proportion of the companies included in the study did not 
distinguish between local and foreign subsidiaries. One of the possible reasons 
for that was to protect foreign interests of local companies during the economic 
sanctions era. The translation. of foreign subsidiaries into local currency for 
consolidation purposes may be time consuming as it requires more detailed 
information, particularly if the entity is a foreign operation. The specific needs 
of the auditor of a South African multinational are more onerous. Specifically, 
the local auditor is required to [Richards, 1976, p.7 (adapted)]: 
1. carefully study the world-wide operations of the client to determine 
the auditing needs to meet local and foreign legal requirements; 
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2. have a network of offices throughout the world to meet the client's 
needs; 
3. ensure that the foreign offices are staffed with auditors who are 
familiar with South African accounting principles and auditing 
standards; 
4. have the ability to keep overseas offices informed of new 
· developments on a timely basis; and 
5. be freely able to communicate with his overseas offices so that there 
is a clear understanding of exactly what is required and exactly 
when it is required. 
All these omitted variables could conceivably account for the unexplained 
variance in the audit fee model. This is a limitation of the study. 
5.4.4 Busy period 
The cluster of year ends around a particular time of the year, along with time 
pressure for the early issuance of audit reports, produces a flood of work at the 
same time of the year [.AICPA, 1978, p.119]. The timing of audits around a 
particular time of the year is determined by the year end of the client. South 
African listed companies also tend to have common year ends. McGregor's Who 
Own Whom [1993] gives a breakdown of listed company year ends listed in the 
table below. 
Table 9: Listed companies classified by financial year end 
January July 8 
February 102 August 30 
March 124 September 72 
April 22 October 6 
May November 3 
June 212 December 148 
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, Year ends tend to cluster around the quarters with June, December, and March 
being the most popul~. Gloeck et al [1993, pp.59-63] analysis of year ends of 
the Top 200 Listed Companies shows that some audit firms have a significant 
number of periods taking place at a particular time of the year. From their 
analysis, the busiest time of the Big Six affiliates is June and December. The 
most even appears to be Arthur Andersen. 
Although auditing firms try to schedule as much work as possible at interim 
dates, the year-end rush still exists. Chan et al [1993] posit that firms may try to 
smooth out these peaks by charging premium prices for busy season clients. 
They further add that such a smoothing of work flows creates a need to shift 
audit emphasis to pre year end testing which might give rise to less efficient and 
therefore more costly auditing [p.785, Footnote 7]. The variable was 
insignificant in their audit fee pricing model. This finding confirmed Ramzy's 
[1988] survey of auditors which concluded that "the date of the company's year 
end (busy and less busy) ...... are believed to have no effect on the level of audit 
fees" [p.114]. 
Comments from Stuart Morris, a senior partner at KPMG Aiken and Peat, 
indicates that South African firms may not be charging a premium for audits at 
peak times but there is more of an emphasis on maintaining quality and service 
without putting staff under too much pressure [Financial Mail KPMG Aiken and 
Peat Corporate Survey, May 11, 1990]. Therefore, this study has not taken into 
account the effects of peak pricing. 
5.4.5 Auditor Tenure 
Audit fees appear to be potentially susceptible to learning curve effects [Rubin, 
1988]. Simunic [ 1980] suggests that over time auditors may increase their 
efficiency in auditing a particular client. He predicts that the cost savings from 
auditor learning will be passed on to the auditee in the form of a lower audit fee. 
His empirical results did not support the expected negative association of audit 
fees and audit tenure. Rubin [1987] also found that the auditor variable was 
insignificant. 
Apart from the lack of significance of this variable in prior studies, it has been 
excluded because it would have been necessary to survey the firms for the length 
of period that they had been auditors of a particular client. Therefore, the 
relationship between auditor tenure and audit fees is ignored. 
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5.4.6 Fee billing arrangements 
Research done in the US shows that the audit fee is influenced by whether the 
audit arrangement is a fixed fee or hourly billing. In South Africa, the only way 
of distinguishing between the two types of arrangement is by carrying out a 
survey of auditors and management which is beyond the scope of this study. For 
this reason, this variable has not been included. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter sets out the hypothesis underpinning this study. It is expected that 
the audit fee will be a function of client and auditor factors. The size, 
complexity and risk of the client are expected to be positively related to audit 
fees. The relationship between auditor size and audit fees is not predicted as 
there are very strong competing hypothesis. The location of the auditor, MAS, 
and audit delay are expected to be positively related to audit fees whilst the level 
of expertise in a particular sector is expected to have a negative relationship. 
A conceptual model underlying these ideas is given in the following equation: 
Audit Fee= f[client size, ownership structure, complexity & risk, 
reporting structure, auditor size, location, MAS;audit 
delay] 
The model admittedly includes a large number of variables. However, the 
importance of these variables has been suggested by previous research. 




6.1 Data collection 
The sample for this study consists of 104 companies. They were selected among 
listed companies by first classifying all listed companies on the JSE according to 
the size of the auditor based on information in McGregor's Who Owns Whom 
[1991,1992]. 100 firms audited by the large Big Six firms were selected against 
100 firms audited by small and medium size firms, all on a random basis. The 
starting sample was selected from companies listed on 1 January 1991 excluding 
companies in the financial sector (banks and insurance companies), and 
companies jointly audited by a Big Six and a non-Big Six accounting firm. The 
starting sample of 200 companies was adjudged to: 
• be sufficiently large to permit sensible analysis which has the potential 
of being generalisable for South African listed companies; and 
• keep the cost of microfiche and the effort involved in extracting 
variables from them at manageable levels. 
The exclusion of banks and insurance companies warrants further comment. 
Elliott and Korpi [1978] and Simunic [1980] observed that companies in this 
sector tend to be very unique resulting in their appearance as outliers with 
uniformly low values for the audit fee. Their inclusion may inadvertently bias 
the results of this study. 
During the data gathering phase the original sample was reduced to the final 104 
as follows: 
Table 10: Description of sample selection 
Starting sample size 
Companies delisted 
Involved in mergers 
Turnover not disclosed 











The sample period was defined as 1991-1992. This period was selected because 
it preceded the changes in the Companies Act regarding the disclosure of 
auditor remuneration. Prior to 1993, auditor remuneration was broken down 
between audit fees, expenses, fees for other services and prior year over or under 
payments. The amended Schedule 4 issued in 1993 did not require a breakdown 
although Section 289 still does. It was felt that this lack of clarity could hinder 
data collection. Also the sample period was before the relaxation of advertising 
rules for auditors in late 1993. 
Table 11 provides the descriptive statistics of all the variables included. 
Table 11: Data descriptive statistics for total sample 
VARIABLE MEAN MAXIMUM MINIMUM STD DEV. 
AUDIT FEE R518055 R5,985 mil R2169 R3,2 mil 
MAS R56977 Rl,3 mil 0 R485295 
SALES R679 mil R18188 mil R473000 R768 mil 
NIBT R5,5 mil R721 mil (R35 mil) R325000 
ASSETS R5,5 mil Rl5105 mil R704000 R1323 mil 
ENTITIES 20 198 0 38 
INVENTORY R78 mil Rl216,7 mil 0 R527 mil 
DEBTORS R96 mil Rl213,5 mil 0 R55 mil 
REPORTS 2,46 9 0 3.78 
PROFIT 17,80% 183,73% (26,75%) 23.0% 
GEARING 43,55% 237,39% 0 23.4% 
LIQUIDITY 1,73 times 14,77 times - 1,34 times 
DELAY 74 days 290days 24 days 40days 
The variables captured by binary codes have the following characteristics: 
Table 12: Descriptive statistics of binary coded variables 
No. of companies with qualified audit reports 
No. of companies controlled by directors 
No of companies with Johannesburg auditors 






The audit fee averages R518 055 with a maximum of R5,9 million and a 
minimum of R2160, and the standard deviation is greater than the mean. Thus 
the distribution is positively skewed, with a long upper tail of high fees. This 
reflects a similar pattern in two auditee size variables SALES and ASSETS. The 
average size of these variables (ASSETS R5,5 million, SALES R679 million and 
NIBT R5,5 million) reflects a bias towards larger listed companies. 
Inventories also exhibit positive skewness. However, the other measure of 
balance sheet complexity, debtors exhibits negative skewness which indicates 
that the levels of debtors and inventories do not follow the same trend in 
different companies. The scope complexity variable, ENTITIES, varies between 
0 and 198 with an average of 20. Thus, although the variable is defined in 
discrete terms, it provides a fairly good approximation to a continuous measure 
of complexity. 
The REPORTS variable shows that on average, listed companies add at least two 
reports to the additional requirements of the Companies Act. The standard 
deviation indicates a positive skewness showing that more companies actually 
disclose more than the mean. The DELAY variable shows negative skewness 
(average 74 days and standard deviation of 41 days). This is indicative of more 
companies having their audits concluded before the mean delay period. 
Two of the audit risk indicators LIQUIDITY and GEARING have negative 
skewness showing a long lower tail of companies with low gearing and liquidity. 
In contrast, the PROAT variable shows a long upper tail (positive skewness). 
MAS shows a positive skewness indicating a greater tendency to purchase 
advisory services than the mean. Hence, the sample has a large number of 
companies who purchase MAS at amount greater than the mean. The average 
seems to indicate a preference of purchasing MAS from auditors. More than 
75% of firms included in the sample purchased some MAS from their auditors. 
Turning to the discrete variables, the average value for auditor change (not 
shown on the table) is 0.024 which indicates that, on average, the probability of 
any audit in any year being in the hands of a new auditor was only higher than 
over 2%, or, more vividly, that the auditor might expect to retain the audit for 40 
years. The latter inference must, however, be tempered by fhe fact that we 
exclude that discontinuity of companies, which could probably a major cause of 
termination of auditors' tenure of office. The lower number of qualifications 
has essentially the same characteristics as the auditor change variable. The 
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LOCATION factor has a strong bias towards Johannesburg auditors. This is not 
surprising as most listed companies have head offices in Johannesburg. The 
nun:iber of companies controlled by directors shows that there is fair number of 
companies where directors have control. 
The sectorial representation was fairly diverse with a significant proportion of 
the JSE sectors represented'. The only sectors not represented (excluding banks, 
financial services and insurance companies which were not covered by the 
study) were sugar, tobacco and match, and the venture capital market. Although 
some of these sectors have large well known companies, their absence should not 
be of any significance to the outcome as there is a good spread amongst all 
other listed companies. The breakdown per sector is shown in Table 13. The 
"other" in the table refers to sectors which had only one representative in the 
sample. These sectors were investment trusts, fishing, chemicals and oils, printing 
and publishing, steel and allied and furniture and household. 
Table 13: Sectorial representation of sample companies 
SECTOR NO. OF COs % OF TOTAL 
Beverages & Hotels 2 2 
Building & Construction 3 3 
Clothing & Textiles 6 6 
Coal 2 2 
Development Capital Market 6 6 
Electronics 10 10 
Engineering 3 2 
Food 4 4 
Gold ' 6 6 
Industrial Holding 13 12 
Metal 2 2 
Motor 2 2 
Paper & Packaging 3 3 
Pharmaceutical & Medical 2 2 
Property 10 9 
Retailers 17 16 
Transport 5 5 
Other 5 4 
TOTAL 104 100 
The representation of the audit firms in the sample as depicted in tables 14 and 
15 shows some bias in favour of Big Six firms . The large firms audit 60% of 
the sample against 40% audited by the small firms. This was not intended but 
was purely as a result of the elimination of companies at the sample selection 
phase. In any event there is an expectation of a greater proportion of listed 
companies to be audited by larger, well known firms. For the purposes of 
compiling this table, where a client changed audit firms or engaged two firms 
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Goint audits) in the sample period, the audit firms were each given a half to 
enable the allocation of client companies for each firm to reconcile to the total 
number of firms in the sample. 
Table 14: Small audit firm representation in sample 
Audit firm Companies Observations 
BDO Spencer Steward 2 4 
Fisher Hoffman Stride 8 I6 
Glass Arenson 2 4 
Goldberg Jaffe 2.5 5 
Kessel Feinstein 11 22 
Other 16 26 
TOTAL 41.5 83 
Other in the table of small firms refers to 16 firms which were associated with 
only one observation. The firms are Litvin Hack, Levitt Kirson, Henry Ginsberg, 
DuPlessis and Company, Charles Orbach, TP Connaughton, Murray and Co, 
Wiehan Meyemel, Louwfutter and Company, Auret van Wyk, Sandberg and 
Partners, Herbert and Partners, Meintjies and Company, Schneider Katz and Co, 
Venter Jager and Co, and Brenner Hatz and Kilson. 
Table 15: Large audit.firm representation in the sample 
Audit firm Companies Observations 
Arthur Andersen 7 14 
Coopers and Lybrand 9 I8 
Deloitte and Touche II 22 
Ernst and Young I6.5 33 
KPMG Aiken and Peat 13.5 27 
Price Waterhouse Mevemel 5.5 11 
TOTAL 62.5 125 
6.2 Methodology 
. The determination of the pricing model is based on a multiple regression model. 
The model specifications are given by the equation : 
LogY = Bo + B (MAS)+ Log B (SALES) + B3(NIBT) + Log B4(ASSETS) I 2 
+ Bs(ENTITIES)0·5 + BiINV+DEBTOR)+ B7(REPORTS) 
+ B8(PROFIT) + B9(GEARING) + B1o(LIQUIDITY) 






+ B14CLOCATION)+ B15(AUDITOR)+ 
+ B16(0WNERSHIP) + B17(EXPERTISE) + e 
dependent variable (audit fee) 
constant 
independent variables (hypothesised determinants of audit fee) 
error term 
The null hypothesis 
H 0 : Bi=O 
is tested against the alternate hypothesis that 
Ha: Bi :;e 0 
using the t-test for each beta parameter. 
138 
Regression analysis presumes that changes in the dependent variable are caused 
by changes in the independent variables [Pindyck and Rubenfeld, 1991]. In 
effect, regression analysis provides an equation that will allow y to be predicted 
for particular values of B. _To attach such causal relationship, a theory explaining 
the relations between the variables is required. Only once such a theory has been 
specified, would regression be the appropriate procedure to test whether the 
specified relationship holds statistically [Pindyck and Rubenfeld, 1991]. Such a 
theory has already been presented in the preceding chapter which would justify 
the use of regression analysis in the determination of a pricing model for audit 
fees. 
The audit fee regression model developed in this study proxies for an 
unobservable audit production function by the use of publicly-available data 
pertaining to the firm and its auditor [Simon and Francis, 1988]. The majority 
of prior research used multiple regression but other methods used were factor 
analysis [Taylor and Baker, 1981], maximum likelihood regression [Abdel-
khalik, 1990] and correlation analysis [Haskins and Williams, 1988]. These 
methods were used in conjunction with multiple regression analysis. For 
comparative purposes, stepwise regression has been used by Ward et al [1994] 
and Barkess and Simnet [1994]. Simultaneous regression equations have also 
been used by Copley et al [ 1994]. 
The assumptions of the multiple regression model are.[Pindyck and Rubenfeld, 
1.991] : 
1. There is no exact linear relationship among two or more of the 
. independent variables; 
2 The error term has a 0 expected value and constant variance for all 
observations; 
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3. Errors corresponding to different observations are uncorrelated; and 
4. The error variable is normally distributed 
There are instances when the above assumptions may be violated in which case 
the regression model may yield unreliable results. This may occur when there is 
multicollinearity, auto correlation, heteroscedasticity and nonnormality of the 
error term. 
6.2.1 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity arises when two or more independent variables are highly 
correlated with each other. The consequence of which is that it is difficult for 
ordinary least squares regression to disentangle the influence of each 
explanatory variable [Foster, 1986]. The result of this is that [Mendenhall and 
Sincich, 1993]: 
1. the regression coefficients may be overstated; 
2. the regression results may be confusing and misleading due to the 
overlaps of the extent of contributions to the explanatory powers of the 
regression by the correlated variables; and 
3. the parameter estimates can have opposite signs to what is expected. 
The following are indicators of multicollinearity [Mendehall and Sincich, 1993; 
Pindyck and Rubenfeld, 1991]: 
1. Significant correlations between pairs of independent variables in the 
model. Inspection of the covariance matrix for relatively high 
. covariance between estimated parameters is the most common method 
of detecting multicollinearity due to signi.ficant covariance of 
independent variables. 
2. Opposite signs from what is expected in the estimated parameters. 
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3. High standard errors of the coefficients. It is recommended in such an 
instance that one or more of the variables be dropped. If this lowers the 
standard errors then multicollinearity will be the source of the problem. 
4. Nonsignificance of individual regression coefficients when the model 
as a whole is significant. 
The problem of multicollinearity can be solved in a number of ways. The most 
common and simple of these involves using a screening procedure such as 
stepwise regression to select which of the correlated variables may be included in 
the model [Mendehall and Sincich, 1993). Generally, only one (or a small 
number) of a set of correlated variables will be included in the model since this 
procedure tests the parameter associated with each variable in the presence of all 
the variables already in the model. The variable with the largest Pearson product 
moment correlation with the dependent variable is entered into the model first, 
whilst calculating the significance of each beta value. This procedure will be 
repeated until no further independent variables can be found that yield 
significant t-values in the presence of the variables already in the model. The 
result of a stepwise regression procedure is a model containing only the main 
effects with t-values that are significant at the specified alpha (significant) level. 
For a model-building exercise like this thesis, stepwise regression provides a 
useful objective screening mechanism and comparative results to the multiple 
regression model. 
An alternative to stepwise regression is ridge regression [Mendenhall and 
Sincich, 1993) which is more complex. It focuses on reducing the standard 
errors. The estimates of the regression coefficients are biased and have 
significantly smaller standard errors than the unbiased estimates yielded by the 
least squares method. Thus the regression coefficient estimates are more stable 
than the corresponding least squares estimates. 
6.2.2 Serial correlation 
This occurs when the residuals corresponding to different observations are 
correlated. On average it will not affect the coefficient estimates but the 
estimated error .variance of the ·regression will be smaller than the true error 
variance. Hence, one would tend the reject the null hypothesis when in fact it 
should be accepted. In addition the variability of the dependent variable 
explained by the independent variable (R2) would be overstated [Pindyck and 
Rubenfeld, 1991]. 
The Durbin-Watson statistic is used to test for the presence of residual 
correlation. This statistic is subjected to the null hypothesis that no serial 
correlation is present in the sample. 
6.2.3 Heteroscedasticity 
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Unequal variances for different settings of the independent variables result in 
heteroscedasticity. The ordinary least squares approach places more weight on 
observations with large variances than on those with small variances. A residual 
plot will frequently reveal the presence of heteroscedasticity. The other tests for 
heteroscedasticity for multiple regression analysis are fairly complex and in any 
case, some merely confirm what is depicted by a frequency plot [Mendenhall 
and Sincich, 1993]. 
To deal with heteroscedasticity, the dependent variable is transformed using 
either the square root or logarithm functions both of which have a constant 
variance [Mendenhall and Sincich, 1993] 
6.2.4 Non-normality 
From the assumptions of regression analysis, it should be noted that the basic 
assumption is that the random error is normally distributed with mean 0. 
Moderate departures from the normality assumption have little effect on error 
rates associated with the statistical tests and on the confidence coefficients 
associated with the confidence intervals [Mendenhall and Sincich, 1993]. 
However, in the absence of nonnormality, the standard F- and t-tests of 
significance cannot be performed. Nonnormality of the residuals can be 
detected ·graphically by plotting a frequency distribution of the residuals. A 
visual check for skewness may be sufficient proof for absence of nonnormality 
[Mendenhall and Sincich, 1993]. There may not be a need for testing for 
nonnormality as the tests for nonnormality are not powerful [Pindyck and 
Rubenfeld, 1991]. This is mainly due to the application of the central limit 
theorem particularly with large sample sizes. In any event, inferences derived 
from the regression analysis tend to remain valid even when the assumption 
about normal errors is violated [Mendenhall and Sincich, 1993]. 
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6.2.5 Outliers 
Generally, residuals are normally expected to lie within 3 standard deviations 
from the mean [Pyndick and Rubenfeld, 1991]. Residuals which are extremely 
large (more than three standard deviations from the mean) are referred to as 
outliers [Mendenhall and Sincich, 1993]. Outliers may be due to [Mendenhall 
and Sincich, 1993]: 
1. Invalid measurements of data; 
2. Nonnormality of the probability distribution of the random error; 
3. Chance; and 
4 Unassignable causes. 
Normally two approaches are used in deciding whether outliers should be 
disregarded in a regression analysis or not. They can either be eliminated 
regru:dless of whether the cause can be identified or not. Alternatively, outliers 
which can be traced to specific causes are corrected and included in the analysis 
[Mendenhall and Sincich, 1993]. 
Elimination of outliers is not normally recommended as the outlier may be 
containing information indicating that the model may be suspect not the outlier 
[Pindyck and Rubenfeld,1991]. The most common and simple way of detecting 
outliers is the careful study of residual plots. Another way is by running the 
regression excluding the outlier(s) to determine the effect of the outlier on the 
model. 
6.3 Data transformation. 
In certain instances it may be necessary to transform the dependent and 
independent variables. The dependent variable is transformed if the random 
error does not have a normal distribution with a mean value equal to 0, and the 
random errors are not independent [Mendenhall and Sincich, 1993]. The 
independent variables will be transformed to make the model achieve a better 
approximation of the dependent variable. This may be particularly relevant 
where the dependent and independent variables are related but not in a straight 
line. For instance, the audit fee is expected to be positively related to total assets, 
but the relationship may not be 100% linear as the increase in size may result in 
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an economies of scale to the auditor thus increasing the audit fee by a smaller 
amount compared to the increase in size. 
6.4 Tests for assumptions 
6.4.1 Multicollinearity 
The covariance matrix was inspected for covariance parameters with a figure 
greater than 0,5 and significant at the 5% level. The covariance matrix is shown 
in table 16. 
The variables for size and balance sheet complexity (inventory and debtors) 
show the highest and most significant levels of correlation. The number of 
reports also shows strong correlation with both size variables and the complexity 
variables (scope and balance sheet). There are also significant correlations 
between ownership and MAS, audit opinion and number of reports, and 
liquidity and profit. 
The matrix indicates the possible existence of multicollinearity particularly 
between the MAS, size and complexity variables. 
6.4.2 Heteroscedasticity 
The plot of the residuals show a roughly cone shape meaning that the size of the 
residuals increases as the estimated audit fee increases (see F~gure 9). 
A log transformation of the audit fee is thus more suitable to reduce 
heteroscedasticity [Mendenhall and Sincich, 1993]. When the audit fee variable 
is transformed the dispersion of the residuals changes as the cone shape 
disappears (figure 10); there is no tendency of the residual variance to increase 
as the mean audit fee increases. To examine whether the transformation of the 
dependent variable improves the predictive power of the model, two regressions 
were run, one using the untransformed dependent variable and the other using a 
transformed va~iable. 
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Figure 9: Residual plot for untransformed audit fee (Audit Fee) 
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Table 17 : Regression results using untransformed audit fee variable 
(Dependent variable= AUDIT FEE) 
Independent Coefficient Standard T-value Significant 
Variable Error level 
Constant 35100 2.188E5 0.1604 0.8728 
MAS 3.2849 0.22742 14.4444 0.0000 
Sales -8.243E-6 l.083E-6 -7.6095 0.0000 
NIBT 0.00471 0.000395 11.9275 0.0000 
Assets l.187E-7 6.577E-8 1.8053 0.0726 
Entities -1106.01 1658.34 -0.6669 0.5056 
INV+DEBTOR 52152.94 l.1952E5 0.4363 0.6631 
Reports 98925.05 2.3753E4 4.1647 0.0000 
Profit -799.375 2614.52 -0.3057 0.7601 
Gearing -691.769 2271.17 -0.3046 0.7610 
Liquidity -5.8215E4 4.4557E4 -1.3065 0.1929 
Opinion 17419.80 3.1541E5 0.0552 0.9560 
Change -4.2446E5 3.5213E5 -1.2054 0.2295 
Auditor -3.1875E5 l.4201E5 -2.2445 0.0259 
Location -6288.024 l.3742E5 -0.0458 0.9636 
Ownership -8.2584E4 l.2776E5 -0.6464 0.5188 
Expertise 2109.234 5865.68 0.3596 0.7196 
Del av 1.33429 1505.09 0.8865 0.3765 
Adjusted R2 = 0.9381 F-Ratio = 186.476 P-value = 0.0000 
Durbin Watson Statistic = 1.586 Standard Error of Estimate = 793977 
n=208 
Table 18: Regression results using transformed audit fee variable 
(Dependent variable= Log (AUDIT FEE) 
Independent Coefficient Standard T-value Significant 
variable Error Level 
Constant 10.515 0.3049 34.4892 0.0000 
MAS 4.156E-8 3.168E-7 0.1312 0.8958 
Sales 1.33E-12 l.50E-12 0.8868 0.3763 
NIBT 7.21E-10 5.50E-10 1.3113 0.1913 
Assets -1.63E-13 9.16E-14 -1.7826 0.0762 
Entities 0.01600 0.00231 6.9280 0.0000 
INV+DEBTO 0.7211 0.16651 4.3310 0.0000 
Reports 0.2286 0.03309 6.9103 0.0000 
Profit -0.0081 0.00364 -2.2261 0.0272 
Gearing 0.0001 0.00316 0.0314 0.9750 
Liquidity -0.0686 0.06207 -1.1057 0.2702 
Opinion 0.4112 0.43939 0.9360 0.3505 
Change -0.6190 0.49054 -1.2619 0.2085 
Auditor 0.2235 0.1978 1.1298 0.2600 
Location 0.1024 0.19145 0.5347 0.5925 
Ownership -0.2726 0.1778 -1.5317 0.1273 
Expertise 0.0046 0.00817 0.5643 0.5732 
Del av 0.00277 0.00209 1.3218 0.1878 
Adjusted R2 = 0.6259 F-Ratio = 21.47 P-value = 0.0000 
Durbin Watson Statistic= 1.291 
n=208 
Standard Error of Estimate = 1.106 
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Examination of key statistics depicted in tables 17 and 18 above show that the F-
value decreases from 186.47 to 21.47. The R2 follows the same pattern falling 
from 93.81 to 62.59. These are fairly significant changes in the usefulness of 
the model following the transformation of the dependent variable. The 
untransformed model shows very large standard errors for the coefficients which 
render it unreliable. Also note that the standard error of estimate of the first 
order regression is R793 977 versus Rl.106 for the second order. Whilst there is 
a reduction in heteroscedasticity, there is no indication that the second order 
model is a significant improvement over the straight line model. 
6.4.3 Nonnormality 
A plot of the normal probability plot of residuals is shown in Figure 11. It is 
apparent that the data follows a normal distribution fairly closely adding weight 
to the normality assumption of the data. 
6.4.4 Serial correlation 
For serial correlation the intention is to test the null hypothesis 
H0 : No residual correlation 
against the alternative 
Ha : Positive/Negative residual correlation 
The Durbin-Watson statistic of the regression before transforming any of the 
variables is 1,291. Using an alpha value of 0,01, it is clear that the statistic lies 
between the upper and lower bounds. It should be noted that the standard tables 
for interpreting the Durbin-Watson statistic allow for 5 variables and 100 
observations. The table gives 1,44 and 1,65 as the lower and upper boundaries 
for 5 variables and 100 observations. As the number of variables and 
observations increases, the band gets wider. Therefore, the 208 observations in 
this data with 17 variables would give a wider band within which observed 
statistic of 1,291 would lie comfortably. This would also apply to the 1.586 for 
the transformed variable. The conclusion reached is that there is no serial · 

















Figure 11: Normal probability plot of residuals 
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6.5 Concluding remarks 
Based on these diagnostic procedures, the results of the regression assumptions 
are satisfied. The ordinary least squares regression coefficients and the standard 
error of the estimate are efficient, consistent, unbiased estimators of the true 
population values. 
The computer applications package Statsgraphics (Version 5) was used to 
perform all calculations. 
7 .1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out the results of all the regression models. The first step was to 
perform simple averages of audit fees based on the size of the auditor and the 
auditee. This was followed by correlation analysis. Results of the multivariate 
models are presented last and these will form more concrete evidence on the 
determinants of audit fees. 
In order to provide a more detailed analysis of the results, the firms were divided 
into two categories based on size. The partitioning of the sample by size is 
fraught with measurement problems as there is no generally accepted definition 
of a small or large firm. The indicators of size commonly used in South Africa 
are the number of employees, sales volume, number of operating units, 
geographical dispersion, value of assets, organisational structure, limited 
electrical power usage and influence on the total market [Boshoff, du Plessis, 
Moolman and Radder, 1989]. 
Simunic (1980] and Palmrose [1986a] used the median asset value in their 
samples to split the sample into large and small companies. Francis and Stokes 
[1986], Francis and Simon [1987] and Anderson and Zeghal [1994] adopted 
100 million in total assets (in the currency of the country under investigation) as 
the point that divides the small/large auditee market segments. However, none of 
the authors offer a statistically plausible reason that justifies the use of this 
number. 
In an emerging market, like the JSE, such a number could include companies 
that are perceived to be large in local terms. A possible measure could be total 
assets of R75 million. The cutoff amount is based on the 1992 Financial Mail 
Top Companies Survey where the top 200 listed companies have total assets 
greater than R75 million. When the R75 million benchmark is used instead of 
the RlOO million, only two companies fell between R75 and RlOO million. So 
whether R75 or RlOO million is used, there is no major distortion. Therefore, the 
R 100 million suggested by the Francis [ 1984] will be adopted as it also provides 
for better and consistent international comparison. 
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7.2 Preliminary results 
The discussion of the results is introduced by first comparing average audit fees 
for large and small auditees. This is a weak test for differences in audit fees but 
gives a feel for the potential outcomes in the final analysis. 
7 .2.1 Comparisons of mean audit fees 
The average audit fee per rand of turnover for large audit firms was 5,719c 
whilst the small firms charged 4,722 cents for the total sample. This ratio is a 
basic measure of audit fees whilst controlling for possible size effects. When the 
sample is partitioned by size, a similar trend persists as shown in table 19 below: 
Table 19: Average audit fees per rand of turnover 
Auditor Company size 
Small Large 
Small R0.0778 R0.0247 
Large R0.0830 R0.0350 
From the above table, the average fee per rand of turnover for large audit firms 
is higher compared to small audit firms regardless of client size. This trend 
continues even when the size effect is disregarded as shown. by the actual average 
rand amounts shown below (table 20): 
Table 20: Actual average audit fees 
Auditor Company size 
small large 
small R82183 R691397 
large R98700 R873757 
Both tables seem to indicate that the large audit firms charge a higher fee 
regardless of client size. To analyse the price differences further, a difference of 







= 0 (no difference in mean audit fees per rand of turnover between 
large and small audit firms). 








< 0 ( mean audit fees per rand of turnover for larger audit firms were 
greater than mean audit fees for small audit firms). 
The results gave a test statistic T = 3.37351 which is significant at the 5% level. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected. This is interpreted as implying that 
audit fees charged by large firms are higher than those charged by small audit 
firms, after controlling for size only. 
7 .2.2 Pearson correlation coefficients 
The partial correlation coefficients in the covariance matrix (see table 16 page 
144) were also inspected for significant correlations between the dependent 
variable and some of the independent variables. The coefficients indicate that 
there are strong (correlation coefficient> 0.5) positive individual relationships 
between the audit fee and the size variables (although SALES shows a weaker 
correlation), scope and balance sheet complexity, REPORTS and auditor size. 
The OWNERSHIP and EXPERTISE variables have weaker correlations with the 
audit fee. The remaining variables are not significant but warrant some 
comment. The audit risk variables, PROFIT and LIQUIDITY have opposite signs 
to those expected. The remaining risk variable, GEARING, has a positive sign as 
expected. The LOCATION sign is positive as expected in contrast to the 
OPINION variable which has a negative sign. A similar comment can be made 
for the CHANGE variable which has a positive sign against the negative 
relationship it is expected to have with the audit fee. 
On the basis of Pearson product moment correlations, it appears that null 
hypotheses 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 11 are likely to be rejected whilst hypotheses 3, 4, 
6, 10, and 12 cannot be rejected. Therefore, there appears' to be a bias towards 
client factors in the determination of audit fees. With the exception of the MAS 
and auditor size variable, the auditor factors appear to be relatively weak 
predictors of the audit fee. 
Therefore, both simple averages test and Pearson correlations seem to suggest 
there is differential pricing between large and small audit firms, with large firms 
charging more than small ones. The Pearson correlation analysis adds client 
complexity and the number of reports as other variables affecting fees other 
than client size. 
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7 .3 Multiple regression results 
The means test captured only the difference in size, but not all the other factors. 
Similarly, the Pearson correlations coefficients only relate the total correlation 
between the audit fee and each potential determinant, unlike partial correlations 
which allow for the effects of other variables arising from multiple regression 
[Pong and Whittington, 1994]. This severely limits the extent of inferences 
which can be drawn from such analyses. In contrast, multiple regression takes 
into account many other factors and therefore provides more convincing proof 
of any difference in audit fees. To assess the influence of collinearity of 
independent variables, a step-wise regression analysis was performed for 
comparative purposes and validation of multiple regression results. 
In analysing the results, the key indicators used are the coefficient of 
determination (R2), the F-statistic, the coefficients (8) and their levels of 
significance. The R2 measures the association between the dependent and 
independent variables. It measures the proportion of the variation of the 
dependent variable about its mean, which is explained by the predictor 
(independent) variables [Pindyck and Rubenfeld, 1991]. The adjusted R2 is a 
more reliable measure of goodness of fit in the population than the R2 value 
[Ramzy, 1988]. The sample R2 value tends to be an optimistic estimate of how 
well the model fits the population. The model does not fit the population as well 
as it fits the sample from which it is derived. The adjusted R2 corrects for the bias 
thus giving a more reliable measure of the goodness of fit. Hence only the 
adjusted R2 is shown in the results below. 
The coefficients of the variables are tested at the alpha level of 5% which is the 
conventional level of significance [Pindyck and Rubenfeld, 1991]. The F-
statistic shows the overall usefulness of the model. The higher the F-value the 
better the usefulness of the regression equation. 
The results for the regression analyses are presented below (tables 21 and 22). 
The results indicate that MAS, client size (SALES, NIBT and ASSETS), balance 
sheet complexity (INV + DEBTOR), the number of reports and audit delay are 
significant predictors of audit fees. 
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Table 21:' Results of multivariate regression (Dependent variable = 












Profit -0.001316 0.002819 -0.4670 0.6410 
Gearing 0.000277 0.002311 0.1199 0.9047 
Liquidity -0.051223 0.045122 -1.1352 0.2517 
Opinion 0.201784 0.318712 0.6334 0.5272 
Change -0.145727 0.357687 -0.4074 0.6842 
Auditor -0.107857 0.145515 -0.7412 0.4595 
Location -0.037869 0.136692 -0.2770 0.7821 
Ownership -0.040426 0.132902 -0.3042 0.7613 
Expertise 0.001294 0.005883 0.2200 0.8261 
1111~,,,.~~~•11• •11r~r,o:l~!S~~ii iiltllIIREifkf Wlltt~ltjlflf~ ~~i•vt&lk .... -~111:'.:.: .. iwffl 
Adjusted R2 = 0.8061 F-Ratio = 51.86 P-value = 0.0000 
Durbin Watson Statistic = 1.242 Standard Error of Estimate = 0. 7963 
n=208 
Table 22: Results of stepwise regression model 
Independent Coefficient Standard 
Variable Error 
Constant -0.559039 0.707799 
MAS 5.348E-7 l.770E-7 
Log Sales 0.411645 0.04674 
NIBT -1.2825E9 2.88E-10 
Log Assets 0.226085 0.058516 
INV+DEBTOR 0.643460 0.128596 
Reports 0.085115 0.023578 
Del av 0.003111 0.001215 
Adjusted R2 = 0.8106 F-Ratio = 91.06 
Durbin Watson Statistic= 1.226 













P-value = 0.0000 
Notice that when step wise regression is used, there is only a slight improvement 
in the predictive power of the model (improves from 80.61 to 81.06), and the 
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standard error of estimate (decreases from 0.796 to 0.787). However, the 
usefulness of the model as a whole improves dramatically as shown by the 
increase in the F-ratio from 51.06 to 91,06. There is no difference in the 
significance of the variables. These results have not taken into account the 
possible influence of outliers. 
7.3.1 Outliers and other influence factors 
The statistical applications package used in the analysis has the ability to pick 
out any unusual observations based on the distribution of residuals. These 
unusual observations were identified and investigated for any errors in data 
capturing. The observations were traced back to the companies and the entire 
data relating to the particular company scrutinised for any possible errors. The 
unusual observations were as follows: 
• 7 were property companies. 
• 2 had audit fees less than R5000. 
• 2 changed auditors. 
• 2 had qualified audit opinions. 
• 2 had fairly high losses. 
For the purposes of this study, the outliers will not be excluded. Instead their 
influence will be tested by running one regression including them, and another 
one excluding them. Because the property companies were prevalent amongst 
the outliers, all of them were treated as outliers to determine if they had a 
marked effect on the results. If there are significant differences, then the results 
will have been influenced by them. The results for the regressions, excluding the 
28 unusual observations are shown in table 23. 
Basically, the multiple regression results do not change, meaning that the outliers 
do not have cause a meaningful distortion of the results. The only variable 
affected is the audit delay variable which is only significant at 10% when the 
outliers are excluded. However, the level of significance of all the other variables 
previously identified as significant improves. It is also worth noting that both the 
R2 improves marginally whilst the F-ratio is unaffected. Therefore there is a 
marginal improvement in the goodness of fit of the model without the outliers. 
However, the significance of the independent variables remains unchanged. 
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Adjusted R2 = 0.8243 





























P-value = 0.0000 
Standard Error of Estimate= 0.7114 
The results of the stepwise regression model (table 24) include the profitability 
variable as an additional significant variable replacing the audit delay variable. 
The F-ratio also shows some improvement. The R2 does not improve but the 
standard error of estimate improves marginally from 0.711 to 0.656 showing 
marginal improvement in the predictive power of the model. 
Table 24: Stepwise regression statistics excluding outliers 
Independent Coefficient Standard T-Value Significant 
Variable Error Level 
Constant 2.255906 0.691452 3.2626 0.0014 
MAS 2.1521E-6 4.452E-7 4.8343 0.0000 
Log Sales 0.293689 0.051712 5.6794 0.0000 
Log Assets 0.205669 0.059944 3.4310 0.0008 
INV+DEBTOR 0.765129 0.14781 5.1764 0.0000 
Reports 0.085117 0.031143 2.7331 0.0071 
Profit -0.00631 0.00215 -2.9307 0.0039 
Adjusted R2 = 82.27 F-Ratio = 117 .04 P-value = 0.0000 
Durbin Watson Statistic = l.382 Standard Error of Estimate = 0.6555 
n=184 
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In both sets of results there is reasonable consistency. It is therefore safe to 
surmise that the outliers do not influence the results in such a way as to render 
them unreliable. 
Directly linked to the identification of outliers is the isolation of influential 
observations which may not be outliers but which may be having a dominant 
effect on the results. The statistical package used did not detect any such 
observations. This means that the results in this study are not driven by 
individual observations. 
The results therefore indicate that of the 16 variables hypothesised to influence 
audit fees only 7 are significant. Below is a summary of the comparison of the 
expected relationship between the variables and the audit fee and actual as 
revealed by the regression model (table 21). 
Table 25: Comparison of expected and actual relationships between audit fee 
and auditor and client factors 
Factors Expected Actual 
Sil!n sien Sienificant 
Sales + + Yes 
Assets + + Yes 
NIBT + - Yes 
INV+DEBTOR + + Yes 
Entities + + No 
Reports + + Yes 
Opinion + + No 
Profit + - No 
Gearing + - No 
Liquidity + - No 
Ownership + + No 
Audit Delay - + Yes 
Auditor +/- - No 
Location + - No 
Expertise +/- + No 
MAS + + Yes 
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7.3.2 ... Discussion and analysis 
Since this study draws extensively from international research, it is important 
that the results and statistical data presented above be compared to some of the 
developing and developed countries who used the the same methodology. Table 
26 provides comparative statistical data for a selection of international studies 
reviewed in Chapter 4. 
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In terms of the size of the sample, this study is comparable as most of the studies 
carried out elsewhere have a sample size between 32 and 373 observations. The 
sample size of 208 observations appears to be amongst studies with a larger 
' 
sample size and well above the average sample size. Furthermore, the data used 
is amongst the latest as it covers the first two years of the 1990s. Based on the 
data comparison, it is fair to assume that in terms of the data used and the 
sample size, there is adequate justification for comparison with studies from 
elsewhere. 
To provide a better understanding of the influence of auditee size on the results, 
two regression were run; one for large auditees and another for small auditees. 
The results are shown below (tables 27 and 28). Comparative statistics for 
stepwise regression are provided in the Appendix 3(a) and 3(b). 


























Standard T-Value Significant 
Error Level 
1.7784 0.5993 0.5503 
0.011466 -0.3356 0.7379 
0.002992 -1.0867 0.2797 
0.157017 -1.6046 0.1116 
0.532938 0.8697 0.3865 
0.774178 -1.3527 0.1791 
0.249817 -0.0740 0.9411 
0.195918 0.0156 0.9876 
0.236222 0.6943 0.4891 
0.009075 1.1711 0.2443 
0.002265 1.4330 0:1549 
Adjusted R2 = 0.7545 F-Ratio = 22.69 P-value = 0.0000 
Durbin Watson Statistic= 1.927 Standard Error of Estimate = 0.8345 
n=120 
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Constant 1.434166 1.72672 
Reports 0.064414 0.063734 
Profit -0.003059 0.003361 
Gearing 0.01088 0.058173 
Liquidity -0.041349 0.042336 
Opinion 0.107049 0.357313 
Change -0.2352 0.380682 
Auditor -0.274802 0.192434 
Location 0.173498 0.183441 
Ownership -0.026538 0.161581 
Expertise 0.004852 0.007899 
Dela 0.003317 0.002245 















P-value = 0.0000 
Durbin Watson Statistic= 1.522 Standard Error of Estimate = 0.6797 
n=88 
7.3.2.1 Client factors 
Size 
In the whole sample, all three variables are significant. ASSETS and SALES have 
a positive sign as expected. However, the NIBT is the only exception with a 
negative sign which implies that it is negatively related to the audit fee. The 
SALES variable is significant across all company sizes whilst ASSETS is not 
significant for large auditees. NIBT seems to be sensitive to size as it is 
significant and has a negative coefficient in the large auditee sample whilst it is 
insignificant and positive in the small auditee segment. The multiple regression 
results do not differ with the step-wise regression analysis which strengthens and 
validates the multivariate results. 
A possible reason for the significance of SALES across all auditee sizes could lie 
in the fact that the calculation of materiality requires a stable indicator. It is 
therefore more likely that auditors would assess the significance of amounts 
stated in the financial statements in terms of turnover, rather than the absolute 
rand value of net income. A secondary reason could be the fact that in most 
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companies turnover exceeds total assets, which would mean that materiality 
would be gauged against the amount of sales. 
A second possibility could be that audit firms use different approaches in clients 
of different sizes. This is influenced by the volume of transactions in each client. 
For large clients, sales may be the best indicator of transaction flow and the 
possible complexity of systems than in small companies. In small companies, 
revenues are generally less compared to balance sheet items and therefore less 
work may be necessary in studying the systems of transaction flows. In such a 
case, the emphasis is likely to be on both the verification work of balance sheet 
items which comprises mainly of different types of assets and revenues. 
The NIBT variable seems to be a less powerful and reliable predictor of size. It is 
implausible for a company's audit fee to be negatively related to size. This 
variable may be hinting at the "ability to pay" theory, which implies that 
auditors may be more willing to sacrifice audit fees for large companies making 
losses than for small clients [Chan et al, 1993]. When the sample is studied 
carefully, the largest losses were recorded by large companies with one reaching 
R35 million. In contrast the smaller companies tended to be more profitable. 
This would explain the positive coefficient in the small auditee segment but 
weakens the argument for the ability to pay theory, as the coefficient is 
insignificant. 
Auditee size has been found to be the most consistent predictor of audit fees 
across different countries. Simunic [1980] Palmrose [1986a], Taylor and Baker 
[1981], Francis [1984], Low et al [1990], Chan et al [1993], all found that 
auditee size whether proxied by turnover or total assets had a dominant effect on 
the level of audit fees. The findings here further strengthen their findings. 
Complexity 
Only one of the two complexity measures is significant. From the results it 
would appear that balance sheet complexity as measured by the level of assets in 
debtors and inventory (INV+ DEBTOR) requires more audit effort than the 
diversity of the auditee as measured by the number of consolidated subsidiaries 
and associate companies. It appears that auditors do spend a large portion of 
their time verifying the completeness, existence, ownership, valuation and 
disclosure of inventories and receivables. This is regardless of the size of the 
auditee. From an audit point of view, it is therefore likely that inventories and 
receivables will be problem areas, as expected. 
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To find out which of the two balances is more important, a separate regression 
was run using the proportion of assets in inventories and the proportion of assets 
in receivables as additional variables. Both variables were significant at 5% but 
the level of significance for inventories was 1 % versus 4,5% for receivables. It 
would appear that there may be a difference in the level of effort and expertise 
involved in the audit of the two types of current assets. 
This could be explained by the differences in complexities of internal control 
systems affecting receivables and inventories. Many companies have very 
complex costing systems, which require a detailed knowledge of the workings 
and require a high degree of technical knowledge. This would mean the use of 
senior staff at higher charge out rates. In contrast, the major concern in debtors 
is their recovery and any possible write offs. Although debtors may consist of 
numerous small amounts, these tend to have less audit risk attached to them, thus 
' requiring less audit effort. The focus invariably is on trade debtors which tend to 
be the single largest component of receivables. 
The insignificance of the scope complexity measure is quite puzzling, as prior 
studies have consistently identified it as a significant predictor of audit fees. 
Even more puzzling is the fact that the coefficient of the variable is negative and 
significant in the small auditee class, meaning that scope complexity in small 
companies may be negatively related to the audit fee. This result is validated by 
the stepwise regression model. Informal discussions with some practitioners in 
Cape Town did not give any meaningful reasons for the negative coefficient. 
The lack of significance of the ENTITIES variable may be explained but the 
lack of decentralisation of groups and homogeneity of accounting systems. In 
effect, where there is fairly strong central control of group operations, the 
auditor can spend more time evaluating the controls around head office and 
then perform less time-consuming confirmation tests. 
It is also possible that the measurement of the scope variable was affected by the 
lack of distinction between operating and dormant subsidiaries. The presence of 
dormant and non-operating subsidiaries, gives the impression that the scope of 
the client is wide, whereas from an audit point of view it is fairly routine. A 
typical example is Pick 'n Pay which has quite a number of subsidiaries which 
are actually individual stores located in different parts of the country. Since most 
of the accounting work is centralised within the group, the audit effort is more 
likely to be centred around head office controls. So the use of subsidiaries may 
not adequately capture the full extent of scope complexity. 
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Another reason may be the use of "accounting packs", commonly used by 
auditors of subsidiary companies to report to the group auditors. The pack 
consists mainly of proforma financial statements designed to facilitate the 
consolidation process by requiring information on inter company balances, 
movements in reserves, purchase/sales of inter company stocks and depreciable 
assets and any profit or loss thereon. The design and layout of the pack makes 
the consolidation process more efficient and cost effective. 
To check the accuracy of the number of subsidiaries used in the model, the 
numbers were compared to those available from the Bureau of Financial 
Analysis database. There were no significant differences. Therefore, the data 
used was accurate. To examine if the scope complexity measure was influenced 
by the type of measure used, the number of consolidated subsidiaries and equity 
accounted associates was substituted with the number of chief operating 
subsidiaries published in the JSE Bulletin [J~E, 1992;1993]. This variable was 
positive but still insignificant. Due to the insignificance of the scope variable, 
future studies may have to devise a reasonable measure of diversification to 
capture scope complexity. Possible measures could be the number of industries 
in which the auditee operates, the number of operating divisions and number of 
different locations. 
Equity accounted associate companies may not involve significant audit effort as 
the lead auditor may only rely on the competence of the associate's auditors. 
This would normally be in the form of a questionaire without necessarily a 
review of working papers. This reduces the amount of audit work necessary for 
equity accounting for the associates. 
Balance sheet complexity when measured either by debtors or inventories 
emerges as a stable predictor of audit fees across different countries. Whilst 
some studies support both balances others show one of the two. In this study, 
inventories and debtors are both significant thus adding weight to findings from 
overseas countries which found that both balances are key determinants of audit 
fees. 
Most of the studies reviewed under the literature survey have found the number 
of subsidiaries to be a significant determinant. This study is not unique in 
finding the number of subsidiaries to be insignificant in the determination of 
audit fees. Wallace [1984a] (US) and Firth [1985] (New Zealand) also found 
this variable insignificant. However, these two studies appear to be exception to 
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the norm. In fact, the finding goes against current practice as provided through 
interviews with practitioners by Chanet al [1993]. 
A possible reason may be due to the uniqueness of the South African group 
structures which tend to have a very strong head office control. Furthermore, the 
influence of head office may mean that audit fees are determined up front on a 
group basis which may not take into account the number of subsidiaries. 
Instead, the size of each subsidiary, complexity and risk characteristics of the 
operating unit may be considered more important. There may also be a 
"discount" for group audits due to the amount of billable hours which can be 
achieved in a large group. 
Reports 
The number of reports in the annual financial statements is a significant factor in 
the determination of audit fees. Whilst this factor is significant in the whole 
sample and the large auditee segment, it is not significant in the small auditee 
segment. The reasons behind this disparity in unclear. It would appear that in 
general there is an attendant audit cost in producing additional financial 
information in the annual report. This cost is generally observable amongst 
listed companies in general but more so in large ones. 
A possible explanation may lie in the differences in the annual reports produced 
by listed companies. The large companies tend to have very elaborate financial 
analysis in their report. Some produce supplementary inflation-adjusted 
financial statements whilst others give full current cost income statement and 
balance sheet. A cursory review of companies noted for quality reporting in 
South Africa tend to be the large diversified groups. Because most of this 
information relates to the audited financial statements, it is subject to review for 
consistency by the auditor. This means additional costs for the company. This 
observation may add weight to the argument presented by certain companies 
against producing inflation accounting financial statements on the basis of cost. 
This research does indicate that there are additional audit costs incurred by 
companies that produce such additional information. 
All studies that included the number of reports (Firth [1985], Palmrose 
[1986a]and Rubin [1987]) found it to be a significant explanatory variable of 
audit fees. Evidence presented by Firth [1985], suggests that the nature of the 
additional reports is important. The more technical they are, the more they will 
have an impact on audit fees. 
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Audit opinion 
The results show that audit opinion is an insignificant factor in the determination 
of audit fees across all auditee sizes. This is in spite of the difference in the 
nature and reason of the qualification given by the auditor. Amongst the large 
auditees, the qualifications were related to disagreements over accounting 
policies whilst in the small auditee segment most were more related to a 
disagreement over going concern difficulties. 
A going concern difficulty would require additional audit work like contacting 
bankers, evaluating solvency, scrutiny of management plans and assessment of 
recoverability of fixed assets. It appears that the nature of the qualification has 
no impact on the audit fee. A disagreement over application of GAAP may have 
very minimal effect on users [Firth, 1985]. As a result, there may be competing 
explanations which may negate each other rendering the variable insignificant. 
In addition, the insignificance of this variable may be explained by the small 
number of observations. If a greater number of observations is used, a more 
clear picture of the effect of the audit opinion on the audit fee may emerge. 
Globally, conclusions on the effect of the audit opinion are mixed. Gist [1992] 
argues that the opinion variable is in fact a form of safeguard for the auditor if 
the client gets into financial trouble. Therefore, it may be more of an indicator 
of audit risk. In the absence of a meaningful relationship between audit fees and 
auditee risk (discussed below), this comment suggests that risk whether measured 
by financial variables or the audit opinion does not influence the audit fee. 
Ownership structure 
The effective control of a client by management and directors is not.a major 
factor in the determination of audit fees. This variable is negative in the whole 
sample and the small auditee segment, but positive for large auditees. This 
confirms agency theory which posits that large companies would incur high 
costs of monitoring. A possible reason for the positive coefficient could be the 
interaction between the percentage of shares owned by management and the size 
of the auditor. 
Most of the companies controlled by directors are relatively small and are also 
audited by small auditors who are expected to charge less than larger, well 
known ones. _Therefore the ownership effects may be offset by the auditor 
choice decision. By the same token, larger companies tend to employ large 
auditors which would translate to a higher audit fee and hence, a positive 
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coefficient would be expected. Larger companies also have to use extensive 
systems of monitoring to shareholders who are not involved in the day to day 
running of the business. The auditor has to assess the effectiveness of these 
systems. 
Palmrose [1986a]'and Chan et al [1993] found the ownership structure to be 
influential in the determinants of audit fees. The difference between the two 
studies and South Africa may be indicative of different legal systems. Palmrose 
used a public/private ownership dichotomy which cannot be used in this study as 
by definition, all companies listed on the JSE are public companies. Chan et al 
would therefore provide a more acceptable comparison. Essentially, the 
differences between the findings here may have been influenced by the 
measurement: of directors' shareholdings. The disclosure of directors 
shareholdings in the UK tends to be open whilst in South Africa. the use of 
nominee companies may understate the extent of the directors' control. 
Auditee risk 
None of the factors that are hypothesised to link audit fees to auditee risk are 
significant. The GEARING variable is positive in the whole sample and the small 
company segment. However, it is negative in the large auditee segment. On the 
whole, the positive sign for the whole population gives weak evidence of 
increased audit testing for companies with high proportions of debt. The 
difference in the sign between large and small companies may be indicative of a 
difference in perception of gearing as an audit risk variable. Auditors could use 
the level of debt as a more important criterion for audit risk in large companies 
than in small companies. This may have its roots in the fear of the effect highly 
publicised failures of large South African companies due to high debt on 
auditor reputation. In addition, large companies have more borrowings from 
external bankers than small companies. For small companies, debt may not be a 
major problem due to personal guarantees by directors who tend to be owners. 
Furthermore, loans. may be guaranteed by holding companies for those 
controlled by conglomorates. 
The PROFIT variable is negative across all auditee sizes. It would therefore 
appear that as the client's profitability declines, the auditors spend more time, 
thus charging a higher fee. This provides weak evidence of lower risk associated 
with profitable companies. It is worth linking this variable with NIBT, although 
the latter was used to measure size. If the "ability to pay" theory was valid, then 
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the PROFIT variable would bear resemblance to NIBT. This lack of association 
further weakens this theory. 
The LIQUIDITY variable is negative in the whole sample and across auditees of 
different sizes. This means that as the liquidity problems of the client worsen, 
auditors spend more time on the audit, which may be indicative of the 
expectation that greater solvency problems warrant greater audit testing. 
Therefore, this result goes against Wallace's [1989] observation that companies 
with liquidity problems pay a lower audit fee. 
On the whole, this study provides weak evidence that audit fees are affected by 
client's going concern difficulties. It is worth mentioning that the measures of 
going concern difficulties used here were only measurable ones. It could be that 
auditors focus more on the qualitative factors which cannot be captured by a 
numerically based model. However, due to the lack of significance of the 
coefficients, it would appear that auditee risk as measured by going concern 
difficulties is not a significant determinant of audit fees. 
Across different co"untries, various authors have used measures such as operating 
losses, debt to equity (gearing), ratio, unsystematic risk, return on equity and 
liquidity ratios to estimate audit risk. Evidence on these is mixed and far from 
conclusive. Chan et al [1993] used the profitability of the client, whilst Francis 
and Stokes [ 1986] used gearing and both found their measures to be 
significantly correlated to the audit fee. This study seems to indicate that client 
profitability, gearing and liquidity may not be adequate proxies of audit risk. So 
internationally, no single adequate measure of audit risk has yet been identified. 
This may point towards non financial measures of auditee risk. 
In contrast to private sector studies, public sector studies in the US (Rubin 
[1987], Baber et al [1987] and Ward et al [1994]) have consistently found that 
financial risk as measured by the level of debt of a public authority is a good 
proxy for audit risk. The difference may be indicative of the different 
environments between the private sector audit market and public sector. 
Audit delay 
Audit delay is positively related to the audit fee for the whole sample, but is not 
significant in either small or large auditees. The positive coefficient suggests that 
audit fees will be higher if the audit is completed later rather than earlier. The 
time between the financial year end and the signing of the audit report may be 
indicative of increased audit testing. Therefore, it appears that tight deadlines do 
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not impose additional audit costs. It may also mean that a longer time lag may 
indicate some uncertainties which require more audit work to be resolved before 
the audit report is signed. It is worth noting that DELAY and OPINION are 
positively related and their Pearson correlation is significant at 5%. Therefore, 
the delay may be indicative of increased audit testing related to the type of 
opinion to be issued. 
This result is contrary to that reported by Firth [ 1985] who did not find the 
variable insignificant. Whilst, Chan et al [1993] found this variable to be 
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significant, their study found that audit fees were negatively related to audit 
delay. Hence, further corroborative evidence is needed. 
7.3.2.2 Auditor factors 
Management adviso_ry services 
The acquisition of other services is a significant determinant ,of audit fees. As 
observed by Simon [1985], Simunic [1984], Palmrose [1986b], Turpen [1990], 
Barkess and Simnet [1994], the correlation coefficient is positive for the total 
sample and across all client sizes, although it is only significant at 10% for small 
auditees. This is strong evidence of the existence of beneficial knowledge 
spillovers w~ich are not being passed on to clients in the form of a lower audit 
fee. 
To further analyse the influence of MAS on audit fees, difference of means tests 
between purchasers and non purchasers of MAS were performed for all the 
variables. The MAS purchasers tended to be large, complex organisations with a 
very diverse ownership structure. There is no difference in terms of going 
concern risk (profitability, liquidity and gearing) between purchasers and non-
purchasers of MAS. The audit fees are significantly different between the 
groups. In addition, the biggest purchasers of MAS were clients of Big Six audit 
firms, which is consistent with research from Australia [Barkess and Simnet, 
1994]. These results are consistent with the correlation matrix which shows 
significant positive correlations between MAS, size complexity and the auditor 
size variable. Whilst the reasons for these observations are unclear, it could 
explain the lower level of significance of the MAS variable in the small auditee 
sector. 
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An intriguing possibility noted by a local practitioner is that there may not be a 
direct relationship between the audit function and MAS. The reason for this 
could be that the staff and partners involved in the performance of the audit are 
often different from staff responsible for MAS. Thus, the extent of beneficial 
spillovers which often occur would not necessarily be passed over to the audit 
function. There would thus be minimal impact on the audit costs. In effect, the 
audit fee may be discounted if there are MAS offered over and above the audit. 
The nature of the advisory services may have a direct audit impact, particularly if 
it relates to design implementation of computer systems. Such consulting work 
can create changes in the client's organisation that have non-trivial implications. 
The audit firm is still faced with the task of studying and monitoring the 
performance of the system which involves significant man hours. The new 
systems result in added audit work in reviewing its performance. In effect, if the 
nature of the MAS was known, the effect of the MAS on the audit fee could be 
studied over a period of time. There may be "teething" problems which 
disappear gradually resulting in efficiencies in later years. The above analysis 
shows the importance of the disclosure of the nature of advisory services. 
A secondary issue that has not been addressed in past studies is the possibility of 
confounding factors arising from the interaction between the auditor size, 
company size and complexity. Looking at the correlation matrix, there is a very 
strong, positive and significant correlation between two size factors (NIBT and 
ASSETS)and balance sheet complexity (INVENTORIES and DEBTORS). The t-
tests referred above bring into the picture the auditor size factor. The two size 
factors (ASSETS and NIBT) and balance sheet complexity (INV+DEBTOR) 
have been identified as significant factors in the determination of audit fees. 
These factors may be driving the MAS factor making it more important than 
what in fact it should be. 
Auditor size 
The results show that the AUDITOR is insignificant in the sample as a whole and 
across all auditee sizes. The coefficient is negative across all client sizes. Reasons 
for this should be discussed on the basis of economies of scale and reputational 
effects. The apparent lack of significant economies of scale may be the result of 
the benefits of economies of scale and scope of Big Six firms not filtering down 
completely to their offices in South Africa. That is, the South African affiliates 
of Big Six firms face local competition which does not have to bear the overhead 
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costs of international firms for training and other facilities without receiving the 
full benefits of being a member firm. This would be especially true in audits of 
client with limited overseas investments who would have little use for a world-
wide presence by the auditor [Park, 1990, p.80]. 
The lack of a Big Six auditor premium may also indicate that clients do not see 
the audit function as substantially differentiated to warrant a premium. A catch-
all explanation would acknowledge the probable existence of economies of scale 
and premia for reputation. Note that these are competing explanations with 
opposite effects on the auditor variable. Thus, the two effects may offset each 
other resulting in the AUDITOR variable being insignificant. 
Some additional tests were conducted to confirm that the lack of significance of 
the auditor variable was not due to model misspecification or other data 
problems. To ensure that a subset of Big Six firms was not responsible for the 
significance of the AUDITOR variable, the regression was run wit4 a separate 
· dummy variable for each Big Six firm. The results of this regression are shown 
in table 29, with the stepwise regression results shown in Appendix 4. 
From this regression, the significance of the auditor variable changes 
significantly. The signs of the coefficients are no longer uniform across all big 
six firms. The predictive power of the model remains unchanged at 80%, 
although there is a marked decrease in the F-ratio. Thus, the model using big six 
dummy variable is not an improvement over one using the Big Six-non-Big Six 
dichotomy. 
The Price Waterhouse (PW) variable is significant and negative. Coopers and 
Lybrand (CL) also shows a negative coefficient which is only significant at 10%. 
The remaining four firms have insignificant coefficients with negative ones for 
' Arthur Andersen (AA), Ernst and Young (EY), KPMG Aiken and Peat (KPMG), 







Regression results using each Big Six firm as a dummy 
variable 
Coefficient Standard T-Value Significant 
0.572453 
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Profit 0.000067 0.003037 0.0221 0.9824 
Gearing 0.001648 0.002648 0.6222 0.5346 
Liquidity -0.056394 0.047258 -1.1933 0.2343 
Opinion 0.238212 0.329181 0.7237 0.4703 
Change -0.33936 0.374915 -0.9052 0.3666 
Location -0.050832 0.146507 -0.3470 0.7290 
Ownership -0.117277 0.140453 -0.8350 0.4043 
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Non-BIG 6 0.06829 0.2591 0.2636 0.7925 
AA -0.093921 0.269686 -0.3483 0.7280 
-0.003316 0.202361 -0.0164 0.9869 




Adjusted R2 = 0.8028 
-0.396427 0.238573 -1.6617 0.0983 
0.218809 0.228868 0.9561 0.3403 
-0.054565 0.204594 -0.2667 0.7900 
F-Ratio = 39.12 P-value = 0.0000 
Durbin Watson Statistic= 1.412 Standard Error of Estimate = 0. 7844 
n=208 
It appears that PW, and to a lesser extent CL, enjoy economies of scale in their 
audit methodologies. The other firms may also have economies of scale with the 
exception of DT which may be offering a differentiated product. It is interesting 
to note that the NON-BIG 6 variable is positive. The implication for this is that 
the prices of some Big Six firms are lower than those charged by non-Big Six 
firms. Overall, the results do not seem to indicate that they are driven by one 
particular firm, but show different pricing characteristics amongst the Big Six 
firms. The question that has to addressed in future research is, what types of 
audit methodologies are used by the firms that result in economies of scale. 
Another possible problem is the fact that client size could be a confounding 
factor since Big Six clients are likely to be larger than other auditees. In this 
sample average size in terms of assets for Big Six clients was R835,8 million 
versus R159,9 million for clients of non-Big Six firms. This difference was 
significant at the 1 % level. So, to be certain that client size was not driving the 
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results, the regression was run on a sample which eliminated any size differences 
between Big Six and non-Big Six clients. Firms having a Big Six auditor were 
matched with firms of comparable size with non-Big Six auditors, with a size 
match of within 10% of total assets. This procedure resulted in a subsample of 
41 matches (82 observations) which were virtually indistinguishable in terms of 
size as measured by assets. Mean assets (standard deviations) were R263,1 
million (R569,5 million) for firms audited by Big Six auditors and R264,1 
million (R617,7 million) for firms with non-Big Six auditors. The standard 
deviations show positive skewness which indicates a dominance of large 
companies in both subgroups. The regression results for this sample were 
consistent with those reported earlier, and the auditor variable remained 
insignificant at the 5% level. Thus it does not appear that model misspecification 
is responsible for the lack of significance of the variable representing Big Six 
firms. 
An attempt was made to run two separate regressions, one for clients of Big Six 
firms and another clients of non-Big Six firms. No results could be obtained for 
the Big Six clients as the auditor size variable was linearly related to assets and 
turnover. However, for non-Big Six clients the auditor size variable was 
insignificant. 
To asses~ the possibility of existence of monopoly pricing, economies of scale 
and product differentiation, the results were analysed using the nine scenarios 
used by Simunic [1980] as discussed in Chapter 6. In this study, the Big Six 
coefficient is negative, i.e. B8<b8 in the small auditee segment. Similarly, in the 
large auditee market. This relationship falls into Scenario 9 (table 7 page 111) 
per the model. This is interpreted as meaning that the audit services market is 
competitive with economies of scale to the Big Six. So, in terms of Simunic's 
model, economies of scale favouring large producers exist in South Africa. This 
would explain why there is no premium observed in the regression as any 
possible product differentiation is swamped by the economies of scale. 
In this study the auditor size variable is insignificant. This would confirm the 
findings of Firth [1985] in New Zealand and Haskins and Williams [1988] for 
Malaysia. In the US early studies using data from the 1970s found the auditor 
size factor to be negative and significant whilst the later studies back the 
existence of a premium. The existence of a premium in the US has been 
observed even in public sector studies. The premium is observable in Canada, 
India, Singapore, the UK, Ireland and Australia. So it appears that across 
different countries the Big Six are offering a differentiated product. New 
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Zealand, South Africa and Malaysia appear to be notable exceptions. The three 
countries do not appear to have a common socio-economic and legal link which 
may explain the lack of a Big Six premium. 
During the time period covered by this study, there were economic sanctions 
against South Africa which meant that South African firms could not overtly 
invest in overseas countries. Therefore, they may have not needed audit firms 
with well known international reputations as auditors. This would mean that a 
premium for a differentiated product may not have been prevalent in this era. 
Secondly, the sample period covered a period when there were restrictions 
against advertising by audit firms. If the reputation of the audit firm is built 
through service which is communicated through advertising, lack of awareness 
may curtail the brand premium. In auditing, that may have been the reason for 
the lack of an audit fee premium for larger and generally well known firms. 
Expertise 
The coefficient of the auditor expertise factor is positive in all client sizes, but 
insignificant. It appears that there may be a premium charged by auditors when 
there is more than one client in a particular sector of the JSE. 
To examine the effects of different measurement schemes, the expertise variable 
was replaced by the number of clients audited by the incumbent audit firm in 
the auditee's JSE Sector. The coefficient changed from a positive to a negative 
in the total sample and the small auditee segment. However, it remained positive 
in the large auditee segment. There was still no improvement in its significance. 
It would seem that the expertise variable is sensitive to measurement. 
Specifically, for the sample as a whole, the binary variable captures the 
reputational effects whilst the market share metric captures the possible existence 
· of the economies of scale to auditors with expertise in a I?articular sector. The 
lack of consistency when the variable is analysed by auditee size suggests that 
reputational effects of expertise are more dominant amongst large clients. In 
contrast, economies of scale of expertise are likely to exist amongst small firms. 
However, this is counterintuitive as economies of scale should be more prevalent 
amongst large auditees. 
There might be some interaction between the audit firm size variable and the 
expertise factor. The correlation matrix shows a significant positive correlation 
between auditor size and expertise. In more than 96% of the sectors covered by 
this study, the small audit firms had only one client whilst the large audit firms 
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had a greater share of the companies in each sector. A meaningful presence of 
the small audit firms was only observed in the electronics and the development 
capital market sectors. 
When the auditor size variable is replaced by individual Big Six dummy 
variables, the expertise variable remained insignificant but became negative in 
the whole sample and the large auditee sample. It remained positive in the small 
auditee segment. This result did not change even when the measurement of the 
expertise variable was either a binary code or a continuous metric. This 
observation suggests that for large firms there may be economies of scale with 
regard to expertise in the large auditee segment whilst there is a premium for 
small audit clients. For large clients, there is greater scope for involvement of all 
major key aspects of specialisation whilst for small clients only certain aspects 
are involved which may necessitate a higher charge for small firms. 
The significant relationship between auditor size and expertise complicates the 
analysis of EXPERTISE. Regardless of what company size is being audited, the 
discussion of AUDITOR above concluded that there were economies of scale for 
large auditors. Therefore, the premium for expertise may be there, but it is also 
negated by the economies of scale. 
Internationally, the latest evidence from Gist [1994a, 1994b l supports the 
existence of a premium for auditor expertise. Similarly, in the public sector, Deis 
and Giroux [1992] and Ward et al [1994] found the existence of a premium. In 
contrast, Palmrose [1986a], using data from 1980-81, found that auditor market 
share was insignificant. This data was drawn from a period when there were 
restrictions on- advertising from audit firms. Bernstein [1988] noted that the 
emphasis of industry expertise became a major marketing point in late 1980s. 
So it is possible that the effect of industry expertise may have been muted. Since 
then, industry expertise has grown in emphasis which may account for the 
consistency of results in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As the importance of 
this variable may be influenced by marketing efforts, the restrictions on 
advertising until recently may be influencing its lack of significance. 
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Location 
Auditor location is not a significant factor influencing audit fees. In both the 
large and small auditee segments the coefficient is positive whilst in the whole 
sample it is negative. This suggests that the Johannesburg auditors of small 
companies charge more whilst Johannesburg-based auditors of large companies 
charge less. It is possible that Johannesburg auditors of small companies have a 
higher cost structure than their counterparts elsewhere. For large companies, 
their Johannesburg auditors have a lower cost structure. This could be explained 
by possible economies of scale of large auditors, most of which have large 
operations in Johannesburg. The lack of significance in the whole sample may 
be due to the inability to establish the extent of involvement of other offices in 
the audit. For example, a diversified group like Tiger Oats is based in 
Johannesburg, but it has significant interests in Cape Town and Durban. These 
divisions are audited by auditors based in these cities, which may mask the 
influence of the group auditors based in Johannesburg. To examine this factor 
more accurately, an assessment of which offices actually performed the audit, 
and in what proportions, has to be made. 
Only one study examined auditor location as a determinant of the audit fee. 
Chan et al [1993] found that the location of the auditor may be a proxy for 
their cost structure. In South Africa, auditor location has an insignificant effect 
on audit fees. This observations may have been influenced by the spread of 
audited locations whose effect on the audit fee cannot be isolated. 
Auditor change 
The auditor change variable is insignificant, but negative as expected. This 
provides weak evidence of the existence of fee cutting on initial engagements. 
The results in this case are likely to have been influenced by the small number 
of observations. 
Further tests were performed to evaluate the consistency of this finding. The 
audit fee on the first year of the engagement was compared to the prior years 
after adjusting for inflation. Secondly, differences between actual and predicted 
initial audit fees were ranked by sign using the Rank sign test. A positive sign 
denotes actual fees exceeded predicted, and a negative sign indicates that actual 
fees are lower than predicted (price cutting). The rank sign test shows a tendency 
of negative signs : four of the five observations had negative signs. However, 
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there was no statistically significant difference between the number of positive 
and negative signs. 
Of the five observations, two involved a change from one Big Six firm to 
another, two were changes from one non-Big Six firm to another, and one was a 
change from a non-Big Six firm to a Big Six firm. Below is a summary of the 
key statistics relating to the five observations. In order to evaluate if the 
companies changing auditors were significantly different from those which did 
not, differences of means were tested for all financial variables. The test results 
showed that the firms were not significantly different, with the exception of 
MAS, where firms that changed auditors had high bills for MAS. 
Table 30: Key statistics of firms changing auditors 
Audit fee 
Prior Initial Nominal Real 
Year Year Change Change 
(%) (%) 
Company l 22000 12000 -45 -52 
Company 2 30000 30000 0 -13 
Company 3 188000 260000 38 20 
Company 4 161000 117000 -27 -36 
Company 5 85000 127000 49 29 
There is a definite trend of undercutting on new engagements. Company 3 was 
involved in significant acquisitions during in the year in which auditors were 
changed. Company 5 engaged a Big Six firm (which succeeded a non-Big Six 
firm) after it was listed. The increase, instead of an expected decrease may, be 
due to reputational effects. 
When the predicted audit fee on the initial year of the engagement is compared 
to the actual, Companies 1 to 4 had a higher predicted audit fee whilst company 
5 had a lower predicted fee. However, the smallness of the sample size means 
that these results indicate weak evidence of lowballing. The positive sign for 
Company 5 suggests the possible existence of a Big Six premium. 
Internationally, studies which have focused entirely on auditor changes such as 
Ettredge and Greenberg [ 1990], Turpen [ 1990] observed fee cuts on initial 
engagements equal averaging around 20%. In contrast, studies which have 
included this variable as part of many others, e.g. Francis (1984] tended to have 
low representation of clients changing auditors. The same applies to this study. 
The effect of auditor changes will best be examined by increasing the sample 
size and studying the auditor change variable as key point of focus. 
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7 .3 The intercept term 
In a regression equation the intercept term, B0, represents the fixed cost element 
of the audit. In all three multiple and stepwise regression equations this variable 
is insignificant. In the sample as a whole it is negative whilst it is positive for both 
the large and small auditee segments. The positive signs indicate that there is a 
fixed cost attached to the audit. However, the lack of significance of the term 
implies that the fixed cost element of the audit is small or negligible. 
7.4 Summary 
The results presented here are, to a certain extent, consistent with those reported 
elsewhere. They indicate that: 
1. The size variables total assets and turnover are significant determinants of 
audit fees. Total assets is not a consistent predictor across all auditee sizes. 
2. The number of subsidiaries and associate companies is not a significant 
determinant. Secondly, the coefficient is also negative, indicating that 
there could in fact be, a negative relationship between scope complexity 
and audit fees. Balance sheet complexity, as represented by the proportion 
of assets in inventory and receivables is significant. However, it appears 
that the percentage of assets in inventories is a more important factor than 
receivables. 
3 . The number of reports depicting financial information in the annual 
reports is also a significant determinant, implying .that additional 
disclosures incur additional audit costs in annual reports. 
4. Tight audit deadlines do not impose significant audit costs as audit delay 
is negatively related to the audit fee. 
5. The only important determinant factor under the auditors' production 
function is MAS. This may be driven by the fact that: 
• purchasers of MAS tend to be large complex companies who are 
clients of Big Six audit firms; 
• Some consulting work has significant audit implications 
necessitating intensive audit effort; and 
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• Audit firms may be earning economic rents on MAS which are 
not being passed on to clients in the form of a lower audit fee. 
6. Auditor size and industry expertise does not affect significantly affect 
audit fees. 
On the whole audit fees appear to be driven by client characteristics. 
Clearly, the above contains several important implications for management and 
auditors and also points to several areas where further research is warranted or 
needed to draw firmer conclusions or to clarify and extend some of the above 
results. These implications are considered in Chapter 8. 
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8.1 Introduction 
In summing up the results of the study, it is important to bear in mind the 
purpose and the limitations within which the study was conducted. 
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The research is based on a sample of listed companies excluding the financial 
services sector and is largely exploratory in nature. The conclusions drawn can 
'only hold for listed companies. Nonetheless, it is felt that the results and 
conclusions can be of use to both management and audit practitioners. In 
addition, they set some groundwork for the future research agenda into audit 
fees. 
8.2 Summary of results 
The introductory chapter of this thesis set out four objectives for this study, and 
before proceeding on to areas of future research and conclusions arising from 
the results, it is necessary to consider what extent the results presented in Chapter 
7 met these objectives. 
8.2.1 Company specific variables 
In line with findings from other countries, auditee size and complexity are two 
key determinants of audit fees. The number of reports also affects the audit fee 
particularly amongst larger listed companies. Audited risk as proxied by 
profitability, liquidity and gearing is not significantly related to audit fees. Other 
variables included were ownership structure, the number of subsidiaries and 
associated companies and audit report opinion all of which were insignificant. 
8.2.2 Type of audit firm 
On the whole, there are significant differences between audit fees charged by the 
Big Six and the other smaller audit firms. In companies with assets less than 
RIOO million, the fees charged by the Big Six are less than those charged by 
other firms. This means that there are economies of scale in auditing that are 
exploited by large audit firms in their audit methodology. The exact nature and 
source of these economies of scale cannot be adequately determined by the 
methodology used in this study. There is also evidence of competition in the 
audit services market which would support evidence from local practitioners that 
there is competition amongst the Big Six in spite of their dominance in the 
audits of listed companies. 
8.2.3 Management advisory services 
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In general companies that buy MAS from their auditors pay higher fees than 
those that do not. This, by and large, is an international trend. This study found 
that firms that purchase MAS from their auditors tend to be large complex 
entities which are clients of the Big Six. It is suggested that the correlation may 
be influenced by the resultant audit implications from MAS provided by 
incumbent auditors. 
8.2.4 Change in auditors 
Evidence from the five companies included in the study indicate there may be 
"lowballing" with new auditors setting the audit fee at levels below that of the 
previous auditor. However, the evidence is tentative as the sample size was too 
small to draw firm conclusions. 
8.2.5 Summary 
. Overall the selected independent variables are highly significant and permit a 
reasonably good fit considering the multitude of elements which can affect the 
audit fee. The model successfully identify the most critical factors but there is 
almost 20% of the audit fee which they do not explain. The significance of the 
regression equation indicates that the model is not a statistical artefact hut 
represents an actual relationship between audit fees and the selected variables. 
The results indicate that audit fees are largely determined by client factors. This 
may have been influenced by the fact that most client characteristics are easily 
observable whilst audit firm factors can only be estimated. This study has not 
identified all the major determinants of audit fees. Non-quantitative factors 
cannot be satisfactorily factored into a quantitative model. This limits the 
assessment of personal judgement in the setting of audit fees. 
8.3 Applications of this study 
One of the key objectives of the study is to develop a model that can be used to 
judge the reasonableness of audit fees. It means that in preparing for the annual 
audit, management has to ensure that debtors and stock are either low in relation 
to total assets or have to prepare all the necessary schedules required by the 
auditor to minimise audit hours spent by the external auditors. The role of the 
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internal audit function becomes more important as their work in verifying 
debtors and stock has to be of high quality and must be adequately documented. 
This may minimise the number of hours spent by the external auditors in this 
area. 
Furthermore, when management is assessing the reasonableness of the audit fee, 
it is the finding of this research that any significant changes in debtors and 
inventories has a direct audit impact. 
Due to increasing competition a growing number of companies are inviting 
auditors to tender for audits. This requires audit firms to estimate what their 
audit fee will be in advance. A model similar to the one developed above shows 
the areas that generally influence audit fees across different companies. 
Nevertheless, fee proposals still require a comprehensive review of the particular 
characteristics of a potential client 
Having identified factors that affect audit fees across different companies, audit 
firms can use such a model to justify their annual audit fee. Both management 
and auditors would use a similar base to justify whatever fee they deem to be 
reasonable. This reduces areas of subjectivity. 
8.4 Areas of future research 
In identifying areas of future areas of research, the starting point should be an 
attempt to include variables which have not been included in this study as new 
variables. In addition, the limitations of this study have to be addressed. 
This thesis has shown the general lack of research in the area of audit practice 
in South Africa. Emanating from this the unresolved issues appear to be in: 
• Identifying proxy variables for audit risk. The financial variables used in 
the study were not significantly related to the audit fee. Therefore, 
consideration must be given to identifying other variables which may 
not be financial. 
• Identifying proxy variables for scope complexity variables. The use of 
the number of subsidiaries and associate companies gave 
counterintuitive results. Measures that should be considered are extent 
of diversification as measured by number of divisions, number of 
locations and the number of industries in which the client operates, 
among others. 
• Isolating the influence of brand name/reputational effects from 
economies of scale influences. This presents a possibility of surveying 
users of financial statements and management for their opinions on the 
determinants of audit quality. 
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• Change in auditors. In the sample used there were very few companies 
that changed auditors. As a result, the findings presented here are 
tentative at the least. Future research in this area, should increase the 
sample size and use the key factors identified in this thesis as control 
variables. 
• MAS. The influence of MAS on audit fees can be explored further 
through ascertaining the nature of advisory service and testing the 
relationships with the audit fee. With the change in legislation, it will 
now be possible to identify the exact nature of such services. This 
presents a good opportunity for research in this area. 
A critical factor in the practice of auditing and setting of fees is judgement. The 
influence of judgement means that it will never be possible to predict the audit 
fee with 100% accuracy. In order to better understand the influence of 
judgement on audit fees, subjective factors should be taken into account and 
further research be made on how they may be quantified and thus built into an 
audit fee model. 
· The research has been severely limited by the lack of output data for audit 
firms. Hence, the function has been estimated from audit fees which may not 
be an accurate indicator of the production function. This can only be done with 
the co-operation of audit firms due to the necessity of audit hours as measures 
of audit effort. 
8.5 Concluding remarks 
The auditing profession in South Africa is bound by its code of ethics to base 
their fees on costs incurred. Although there is no monitoring of these fees, it is 
possible that the actual basis of fee setting may be dependent on factors other 
than, or in addition to, the costs of the audit. However, given that client size, 
client riskiness, audit complexity are effective proxies for costs, it is suggested 
that fees are being broadly based upon costs incurred. By and large there is a 
considerable similarity in the economics of auditing across several different 
countries. This similarity may increase in due course as the internationalisation 
of auditing gathers momentum as the new millennium approaches. Although 
there is high level of concentration within the market for audit of listed 
companies, this does not appear to lead to monopoly pricing. 
184 
! 
L~ .. -~.--:_: ... ~,~~.J~-·~~- I 
Appendix 1: The Audit Process 
I 
PRE -ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITIES 
Perform new client investigation. or 
consider change in circumstances of 
existing client 
Determine skills and competence 
requirements 
Establish terms of engagement 
PLA NNING 
Obtain. or update, knowledge of the 
business 
Make a preliminary judgement of 
materiality for planning purposes 
Assess inherent risk of misstatement 
relating to each assertion 
Obtain an understanding of the 




Study those internal controls 
on which it is intended 
to place reliance 
I 
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Appendix 2: List of companies included in the study 
NAME SECTOR 
1. ACREM RETAIL 
2. ADVANCED TECHNICAL ELECTRONICS 
3. AFCOM PACKAGING PAPER 
4. AFRIKANDER LEASE GOLD 
5. AIDA HOLDINGS PROPERTY 
6. ANBEECO INVESTMENT HOLDINGS ELECTRONICS 
7. ANGLO TRANSVAAL COLLIERIES COAL 
8. AFRICAN CABLES ELECTRONICS 
9. ANGLO-AMERICAN COAL COAL 
10 APEX PROPERTY FUND PROPERTY 
11. ASSOCIATED MANGANESE FUND METALS 
12. AUDIODEK HOLDINGS ELECTRONICS 
13. AUTOQUIP GROUP RETAIL 
14. BARLOW RAND LIMITED INDHOLDINGS 
15. BARLOW RAND PROPERTIES PROPERTY 
16. BERGERS GROUP RETAIL 
17. BIDVEST IND HOLDINGS 
18. BLOCH LTD DCM 
19. BOLTON FOOTWEAR CLOTHING 
20. BOUMAT BUIIDING 
21. BOYMANS RETAIL 
.22. BRISTOL INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 
23 BTRDUNLOP INDHOLDINGS 
24. CADBURY SCHWEPPES BEVERAGES 
25. CARGO CARRIERS TRANSPORT 
26. CASHBUILD RETAIL 
27. CENMAG HOLDINGS DCM 
28. CENTERCITY PROPERTY FUND PROPERTY 
29. CITY INVESTMENT HOLDINGS DCM 
30. CLICKS STORES RETAIL 
31. CNAGALLO RETAIL 
32. CONSHU HOLDINGS CLOTHING 
33. CONSOL PAPER 
34. CULLINAN HOLDINGS INDHOLDINGS 
35. DELTA ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS 
36. DORBYL ENGINEERING 
37. EDGARS STORES RETAIL 
38. EGOLI CONSOLIDATED MINES GOLD 
39. ENVIRONMENT RESOURCES DCM 
40. FENIX INDUSTRIES CLOTHING 
41. FORIM HOLDINGS PROPERTY 
42. GENERAL OPTICAL PHARMACEUTICALS 
43. GENTYREINDUSTRIES MOTOR 
44.' GLODINA HOLDINGS CLOTHING 
45. GRINDROD UNICORN IND HOLDINGS 
46. GRINTEK ELECTRONICS 
47. GROWTH POINT PROPERTIES PROPERTY 
48. HIGHSTONE PROPERTY FUND PROPERTY 
49. HUDACO INDUSTRIES ENGINEERING 
50. IMPALA PLATINUM PLATINUM 
51. INDUSTRIAL SELECTIONS INV-TRUSTS 
52. ISCOR LIMITED STEEL 
53. JASCO ELECTRONICS 
54. JD GROUP 
55. KAROS HOTELS 
56. KNIGHTS GOLD MINING 
57. LEBOW A BAKERIES 
58. LESLIEGOLDMINING 
59. LTA 
60. MACPHAil.. HOLDINGS 
61. MARSHALS CONTROLLING INVESTMENTS 
62. MARTIN JONKER 
63. MASONITE 
64. MAXMECH MECHANICAL SEALS 
65. MICOR INDUSTRIAL CORP 
66. MIDAS 
67. MILSTAN HOLDINGS 
68. NAMIBIAN FISHING INDUSTRIES 
69. NUWORLD HOLDINGS 
70. OHIO GROUP 
71. OK BAZAARS 
72. ORYX GOLD MINING 
73. OZZLTD 
74. PEP LIMITED 
75. PENROSE HOLDINGS 
76. PLATE & GLASS SHATTERPRUFE 
77. PRESTO TRANSPORT HOLDINGS 
78. PRETORIA PORTLAND CEMENT 
79. PROGRESS INDUSTRIES 
80. RACY GROUP HOLDINGS 
81. RAND LEASES GOLD MINING 
82. RENTMEESTER BELEGGINGS 
83. ROMANO FURNITURE 







91. SONDOR INDUSTRIES 
92. SOUTH AFRICAN BREWERIES 
93. SOUTH AFRICAN FREIGHT SERVICES 
94. SPECIALITY STORES 
95. TIGER OATS 





101. W & A INVESTMENT CORPORATION 
102 WALTONS 
























































Appendix 3(a): Stepwise regression statistics for large auditees 
Independent Coefficient Standard T-Value Significant 
Variable Error Level 
Constant 1.516592 0.969430 1.5646 0.1204 
MAS 6.508E-7 1.674E-7 3.8858 0.0002 
Log Sales 0.539227 0.052702 10.2316 0.0000 
NlBT -1.216E-9 3.79E-10 -3.2093 0.0017 
INV+DEBTOR 0.779234 0.324964 2.3979 0.0181 
Reports 0.088125 0.027026 3.2607 0.0015 
Adjusted R2 = 0.7568 F-Ratio = 55.59 P-value = 0.0000 
Durbin Watson Statistic= 1.968 Standard Error of Estimate = 0.8306 
n=120 
Appendix 3(b): Stepwise regression statistics for small auditees 
Independent Coefficient Standard T-Value Significant 
Variable Error Level 
Constant -0.002566 1.14235 -0.0022 0.9982 
MAS 0.000011 3.51E-6 3.0209 0.0033 
Log Sales ·0.243749 0.06038 4.0369 0.0001 
Log Assets 0.387097 0.08551 4.5266 0.0000 
INV+DEBTOR 0.796118 0.16016 4.9566 0.0000 
Entities -1.338E-8 5.30E-8 -2.5216 0.0135 
Auditor -0.358962 0.15305 -2.3453 0.0213 
Adjusted R2 = 0.6858 F-Ratio = 33.61 P-value = 0.0000 












Adjusted R2 = 77.68 
Stepwise regression statistics using each Big Six firm as a 
dummy variable 
Coefficient Standard T-Value Significant 
Error Level 
0.944465 0.783388 1.2056 0.2297 
0.245833 0.072672 3.3828 0.0012 
0.34986 0.05511 6.3488 0.0000 
0.196238 0.064315 3.0512 0.0027 
0.651237 0.13386 4.8650 0.0000 
0.090285 0.03507 2.5745 0.0109 
0.04495 0.01473 3.0518 0.0037 
F-Ratio = 28.09 P-value = 0.0000 
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